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Abstract
The first chapter discusses the effects of uncertainty shocks on the labour market. Using US
data, I show empirically that increases in unemployment are due to both an increase in the
separation rate and a decrease in the job-finding rate. By contrast, standard search and match-
ing models predict an increase in the job finding rate in response to an increase in the cross-
sectional dispersion of firms’ productivity levels. To explain observed responses in labour
market transition rates, I develop a search and matching model in which heterogeneous firms
face a decreasing returns to scale technology, firms can hire multiple workers, and job flows do
not necessarily coincide with worker flows. Costly job creation is key to obtaining a decrease
in the job-finding rate after an increase in uncertainty. Standard numerical solution techniques
cannot be used to obtain an accurate solution efficiently and I propose an alternative algorithm
to overcome this problem.
The second chapter studies business cycles when markets are incomplete, nominal wages
do not respond one-for-one to price level changes, and labour markets are characterized by
matching frictions. During recessions, idiosyncratic labour income risk increases as workers
worry about being unemployed. This induces workers to save more. We allow such precau-
tionary savings – in principle – to end up in both an unproductive asset (money) and a produc-
tive assets (firm ownership). The increased demand for money puts deflationary pressure on
prices. If nominal wages are not sufficiently responsive to deflationary pressures, wage costs
and the unemployment rate are pushed up, which in turn intensifies the fear of becoming
unemployed. Unemployment benefits improve welfare in our economy.
The third chapter analyses the inefficiencies created in a search and matching model that
allows for on-the-job search. First, the Hosios rule for the efficient level of the worker’s bar-
gaining power is adapted in a simple model. As the average gain of a new match is lower
when some job seekers already have a job, the efficient level of labour market tightness should
be lower and the worker’s bargaining power higher than in a model devoid of on-the-job
search. Second, the decision of when to perform on-the-job search is endogenised. Too much
on-the-job search is taking place, because workers do not fully incorporate their current firms’
loss when they quit. Partial wage commitment improves the efficiency of the on-the-job search
decision and the efficient level can be obtained.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks
on the Job-Finding Rate and
Separation Rate
1.1 Introduction
There has been recent interest in the importance of uncertainty shocks on macroeconomic vari-
ables. In particular, it has been suggested that an increase in uncertainty during the Great
Recession has contributed to higher unemployment. There are two channels through which
uncertainty shocks can affect the unemployment rate. First, it is possible that higher uncer-
tainty increases the job separation rate so that employed workers are more likely to lose their
jobs. Second, higher uncertainty could reduce the job-finding rate, which makes it harder for
the unemployed to find a job. In my empirical analysis, I confirm that higher uncertainty re-
duces employment. This reduction is driven by both a higher separation rate of workers and a
lower job-finding rate of unemployed. The reduced job-finding rate contributes more to higher
unemployment than the separation rate after an increase in uncertainty. Existing search and
matching models of the labour market cannot account for this significant contribution of the
job-finding rate.
In the literature, there are several measures of uncertainty both on the micro-level and on
the macro-level. In the context of this chapter, higher uncertainty means a higher expected
and higher realized dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity across firms. Bloom, Floetotto,
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2014) use microdata to show that plant-level shocks
become more dispersed in recessions. This makes recessions, and in particular the Great Re-
cession, appear to be a combination of a negative first-moment shock and a positive second-
moment shock at the establishment-level.
An increase in dispersion of productivity across firms implies that more firms get hit by
large negative shocks that lead to the layoff of workers. This so-called realized volatility effect
raises the separation rate in times of higher uncertainty. At the same time it also means that
more firms experience large positive shocks, which can increase hiring. Therefore, a reduc-
tion of the job-finding rate as seen in the data cannot be explained by the realized volatility
effect. In contrast, what is known as the “wait-and-see” effect has the potential to reduce the
11
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job-finding rate: if firms are more uncertain about future realizations of productivity, they
might become reluctant to hire workers in the presence of adjustment costs. This happens if
higher uncertainty reduces the expected continuation value of a newly hired worker.1 For a
model to explain the fall of the job-finding rate, it is important that a wait-and-see effect that
makes firms more reluctant to hire exists and that it is sufficiently strong relative to the realized
volatility effect.
The standard search and matching model assumes constant returns to scale, which rules
out meaningful heterogeneity in firm size. If there are no idiosyncratic shocks, firm size is ir-
relevant and not pinned down. If there are idiosyncratic productivity shocks, as in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), firms cannot be allowed to employ an unrestricted amount of workers.
Because if it were possible to hire more workers at a given productivity level, the most produc-
tive firm would hire all workers. An implication of this restriction to hire additional workers
is that the value of a matched worker to a firm increases without bounds with idiosyncratic
productivity. In contrast, if the firm experiences low productivity in a future period, it has the
option to destroy the match. Therefore, the lower bound for the value of the match is 0. This
asymmetry turns out to be important for the effect of uncertainty on labour market variables.
If volatility of idiosyncratic productivity increases, more matches are destroyed by sufficiently
negative realizations of productivity. Therefore, the realized volatility effect increases the sep-
aration rate. In addition, the absence of an upper bound implies that the expected value of a
match increases. Hence the wait-and-see effect makes firms more reluctant to fire but it actu-
ally increases the expected value of a new match. This last effect increases vacancy posting and
the job-finding rate in response to higher volatility, which is at odds with patterns observed in
the data.
I develop a more general framework which does allow for meaningful heterogeneity across
firms. In particular, I assume that a firm’s production function exhibits decreasing returns
to scale, which means that there can be idiosyncratic productivity shocks without restricting
firms in the number of workers they can hire. In equilibrium, firms with various levels of
idiosyncratic productivity will hire workers if they are small relative to their productivity,
because their marginal product is high. To be precise, firms hire workers until the marginal
value of an additional worker equals the hiring cost.
In this model, it is possible for the wait-and-see effect to reduce hirings if higher uncer-
tainty reduces the marginal value of a worker. The marginal value of a worker consists of the
marginal profit in the current period plus the expected continuation value the firm gets from
the worker being at the firm in the next period. To understand the expected continuation value
of a match it is important to consider the contribution of this one worker in future periods for
different realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Imagine a firm becomes very
productive in the next period. In the standard framework, this means that the match becomes
very valuable for the firm. In a framework in which the firm is allowed to hire more than one
worker, however, the marginal value of one additional worker can never exceed the hiring
cost of an additional worker. In this case, the continuation value of a worker hired in the cur-
rent period will be equal to the discounted hiring cost that the firm saves in the next period.
The ability to hire additional workers, when productivity is high, is of course valuable to the
1By the same logic, firms become more reluctant to fire workers if the expected continuation value increases in
times of higher uncertainty because large improvements of productivity become more likely. The firm can wait for
such a shock and fire the worker in the future if productivity deteriorates.
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firm. But what matters for a firm’s optimal choice is the value of the marginal match and this
value is bounded by the option to hire additional workers.This puts an upper bound on the
continuation value of a worker when the firm becomes highly productive.
The upper bound of the marginal value function is a key difference compared to the stan-
dard framework. It is an implication of the option to hire additional workers, comparable
to the lower bound of the continuation value implied by the option of destroying matches.
The upper bound introduces a concave part to the marginal value function, which has impor-
tant implications for the question of how uncertainty affects the job-finding rate. Due to the
concavity, it is possible that higher idiosyncratic volatility reduces the value of the marginal
worker. In turn, this reduces the number of vacancies posted by the firm and the job-finding
rate for the unemployed.
In my model, I distinguish between workers and the positions they fill. There are sunk
costs of creating a position. They do not have to be paid again when a firm wants to replace
a worker that leaves. For example, if a worker turns out to be not a good match for the firm,
or if he finds a job at another firm, his workplace still exists at the previous firm. It is then less
costly for the firm to hire a new worker who does the same task. The creation cost could be
interpreted as the share of capital needed for a position that cannot be recovered if it is shut
down, or as the cost of finding new clients when a firm increases its size. As a result of this
sunk cost, some firms in my model will fill existing empty positions even though they do not
want to create new positions. These firms shrink over time, because some of their positions
become obsolete. But they still hire workers, because the quit rate of existing workers exceeds
the rate of obsolescence. This is consistent with differences between worker and job flows as
documented by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2012): using JOLTS establishment data,
they calculate that hires amount to around 10% of employment at shrinking establishments on
a quarterly basis.
I show that the creation cost is important for the response of the job-finding rate to uncer-
tainty shocks, because it strengthens the wait-and-see effect: as explained above, the marginal
value of a position is bounded from above by the cost of creation, because the firm always has
the option to create another position. The marginal value is at the upper bound, if a firm cre-
ates positions in the current period. Therefore, it does not increase if that firm becomes more
productive in the future. In contrast, negative productivity shocks reduce the marginal value
of a position. Higher uncertainty thus reduces the expected marginal value, making firms
more reluctant to create positions and hire workers. But in order for the wait-and-see effect
to be quantitatively important, it is necessary that interior continuation values are sufficiently
likely.2
Due to the cost of creating positions in my framework, a firm becomes less likely to destroy
positions after a negative shock. It will rather keep the existing positions and workers, and it
might even want to fill empty positions when workers quit. In these cases, the marginal value
of a position takes an interior value. Then higher uncertainty can have significant negative
effects on the expected marginal value of a position created today, and this strong wait-and-
see effect can reduce the number of posted vacancies. As a result, the job-finding rate falls
as observed in the data. The wait-and-see effect also becomes stronger for those firms that
2If the continuation value was at its uppper bound after each positive productivity shock and at its lower bound
after each negative productivity shock, increasing the variance of the productivity shock would not affect the expected
value. The reason is that the continuation value would neither be strictly concave nor convex but flat at the realized
values.
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want to fire workers. This means that they reduce the number of workers that they fire which
dampens the increase of the separation rate due to the realized volatility effect. As a result, the
separation rate contributes less to changes in unemployment in accordance with the data.
In the absence of the creation cost, the job-finding rate hardly reacts to changes in uncer-
tainty. In this case, higher uncertainty increases unemployment only because of a higher sep-
aration rate. When the cost is sufficiently large, however, the model can generate a significant
drop of the job-finding rate in times of higher uncertainty. Then my model is not only able to
explain the changes of the unemployment rate in the last decade, but it can also account for
the steep drop in the job-finding rate during the Great Recession.
My model is related to the literature on multi-worker firm models with decreasing returns
to scale and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Examples of random search models include
Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007), Elsby and Michaels (2013), and Fujita and Najajima
(2014), whereas Schaal (2012) and Kaas and Kircher (2014) assume directed search. The dif-
ference in my model is that it is costly for firms to create positions, which is an important
assumption to explain the falling job-finding rate in times of higher uncertainty. With the ex-
ception of Schaal (2012), these papers do not consider uncertainty shocks. Schaal (2012) shows
that it is difficult to explain the changes of the unemployment rate during the Great Recession
while matching observed labour productivity, when only aggregate productivity shocks are
used. His model with uncertainty shocks can explain the increase of the unemployment rate
better. But it cannot explain the reduction of the job-finding rate during the Great Recession
which means that the increase of the unemployment rate is primarily driven by a higher sep-
aration rate. Because of the creation cost present in my framework, the job-finding rate falls in
response to higher uncertainty, which fits the observed data better.
This chapter also contributes to the literature of solving heterogeneous agents models with
aggregate shocks by extending the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm. In these models, ag-
gregate outcomes can depend on the distribution of agents, which is an infinite-dimensional
object. In my model, a firm’s optimal choice depends on current and future values of market
tightness, which is the ratio between vacancies and unemployed. Therefore, a law of motion
for market tightness is needed. The distribution of firms over idiosyncratic productivity and
firm size becomes more dispersed due to the creation cost. As a result, approximating the dis-
tribution of firms only using its first moment is not accurate for explaining the demand of firms
for new hires conditional on aggregate productivity and uncertainty. Higher moments cannot
capture the characeristics of the distribution well, either. Instead of adding many higher mo-
ments, I add the observed residual between estimated market tightness and its market clearing
value to the state space.3 It captures the information that is lost by approximating the distri-
bution with its first moment. As the residual is highly autocorrelated, it is useful in predicting
future values of market tightness. Intuitively, if firms underestimate the current value of mar-
ket tightness due to the omitted information, they also expect market tightness to be below its
predicted values in the next periods.
In addition to reducing forecast errors, using the residual method also means that market
clearing can easily be imposed in each period of a simulation: in contrast to higher moments
of the distribution, the residual is not predetermined at the beginning of the period. Demand
3Predicting the demand of firms for new hires is equivalent to predicting market tightness because the number
of (un)employed is in the state space. It is important for firms to accurately predict market tightness because it
determines their cost of filling vacant positions.
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of firms for new hires is downward sloping in the residual, because a higher residual means
a higher market clearing value of market tightness by construction. This allows solving for
the residual in each period such that aggregate demand of new hires equals aggregate supply
exactly.
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides evidence on the effects of
uncertainty shocks on the job-finding rate and the separation rate in the US. Section 1.3 de-
scribes the model and derives the optimal choice of firms. Section 1.4 describes the calibration
that is used. In section 1.5, I show the effects of uncertainty shocks in my model. I analyze
how good the model can fit the US data from 1998-2013 in section 1.6. Section 1.7 describes the
algorithm that I develop to solve the model. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Effects of uncertainty in US data
In this section, I construct a measure for uncertainty based on the implied volatility of US
stock options. I then use it to estimate impulse response functions of labour market transition
rates following uncertainty shocks. In the theoretical model, uncertainty refers to the second
moment of productivity on the firm level. Therefore, I want to construct a measure based on
the volatility of individual firms as opposed to the volatility of an index of firms.4,5
I use data on implied volatility of US stocks, available from 1996 to the second quarter of
2013. For each firm, I calculate the quarterly average of log implied volatility of its call options
with a maturity of 30 days. Allowing for firm fixed effects, I estimate time dummy variables
for each quarter. The resulting time-series is shown in figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Index of implied volatility constructed from US stock options.
The constructed measure for uncertainty is used to estimate a VAR including volatility,
labour productivity, and quarterly averages of the job-finding rate and separation rate. The
following Cholesky ordering is used to identify volatility shocks: I assume that labour pro-
ductivity does not react instantaneously to volatility shocks and shocks to the labour market
transition rates. Furthermore, volatility may only react to shocks in the transition rates with a
4For example, the VIX measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index. To the extent that idiosyncratic firm
shocks are uncorrelated, higher volatility at the firm level does not translate into higher volatility of the index because
of diversification.
5Leahy and Whited (1996) and Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) use the volatility of stock returns as a measure
of uncertainty. An advantage of using the implied volatility of options is that it is a forward-looking measure, but it
is not available as far back in time.
1.2. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN US DATA 16
one period lag.6
-.05
0
.05
.1
.15
0 5 10 15 20
volatility
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
quarters
-.002
0
.002
.004
.006
0 5 10 15 20
labour productivity
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
quarters
-.1
-.05
0
.05
0 5 10 15 20
job-finding rate
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
quarters
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
0 5 10 15 20
separation rate
lo
g-
ch
an
ge
quarters
IRF volatility shock
IRF 95% CI
Figure 1.2: Impulse response functions after a volatility shock in US data.
Figure 1.2 shows the impulse response functions after a one standard deviation shock to
volatility. The job-finding rate falls and the separation rate increases. Both effects contribute
to an increase in unemployment following an increase in volatility. Note that the response of
the separation rate peaks earlier than the job-finding rate, whose fall is more persistent. Its
relative change is initially stronger but after a couple of quarters the job-finding rate changes
more. These relative changes determine how much the unemployment rate is affected by the
shock. As shown in appendix 1.A.2, the following approximation holds:
log
u
u¯
≈ (1− u¯)
(
log
s
s¯
− log f
f¯
)
. (1.1)
This means that a 1% increase of the separation rate affects the unemployment rate by as much
as a 1% decrease of the job-finding rate. Intuitively, this holds because flows into and out of
unemployment are equal on average. For the changes of the job-finding rate and separation
rate shown in figure 1.2 this means that the peak response of the unemployment rate is slightly
less than 40% times the increase in uncertainty.
Table 1.1 lists the forecast-error variance decomposition of the job-finding rate and the
separation rate. The contribution of uncertainty shocks to the job-finding rate is comparable
to productivity shocks for horizons of 8 or more quarters. For the separation rate, uncertainty
shocks contribute about 3 times as much as productivity shocks, except for the first quarter.
6Appendix 1.A.3 shows that the results are robust to changing the Cholesky order, as well as using a different
measure for uncertainty, and different detrending of the data.
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Forecast Horizon Job-finding Rate Separation Rate
(quarters) Uncertainty Productivity Uncertainty Productivity
1 0.5% 2.7% 4.8% 5.2%
4 10.7% 18.4% 26.0% 9.4%
8 24.8% 24.4% 28.1% 9.3%
12 27.3% 29.6% 28.2% 9.0%
Table 1.1: Forecast error variance decomposition of job-finding rate and separation rate due to uncertainty and productivity shocks.
The negative effect of higher uncertainty on the job-finding rate that I find is in line with
other results in the literature. Recent empirical studies by Guglielminetti (2015) and Mecikovsky
and Meier (2015) use different measures for uncertainty and find similar effects. Guglielminetti
(2015) uses a survey-based measure of uncertainty. In a trivariate VAR, she finds that the
job-finding rate falls after an increase in uncertainty. Mecikovsky and Meier (2015) use the
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty in the US proposed by Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng
(2015). They find that job creation falls, wheras job destruction increases in response to higher
uncertainty.
1.3 Model
This section describes the framework and derives the equations that are needed to solve the
model.
1.3.1 Setup
There is a constant unit mass of workers, who search for jobs when they are unemployed and
earn wages when they are employed. They are assumed to be risk-neutral. Workers can lose
their job for two reasons. First, they can be fired when their employer experiences a suffi-
ciently negative productivity shock that makes the match unprofitable. Second, it is assumed
that not all separations are due to low productivity of the job. With a certain exogenous prob-
ability workers quit their job at the end of each period. In both cases, workers that become
unemployed enter the unemployment pool in the next period, and can potentially find a new
job.
I consider a constant mass of firms that can each hire multiple workers.7 Firms post vacan-
cies and matching takes place according to a constant returns to scale matching function. The
matching function can be fully characterised by the probability q (θ) that a vacancy is filled,
where labour market tightness θ is the ratio vu of posted vacancies and unemployed workers.
There are two types of costs that a firm incurs when it wants to increase its size. First, it has to
pay a cost H for each position that it creates. Second, it has to pay a cost c for each vacancy it
posts in order to fill empty positions. The firm takes labour market tightness and the implied
probability of filling each vacancy as given.
In each period, a share δ of positions becomes obsolete. In this case also the workers who
filled the positions, leave the firm. In addition, a share λ of workers quit without rendering
7There is no firm entry and exit in my model. This simplification can be justified by the low cyclicality of job
creation at start-ups as documented by Coles and Kelishomi (2011). Similarly, Fujita and Najajima (2014) argue that
cyclical fluctuations of job flows are mostly accounted for by the expansion or contraction of existing establishments.
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the respective positions obsolete. In this case, the firm can hire another worker for a now
vacant position and it only incurs the hiring cost cq(θ) but not the creation cost H.
8 A firm can
also endogenously fire workers and shut down their positions without any cost, if it wants to
reduce its size.9
For simplicity, I assume that a law of large numbers holds when the firm posts vacancies.
That is the firm can fill each empty position for sure by posting 1q(θ) vacancies. Therefore, the
cost of filling an empty position is cq(θ) .
10 Firms are not allowed to keep an empty position
idle. If it does not want to fill an empty position, it has to close it, and pay the cost H again if it
wants to reopen it in the future. Even though firms cannot mothball positions, the distinction
between positions and workers makes the model more interesting. Now each firm has to
decide at the beginning of the period whether it wants to fill its empty positions. Firms that
are relatively productive will decide to fill these positions whereas other firms will close at
least some of them. As a result, some firms hire workers, while not creating new positions
or even shrinking due to obsolescence. This is in line with the empirical results of Davis,
Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2012). They find for shrinking establishments that hires amount
to around 10% of employment on a quarterly basis.
The production function takes the form zxF (n), where z is the aggregate productivity and
x the idiosyncratic productivity component. Both follow a Markov process. The total wage
bill is denoted by W. The wage equation is specified in equation (1.18). In general, it depends
on both firm-specific and aggregate variables. The total wage bill is increasing in the number
of workers and in firm productivity. In addition, it is increasing in aggregate productivity
and market tightness. These are typical properties of wage equations in search and matching
models, when workers and firms bargain over the surplus of their match. First, workers get
a higher wage when the firm is more productive. Second, they get a higher wage when mar-
ket tightness is high, as it would be easier for a worker to find a new job when he becomes
unemployed, whereas it is more difficult for the firm to replace the worker.
The timing in each period is as follows: at the beginning of the period, a firm with n−1 po-
sitions has (1− λ) n−1 workers that fill them. The remaining λn−1 positions are empty. Then,
the shocks of the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity processes materialise. Afterwards,
the firm has to decide, whether it wants to create new positions. In addition, it has to decide
8Fujita and Ramey (2007) also assume a one-off cost of creating positions, which has to be paid before posting
vacancies. After separations that are not due to obsolescence, empty positions can be filled again. The important
difference with my framework is that firms are not subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and operate at constant
returns to scale in Fujita and Ramey (2007). As a result, the value of each empty position always equals its cost of
creation, which makes the model very tractable. But the lack of meaningful firm heterogeneity would not allow to
analyze the effects of increases in idiosyncratic volatility. In contrast to Fujita and Ramey (2007), I do not assume that
the cost of creating positions increases in the total number of positions created.
9I assume throughout the chapter that a cost is incurred when a position is created. It is a minor change to the
model to let firms pay a cost when it closes positions instead. The results when a destruction cost is used instead of
the creation cost, are very similar for the following reason. When a firm opens a position, it knows that with certain
probabilities it will destroy it in future periods when it becomes sufficiently unproductive. Therefore, when there is a
destruction cost instead of the creation cost, the firm takes into account the net present value of this future destruction
cost upon creating positions. The resulting optimal creation of positions becomes similar even though the firm only
incurs the cost when it destroys the position. Figure 1.22 in appendix 1.B.1 shows the results of the comparative statics
exercise when a destruction cost is used.
10In an earlier version of this chapter, I assumed that vacant positions only get filled gradually. This means that
both the number of filled and the number of empty positions become state variables of each firm. Adding another
state variable makes the numerical solution of the firm’s problem more costly. The impact of assuming that firms
can fill positions immediately on the results are likely to be small for the following reasons. First, it does not take
firms long to fill vacancies on average. For example, den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) use a quarterly job-filling
rate of 0.71, which is in line with the filling probability found by van Ours and Ridder (1992) for establishments in the
Netherlands. Second, a firm that creates new positions is at an interior solution to its optimization problem. Therefore,
small deviations from its optimal size do not have large effects on its value.
1.3. MODEL 19
how many of its empty positions it wants to fill.11 The firm shuts down all vacant positions
that it does not want to fill. In the next step, the matching process takes place. Afterwards, the
firm can fire workers and close their positions.12 Then production takes place. The number
of workers in the production phase is denoted by n∗. After production, a fraction δ of posi-
tions becomes obsolete and the respective workers become unemployed. Finally, a fraction λ
of workers quits. Hence, the firm begins the next period with (1− δ) n∗ positions, filled with
(1− λ) (1− δ) n∗ workers.
Let s denote the aggregate state. It summarizes the current realization of the aggregate
shocks as well as the distribution of positions and idiosyncratic productivity across firms. Let
V (n−1, x, s) denote the value of a firm with n−1 positions at the beginning of the period and
idiosyncratic productivity x, when the aggregate state is s.13 It can be written recursively as
V (n−1, x, s) = maxn zxF (n)−W (n, x, s)− (n− (1− λ) n−1)+
c
q (θ (s))
− (n− n−1)+ H + ...
+βE
[
V
(
(1− δ) n, x′, s′) |x, s] , (1.2)
where I use the shorthand notation (y)+ := max {y, 0}. The firm’s per period profit is given
by the difference between production and the total wage bill reduced by the cost of filling
(n− (1− λ) n−1)+ positions and the cost of creating (n− n−1)+ positions. The continuation
value is given by the expected discounted value of a firm with (1− δ) n positions at the begin-
ning of next period.
Note that there are two kinks in the objective function that the firm wants to maximise.
The first kink appears when n = (1− λ) n−1. Then the firm does not fill any of its empty
positions, but it also does not fire any of its existing workers. The second kink occurs when
n = n−1. In this case, the size of the firm stays exactly the same within the period. It fills all its
existing empty positions, but it does not create any new positions. The firm’s optimal choice
could be either at one of these two kinks or in one of the following three regions, into which
the two kinks separate the possible number of positions. First, the optimal n∗ could be below
the first kink at (1− λ) n−1. This means that the firm fires existing workers. Second, n∗ could
be between the two kinks. In this case, the firm fills some but not all of its empty positions,
and it does not create any new positions. Third, if n∗ is above the second kink at n−1, the firm
creates new positions and posts vacancies to fill all empty positions. In the next subsection, I
will distinguish these five cases for the optimal choice of the firm. I derive an equation for the
optimal choice of positions n∗ and the marginal value of a position in each case.
Figure 1.3 shows an example for the resulting marginal value function. The maximum
value of an additional position at the beginning of the period is given by the cost the firm
saves by not having to create this position and not having to hire the respective worker filling
it. The minimum value for the marginal value of a position is 0, because the firm can always
destroy it and fire the worker without cost. These upper and lower bounds play an important
role when uncertainty changes. In particular, the upper bound only exists, because firms have
the option to hire additional workers in my framework. The result is a concave part of the
11It is always optimal for a firm that creates new positions to also fill its empty positions.
12Firing takes place after the matching process such that only workers who were unemployed at the beginning of
the period can be matched in that period. When I calibrate the model, one period corresponds to one week, such that
this assumption is quantitatively not important.
13A firm with n−1 positions at the beginning of the period employs (1− λ) n−1 workers, because all positions were
filled in the last production phase and a share λ of workers has quit afterwards.
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marginal value function. Then, higher uncertainty can potentially reduce the expected future
marginal value.
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Figure 1.3: Marginal value of a position (including 1− λ workers) for a given level of idiosyncratic productivity x and
aggregate state s.
1.3.2 Solution to firm problem
Let J (n−1, x, s) :=
∂V(n−1,x,s)
∂n−1 denote the marginal value of an additional position at the begin-
ning of the period. To keep notation simpler, let Π (n, x, s) := zxF (n)−W (n, x, s) denote the
firm’s revenue minus the total wage bill. Because of the kinks in the hiring costs, one has to
distinguish five possible outcomes, when characterising the optimal employment decision n∗
and the marginal value of an additional position:
1. n∗ < (1− λ) n−1. The firm fires workers. In this case, the number of positions is reduced
until marginal profit in the current period and the expected future marginal profit sum
to zero. The optimal number of positions n∗ is then implicitly given by
∂Π
∂n
(n∗, x, s) + β (1− δ)E [J ((1− δ) n∗, x′, s′) |x, s] = 0, (1.3)
J (n−1, x, s) = 0. (1.4)
In this case the marginal value of a position J reaches its lower bound 0.
2. n∗ = (1− λ) n−1. The firm keeps all its existing workers, but does not fill any empty
positions. In this case, the marginal value of a worker must be positive but less than the
hiring cost cq so that the firm neither wants to fire workers nor fill empty positions. The
marginal value of beginning the period with an additional position created in the past,
being filled with (1− λ) workers, is given by the sum of current marginal profit of these
workers and the expected future marginal value of additional (1− λ) (1− δ) positions
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in the next period:
n∗ = (1− λ) n−1, (1.5)
J (n−1, x, s) = (1− λ)
{
∂Π
∂n
(n∗, x, s) + β (1− δ)E [J ((1−δ)n∗ ,x′ ,s′) |x, s]
}
(1.6)
∈
(
0, (1− λ) c
q (θ (s))
)
.
In this case the firm is inactive with respect to both creating and filling positions. As
long as it stays in this inaction region, its size is reduced by the factor (1− λ) (1− δ)
each period because of exogenous quits of workers and obsolescence of positions.
3. n∗ ∈ ((1− λ) n−1, n−1). The firm fills some of its empty positions and shuts down the
others. The optimal number of positions is determined by the condition that the marginal
current and future expected profit of an additional worker equals its hiring cost cq . The
marginal value of an additional position at the beginning of the period is equal to the
saved cost of hiring (1− λ) workers:
∂Π
∂n
(n∗, x, s) + β (1− δ)E [J ((1− δ) n∗, x′, s′) |x, s] = c
q (θ (s))
, (1.7)
J (n−1, x, s) = (1− λ) cq (θ (s)) . (1.8)
This means that the marginal values of a position is constant between (1− λ) n−1 and
n−1. The reason is that the firm does not want to fill all its empty positions. Then, the
marginal value of an additional position at the beginning of the period only stems from
the (1− λ) workers that it is filled with. They reduce the hiring cost by (1− λ) cq .
4. n∗ = n−1. The firm keeps and fills all existing empty positions, but it does not create new
positions. In this case, the marginal value of a position must exceed the hiring cost for
filling but be less than H + (1− λ) cq so that it lies below the cost of creating and filling
positions. The marginal value of an additional position created in the past is given by the
sum of current marginal profit of the marginal worker (including the filling cost for the
empty positions) and the expected future marginal value of additional (1− δ) positions
in the next period:
n∗ = n−1, (1.9)
J (n−1, x, s) =
∂Π
∂n
(n∗, x, s)− λ c
q (θ (s))
+ β (1− δ)E [J ((1−δ)n∗ ,x′ ,s′) |x, s] (1.10)
∈
(
(1− λ) c
q (θ (s))
, H + (1− λ) c
q (θ (s))
)
.
In this case, the firm is inactive only with respect to creating positions. As long as it
stays in this inaction region, its size is reduced by a factor (1− δ) each period because of
obsolescence of positions.
5. n∗ > n−1. The firm opens new positions and fills all empty positions. Its optimal size
is determined by the condition that the cost of creating and filling an additional position
equals its marginal current and expected future marginal profit. The marginal value of a
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position created in the past, filled with (1− λ) workers, is the sum of the saved creation
cost and filling cost:
∂Π
∂n
(n∗, x, s) + β (1− δ)E [J ((1−δ)n∗ ,x′ ,s′) |x, s] = H + c
q (θ (s))
, (1.11)
J (n−1, x, s) = H + (1− λ) cq (θ (s)) . (1.12)
Note that in this case the marginal value of a position J reaches its maximum value
H + (1− λ) cq . This upper bound is important in explaining why the job-finding rate can
fall in response to higher uncertainty.
In summary, the marginal value function has to satisfy
J (n−1, x, s) = min
{
H+ (1−λ)cq(θ(s)) ,max
{
JF(n−1,x,s) , min
{
(1−λ)c
q(θ(s)) , max {JK(n−1,x,s) , 0}
}}}
. (1.13)
where JK and JF denote the right hand side values of equations (1.6) and (1.10): JK is the
marginal value that results, if the firm keeps all its workers but is inactive with respect to
filling positions (n∗ = (1− λ) n−1), and JF is the marginal value, if the firm fills all empty
positions but is inactive with respect to creating new positions (n∗ = n−1).
Note that the third case, in which some but not all of the empty positions are refilled,
is relatively unimportant when the length of the period is chosen to be short. In the limit
of a continuous time variant, the interval ((1− λ) n−1, n−1) collapses, and one would only
distinguish between firms that fire workers, those that do not fill empty positions and thus
shrink at rate λ+ δ, those that refill empty positions and shrink at rate δ, and those that create
new positions.
1.3.3 Characterisation of the optimal firm behaviour using three cutoffs
Given the marginal value function derived above, the optimal behaviour of a firm can be
summarised by three cutoffs, that determine how many positions firms want to create, how
many positions they want to fill, and how many workers they want to fire. These cutoffs are
functions of idiosyncratic productivity x and the aggregate state s . If the number of positions
at the beginning of the period is small, a firm will create positions until the number of positions
is equal to the lower bound nLB (x, s). This cutoff is implicitly given by the condition that the
marginal value JF of a firm that fills all position is exactly equal to the upper bound of the
marginal value function:
JF (nLB (x, s) , x, s) = H + (1− λ) cq (θ (s)) . (1.14)
If the initial number of positions lies above the lower cutoff, the firm will be inactive with
respect to creating new positions but it will fill all empty positions as long as the marginal
value JF is greater than (1− λ) cq . This condition implicitly defines the middle cutoff nMB (x, s):
JF (nMB (x, s) , x, s) = (1− λ) cq (θ (s)) . (1.15)
The third cutoff, nUB (x, s), determines the upper bound of positions in the firm. The firm
does not fire existing workers, as long as the marginal value JK is positive. The upper bound
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is implicitly defined by
JK (nUB (x, s) , x, s) = 0. (1.16)
With these three cutoffs, the optimal firm behaviour can be summarised as follows: if a
firm with productivity x has fewer than nLB positions at the beginning of the period, it creates
the difference nLB − n−1 and fills all of them. If its initial positions are between nLB and nMB
it is inactive with respect to the number of positions and it fills the λn−1 empty positions
it initially has. If the number of initial positions lies between nMB and
nMB
1−λ , it fills its empty
positions only up to nMB and shuts down the remaining ones. If the number of initial positions
lies between nMB1−λ and nUB, the firm closes all open positions but keeps its workers. This means
that the number of positions is reduced to (1− λ) n−1. If the firm initially has more positions,
it reduces its size to (1− λ) nUB, which also involves firing workers. Table 1.2 summarises the
optimal behaviour of a firm and figure 1.4 illustrates the optimal choice of positions n∗ given
positions at the beginning of the period n−1.14
n−1 n∗ workers hired workers fired
< nLB nLB nLB − (1− λ) n−1 0
∈ [nLB, nMB) n−1 λn−1 0
∈
[
nMB,
nMB
1−λ
)
nMB nMB − (1− λ) n−1 0
∈
[
nMB
1−λ , nUB
)
(1− λ) n−1 0 0
≥ nUB (1− λ) nUB 0 (1− λ) (n−1 − nUB)
Table 1.2: Summary of firm’s optimal choice of positions n∗ , and the number of workers hired and fired, depending on number of
positions at the beginning of the period n−1.
n
−1
n*
nLB nMB nUB
nLB
nMB
(1−λ)nUB
n*
=n −
1
n*
=(1−
λ)n −1
optimal policy
Figure 1.4: Optimal choice of positions for a given level of idiosyncratic productivity.
The cutoffs are increasing in x as higher idiosyncratic productivity makes the marginal
position more valuable in a given aggregate state. Figure 1.5 provides an example of the three
cutoffs and the optimal decision of firms.
14Note that this describes the optimal choice of positions within a period. Between periods, a fraction δ of positions
is destroyed. Therefore, the number of positions at the beginning of the next period is (1− δ) n∗.
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Figure 1.5: Cutoffs nLB(x), nMB(x), and nUB(x) for a given aggregate state.
1.3.4 Market clearing
In equilibrium, the following market clearing condition has to hold: the mass of workers that
firms want to hire must be equal to the number of newly matched unemployed according to
the matching function. Let Fs (ni,−1, xi) denote the distribution of positions and idiosyncratic
productivity across firms in the aggregate state s. Then∫
ni,−1
∫
xi
(n∗ (ni,−1, xi, s)− (1− λ) ni,−1)+ dFs (ni,−1, xi) = M (u (s) , v (s)) (1.17)
must hold in all possible states s, where M (u, v) is the number of matches when the mass
of unemployed is u and the mass of posted vacancies is v. It is important to ensure that this
condition is satisfied when the economy is simulated in the numerical solution. In section 1.7,
I describe the algorithm that I develop to ensure market clearing exctly.15
1.4 Parametrization
The model is parametrized to US data. In section 1.6, I compare the results from the model
with the corresponding time series in the US. Because the probability for unemployed to find
a job within a month is close to 50%, I choose a high frequency for my model. This allows
unemployed to find a job in less than a month. In particular, I use a weekly parametrization
like Elsby and Michaels (2013) with a discount factor β = 0.999.16
I calibrate the model for various values of the cost of creating positions H. In the next sec-
tions, I will compare the results for those different values of H. Most of the parameters are held
constant across calibrations, and they are summarised in table 1.3. There are three parameters
that I recalibrate in order to meet the following three targets across calibrations: in the absence
15This is important because differences between aggregate supply and aggregate demand might accumulate over
time in a simulation.
16This is equivalent to a yearly interest rate of 5.3%.
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of aggregate shocks, the unemployment rate should be 6.5%, the job-finding rate should be
11.25%, and the cost of filling a vacancy should be 14% of the average quarterly wage.17 In
order to meet these targets, I choose ω3 in the wage equation, the standard deviation σ¯x of the
idiosyncratic shock, and the mass of firms, as described below. The resulting parameters for
different values of H are listed in table 1.4.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.999 Discount factor
η 0.6 Elasticity of matching function (M (u, v) = µuηv1−η)
µ 0.128 Scale of matching function (job-finding rate a (0.72) = 0.1125)
c 0.156 Vacancy posting cost: normalised such that cq(0.72) = 1
ω1 0.8 Firm’s share of production
ω2 0.5c Part of the wage that is proportional to market tightness
ω3 depending on H Constant in wage equation
δ 0.001 Depreciation of positions
λ 0.003 Exogenous worker turnover
α 0.75 Elasticity of production function
H 0− 10 Cost of creating a position (relative to filling it)
mass depending on H Mass of firms
λx 0.043 Arrival rate of idiosyncratic shock (Elsby and Michaels (2013))
σ¯x depending on H Standard deviation of idiosyncratic shock
σσ 0.08 Unconditional standard deviation of log σ¯x
ρσ 0.988 Autocorrelation of log σ¯x
σz 0.02 Unconditional standard deviation of log z
ρz 0.996 Autocorrelation of log z
Table 1.3: Model parameters based on a weekly calibration. The model is solved for different values of creation cost H. The parameters
that are recalibrated depending on H can be found in table 1.4.
H 0 2 5 10 Cost of creating a position
Calibrated parameters
ω3 0.354 0.350 0.346 0.338 Constant in wage equation
σ¯x 0.131 0.231 0.351 0.502 Standard deviation of idiosyncratic shock
mass 0.197 0.182 0.156 0.116 Mass of firms
Not-targeted statistics without aggregate risk
0% 22% 52% 99% Creation cost relative to quarterly output
0% 1.8% 4.1% 7.4% Aggregate creation costs relative to output
1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% Aggregate filling costs relative to output
0.79 0.77 0.74 0.71 Labour share
0.40 0.43 0.41 0.37 Standard deviation of annual employment growth
Table 1.4: List of parameters that are recalibrated depending on H to keep the unemployment rate, job-finding rate, and filling cost
relative to average wage the same across calibrations. The lower part reports some statistics of the model without aggregate risk. The
aggregate expenditures on filling costs c/q and on creation costs H, both relative to output. The last row reports the cross-sectional
standard deviation of yearly employment growth calculated as std
(
ni,t−ni,t−52
0.5(ni,t+ni,t−52)
)
.
Matching function and vacancy costs. The matching function is assumed to take the Cobb-
Douglas form M (u, v) = µuηv1−η . The elasticity η is set to 0.6 as in Elsby and Michaels
(2013). This implies that the job-finding probability for an unemployed as a function of market
tightness is a (θ) = µθ1−η . The probability of a vacancy being filled is q (θ) = µθ−η . Without
loss of generality, I target market tightness to be equal to 0.72 in the absence of aggregate
17These targets are also used by Elsby and Michaels (2013).
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shocks.18 Then the scale of the matching function µ = 0.128 is implied by the targeted job-
finding probability a (0.72) = 0.1125. Vacancy posting cost c is chosen to normalise the cost of
filling positions to 1 (c = q (0.72)). Then the creation cost H can be interpreted as a multiple of
the filling cost in steady state.
Production function. The production function takes the form F (n) = nα. I set α = 0.75 in
between the values used by Elsby and Michaels (2013) and Schaal (2012). Creation costs could
be interpreted as the value of capital that is lost if a position is shut down and the respective
share of capital is sold. Therefore, α should not be interpreted as just the curvature of the
production function when increasing the number of workers, holding capital constant. More
precisely, F (n) is the revenue function rather than the amount of goods produced by the firm.
A downward sloping demand curve, for example due to monopolistic competition, reduces α
relative to the curvature in the pure production function.
Wage equation. I impose the following functional form for the total wage bill:19
W (n, x, s) = (1−ω1) zxnα + (ω2θ +ω3) n. (1.18)
This form is common in search and matching models: workers get a share of the marginal
product and a payment that compensates them according to their outside option. This de-
pends on the value of home production and on the option value of finding another job. The
latter is proportional to a (θ) cq(θ) = cθ, where a denotes the probability of finding a job. This is
because each firm posts vacancies (if any) until the marginal benefit equals the hiring cost cq .
20
The firm’s share of the marginal product is set to ω1 = 0.8. It is not crucial that the wage
per worker differs across firms, i.e. that ω1 is less than 1. More generally, it acts in the same
way as a change in average productivity. Therefore, it scales all firms’ sizes, but it does not
affect the dynamics of positions or vacancies. 21 A result of the relatively high value of ω1 is
that wage dispersion between firms is lower. This avoids that a worker would want to leave
an unproductive firm voluntarily to get a potentially higher wage when finding a new job.
18Note that the scale of the matching function µ and the vacancy posting cost c can be adjusted in response to a
proportional change in market tightness such that a (θ) and cθ remain unchanged. Then, the job-finding rate remains
the same and the firm’s problem is not affected because the filling cost cq(θ) =
cθ
a(θ) and the term cθ in the wage equation
are unchanged.
19The total wage bill is specified as opposed to the wage per worker to simplify notation. The derivative of W with
respect to n gives the effect of hiring an additional worker on a firm’s wage bill. This differs from the wage per worker
because the wage per worker is decreasing in firm size. Therefore, hiring an additional worker reduces the wage a
firm has to pay to its existing workers, dampening the increase of the total wage bill.
20This form can be derived by imposing Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining in the absence of creation costs for
positions (H = 0) like in Elsby and Michaels (2013). There is no analogous analytical solution to the bargaining
problem in my full model when H > 0. This is because some workers are hired at firms that newly create positions,
and others are hired to fill positions that have become empty due to exogenous worker turn-over. The surplus of a
match is not equal across these different positions. Therefore, one needs to know the distribution of vacancies across
firms, if one wants to calculate the expected value of an unemployed, for instance. As a result there is no analytical
solution to the bargaining problem. To make the bargaining problem simpler, it could be assumed that firms have all
the bargaining power. Then, the value for a newly employed worker does not exceed the value of an unemployed.
This approach was used for example in Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007) and in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
In my framework, it would imply that all workers are paid the same wage equal to the flow benefits of an unemployed.
21The reason is as follows. A firm’s production less wages is equal to ω1zxnα − (ω2θ +ω3) n. From a firm’s per-
spective, changing only ω1 to be 1 is equivalent to a permanent change in productivity. The firm optimally responds
by multiplying its number of positions by the factor ω
− 11−α
1 . Then all first order conditions hold exactly as before.
This means that all firms become proportionally larger which is perfectly offset by multiplying the mass of firms by
ω
1
1−α
1 . Then the employment dynamics of the model are identical regardless of the value ω1 even with aggregate risk.
The average wage, however, is affected by a different choice of ω1. As cost of filling relative to the average wage is
targeted in the calibration, the parameter ω3 has to be recalibrated when ω1 is changed. Therefore, the results of the
calibrated model do depend on the choice for ω1. Figure 1.27 in appendix 1.B.1 shows that the main results are robust
to choosing ω1 = 1.
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The parameter ω2 = 0.5c is set to the respective values derived from Stole and Zwiebel
(1996) bargaining when H = 0 and the worker’s bargaining power is 0.5. The constant ω3 is
calibrated depending on H such that the calibration targets are met.
Attrition. I choose the depreciation rate of positions δ to be 0.001 on a weekly basis, which
corresponds to 5% on a yearly basis. The choice of λ determines the exogenous rate of workers
leaving a firm. It should represent the rate at which employees quit for reasons other than low
productivity of the firm. Thus it also determines the share of vacancies that are posted by firms
to replace these workers relative to vacancies posted to fill newly created positions. Given
that the total separation rate is implied by the calibrated values for unemployment and the
job-finding rate, λ also determines how much job destruction is exogenous and endogenous,
respectively. The probability of a worker leaving for exogenous reasons is approximately λ+ δ.
The average separation rate in the model is 0.008. I set λ = 0.003 such that about half of
separations are exogenous in the absence of aggregate shocks. This corresponds to quits being
approximately half of total separations in the US.22
Idiosyncratic shocks. Like in Elsby and Michaels (2013), idiosyncratic shocks arrive at rate
λx = 0.043. When a firm is hit by a shock, the newly drawn idiosyncratic productivity follows
a log-normal distribution:
log xnewt ∼ N
(
0, σ2x,t
)
. (1.19)
Standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity in steady state (σ¯x) is recalibrated when H
is varied. This is necessary because a higher cost of creation makes firms more reluctant to
destroy positions and fire workers. Hence, endogenous job destruction falls. Table 1.4 reports
the resulting standard deviation that is increasing in H. Note that this does not necessarily
mean that the number of positions within a firm becomes more volatile. The last row of table
1.4 shows that for all values of H, the standard deviation of annual employment growth is
close to the estimate of 0.416 calculated by Elsby and Michaels (2013) using data on continuing
establishments in the Longitudinal Business Database from 1992 to 2005.23
Uncertainty shocks. The standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity follows a log-
normal process:
log σx,t − log σ¯x = ρσ (log σx,t−1 − log σ¯x) + εσ,t. (1.20)
When idiosyncratic volatility changes, I also adjust aggregate productivity to compensate for
the following effects. As idiosyncratic productivity follows a log-normal distribution, in-
creases of σx,t increase average productivity across firms.24 In addition, if firms wanted to
keep their marginal product the same, the specified production function implies that labour
demand is a convex function of idiosyncratic productivity x.25 Therefore, higher dispersion
22Monthly quits are on average 52% of total separations from 2001-2013 in the JOLTS dataset produced by the
BLS. Note that while the probability of an exogenous quit in my model is time-invariant, the share of quits in total
separations is procyclical because the separation rate is countercyclical. It would be a simple extension of the model
to make exogenous separations dependent on the aggregate productivity and uncertainty states.
23The annual growth rate is calculated as ni,t−ni,t−52
0.5(ni,t+ni,t−52)
as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
24The expected newly drawn level of productivity is given by Exnewt = exp
(
σ2x,t
2
)
.
25This can be seen in a simple static model, in which the marginal product of a worker equals the wage:
αzxinα−1i = w.
Then labour demand by firm i is given as
ni =
( αzxi
w
) 1
1−α
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of productivity across firms increases aggregate demand for labour. I abstract from this effect
by multiplying productivity with z˜t, dependent on the cross-sectional distribution of idiosyn-
cratic productivity, such that labour demand would not be affected by changes in uncertainty
in a frictionless model:26 ∫
ni,−1
∫
xi
(z˜txi,t)
1
1−α dFs (ni,−1, xi) = const. (1.21)
Aggregate productivity shocks. Aggregate productivity z follows a log-normal process
that is independent from the volatility of idiosyncratic productivity:
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + εz,t. (1.22)
The weekly autocorrelation ρz is chosen to be 0.996, which corresponds to a quarterly autocor-
relation of 0.95. The standard deviation of the innovation is chosen such that the unconditional
standard deviation of log-productivity is 0.02.
Creation cost. I solve the model for various values of H ranging from 0 to 10. Table 1.4
shows that this means that the cost of creating a position is about 10 · H% of quarterly output.
Thus, for the highest cost considered (H = 10) it is about as costly for firms to create one
position as the average quarterly output of each position is. I also report the share of output
that firms spend on posting vacancies and on creating positions in table 1.4. This filling cost
is a bit more than 1% of output, and the aggregate creation cost ranges from 0 to 7.4% of
output. Adding the creation costs, filling costs and the labour share in table 1.4, it can be seen
that average firm profits are about 20% of output. They can be interpreted as the return on
capital, which is absent in my model. Then, the implied capital per position is about 15 times
quarterly output.27 Hence, the largest creation costs H = 10, considered in this chapter, could
be interpreted in the following way: when a position is created the firm has to pay less than
7% of the value of capital that is needed for the position, and this amount cannot be recovered
when the position is destroyed and the capital is sold.28
1.5 Effects of uncertainty in the model
In the first subsection, I study the long run effects of a permanent change in idiosyncratic
volatility. It shows that the creation cost H is crucial for the response of the job-finding rate
after an increase in uncertainty. When H = 0, the job-finding rate is hardly affected, but when
H = 10, it falls significantly and this is responsible for almost half of the drop in employment.
26Frictionless means that firms are always at the creation cutoff nLB (x). This would happen if it was possible
to trade existing positions and workers between firms, until the marginal product at all firms equalises. For the
numerical solution of the model, this also means that mx ≡
∫
i
x
1
1−α
i dF (i) becomes a state variable.
27This is calculated using the quarterly discount factor, which implies the quarterly interest rate β
13
1−β13 , and a profit
share of 20%. Then the implied ratio of capital and quarterly output is 0.2 β
13
1−β13 .
28The resale price of capital in case of partial irreversibility is usually calibrated to match some business cycle
statistics. There is a wide range of values obtained. For example, Khan and Thomas (2013) use an investment resale
loss of 4.6%, whereas Bloom (2009) has a resale loss of 33.9% in his full model. An alternative way to compare the
creation cost used in this chapter with the capital adjustment cost literature is to calculate the aggregate amount of
capital adjustment costs spent in the economy in equilibrium. Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2004) estimate capital
disruption costs that are 15% of revenues minus labour costs. An analogous estimate of the aggregate creation costs
in my model is 16% when H = 5.
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In the second subsection, I decompose the effects of higher uncertainty into changes driven
by the wait-and-see effect, the realized volatility effect, and the general equilibrium effect as
market tightness changes. It demonstrates that the wait-and-see effect becomes stronger when
H is large. This is important, because the wait-and-see effect ultimately reduces the job-finding
rate. In subsection 1.5.3, I solve the full model with time-varying aggregate productivity and
time-varying uncertainty. The impulse response functions after an uncertainty shock confirm
that it is only in case of high creation cost that the job-finding rate falls significantly. I also
show that the quantitative effect of an increase in uncertainty depends on the state of the
economy. In particular, higher uncertainty increases unemployment by more when the initial
unemployment rate was already high.
1.5.1 Comparative statics
In this section, I consider the long run effects of a permanent increase in idiosyncratic volatility
in steady state. I demonstrate that the presence of creation costs is necessary to get a fall in the
job-finding rate as found in the empirical part. Figure 1.6 shows the effect of a 10% increase
in idiosyncratic volatility σx for increasing values of cost H.29 This second moment shock is
accompanied with a negative first moment shock, as described above, such that labour pro-
ductivity would not be affected in a frictionless environment, in which the marginal product
is equal at all firms.
In response to the shock, the separation rate reacts more strongly with higher creation costs.
From the third subplot it becomes evident that without creation costs (H = 0), the job-finding
rate hardly changes in response to higher uncertainty. When H becomes larger, the job finding
rate falls significantly. Both, the higher separation rate and the lower job-finding rate imply
a stronger fall in employment after a permanent increase in idiosyncratic volatility for high
H. In the sixth subplot I decompose how much of the change in unemployment is due to the
higher separation rate and how much is due to the lower job finding rate.30
There are two opposing effects, that change labour productivity in this heterogeneous
agents model. First, the wait-and-see effect increases the dispersion of firms conditional on
idiosyncratic productivity, because they become more reluctant to create and to destroy po-
sitions. This makes the average product of labour more dispersed across firms which leads
to a reduction of measured labour productivity in the aggregate.31 The second effect is that
reduced average employment increases the average product of firms because they operate at
decreasing returns to scale. This effect increases labour productivity. In the comparative statics
exercise the latter effect dominates. In the full model, however, labour productivity can fall in
response to an increase in uncertainty when H is large, as can be seen in figure 1.11.
If we want to explain the effect of uncertainty on the creation of positions, we need to
29Note that due to the calibration strategy, idiosyncratic volatility is increasing in H to get the same level of en-
dogenous job destruction. Therefore, a 10% increase, raises idiosyncratic volatility by more percentage points with
higher creation costs, which is a reason for the stronger response of the unemployment rate. My focus in interpreting
the results, however, is on the relative contribution of job-finding rate and separation rate. Figure 1.23 in appendix
1.B.1 shows the effects, when idiosyncratic volatility is increased by the same absolute amount. Then the response
of employment is comparable across calibrations. Importantly, the contribution of the job-finding rate to the fall in
employment is hardly affected by the alternative size of the shock.
30I calculate the change in unemployment if only the job-finding rate was changed, ∆uJFR, and the change in un-
employment if only the separation rate was changed, ∆uSR. Note that ∆u ≈ ∆uJFR + ∆uSR does not hold exactly. I
report the contribution of the job-finding rate as ∆u
JFR
∆uJFR+∆uSR .
31This effect on measured TFP has also been discussed by Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry
(2014).
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Figure 1.6: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. The job-finding rate
only falls and thus contributes to lower employment in the presence of creation cost H > 0.
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calculate the expected continuation value of a firm at the creation cutoff. Consider a firm that
is at the creation cutoff nLB in the current period. It creates positions until the marginal value
of a position is equal to the cost of creating it. Hence, the marginal value will be at the upper
bound. In the absence of aggregate shocks, the marginal value of a position at this firm will
still be equal to the cost of creating a position if its idiosyncratic productivity does not change
or if it receives a positive shock.32 In the former case it will keep the same number of positions
as its optimization problem looks the same as in the current period, whereas after a positive
productivity shock, it will create new positions until the marginal value is equal to the cost of
creating it. If the firm receives a negative productivity shock, the marginal value of a position
falls below the cost of creating positions and, depending on the size of the negative shock, the
firm might close positions or even fire workers. If it fires workers, the marginal value reaches
its lower bound at 0. The range of interior values for the continuation value is important for
the evaluation of the effect of a second moment shock. If the size of the inaction region is such
that a firm is unlikely to be in the inaction region after a new productivity draw, increasing
the size of the shock does not matter much. In contrast, if there is a large probability that the
firm’s marginal value will be in the interior region, larger negative shocks reduce the interior
continuation value, while larger positive shocks still do not affect the continuation value due
to it being equal to its upper bound already. Then, higher uncertainty reduces the expected
continuation value.
Creation costs are important to get a negative effect on the job finding rate, because they
make an interior solution for the continuation value more likely. The probability of drawing
a level of idiosyncratic productivity, for which the firm has a continuation value between the
lower bound of 0 and the upper bound of the creation cost, becomes larger in the presence of
creation costs.
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Figure 1.7: Cumulative distribution function of continuation value of a firm with median productivity at the creation
cutoff when a shock arrives.
Figure 1.7 draws the cumulative distribution function of the continuation value of a firm
at the creation cutoff if it gets hit by a shock. The continuation value is given relative to its
maximum value of H + (1− λ) cq , to make comparison between a model without creation
costs (H = 0) and with creation costs (H = 5) easier. If a firm that was at the creation cutoff
receives a positive productivity shock, the continuation value is at its upper bound regardless
32Due to depreciation of positions (δ > 0), this is also true after a small negative productivity shock as the marginal
value is decreasing in the number of positions.
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of the presence of creation costs. In the figure, this can be seen by the jump of the cumulative
distribution function from roughly 0.5 to 1 at the maximum continuation value of 100%. If a
negative shock is drawn, the continuation value falls below 100% and eventually reaches 0 for
very negative shocks. Note that without creation costs it is more likely that a firm that creates
a position in this period will destroy it in the next period, because it could open new positions
in later periods without cost. A firm with creation costs, however, would not only incur the
cost of filling a newly created position but also the cost of creation in later periods. Therefore,
it is less likely to destroy the position when a negative shock hits.
1.5.2 Decomposition of effects
The goal is to decompose the effects of higher uncertainty into three components, namely
the wait-and-see effect, the realized volatility effect and the general equilibrium effect due to
changes in market tightness.
The wait-and-see effect means that higher uncertainty makes firms more reluctant to create
positions, because a future adverse productivity shock becomes more likely. This reduces the
expected continuation value and and shifts the creation cutoff nLB down. Likewise, firms
fire fewer workers as the chance of a future positive productivity shock becomes higher. The
resulting increase of the expected continuation value shifts the firing cutoff nUB up. Hence,
the wait-and-see effect implies that higher uncertainty leads to fewer positions being created
and fewer workers being fired.
The realized volatility effect occurs, because a higher volatility of idiosyncratic firm pro-
ductivity makes more firms experience large positive or negative shocks. Holding a firm’s
cutoffs constant, it is thus more likely to get a low enough productivity draw that makes it
fire workers, and also more likely to get a high enough productivity draw that makes it create
new positions. Therefore, the realized volatility effect leads to more positions being created
and more workers being fired in the presence of higher uncertainty.
Thirdly, in general equilibrium changes in market tightness affect a firm’s optimal be-
haviour. For example, if the combination of wait-and-see effect and realized volatility effect
imply that the aggregate demand for new hires falls short of supply, market tightness falls to
ensure market clearing in the matching market. Then, it becomes cheaper for firms to fill their
empty positions. This primarily shifts the intermediate cutoff nMB upwards, which means that
they are more willing to fill an empty position as opposed to shutting it down. In the following
subsections, I discuss the three components in detail.
1.5.2.1 Wait-and-see effect
The wait-and-see effect measures the change in aggregate hiring and firing that is due to firms
adjusting their cutoffs in response to increased uncertainty. It is not useful, however, to just
look at the change of cutoffs conditional on idiosyncratic productivity x, like the amount that
nLB (x) shifts. This is because firms with the same x are not directly comparable as they are
at different percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution when volatility changes. For exam-
ple, take a firm, whose idiosyncratic productivity x is one standard deviation below the mean.
If the standard deviation is doubled, a firm with this same x is only half of a standard de-
viation below the mean. Consequently, it is more likely that this particular firm gets a new
productivity draw that lies below x in the presence of higher uncertainty. Therefore, I will
1.5. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE MODEL 33
compare how the cutoffs of firms at the same percentile of the cross-sectional distribution
change. More precisely, I measure the change of cutoffs at the same percentile relative to their
”perfect-insurance” counterparts. This method takes care of the fact that firms at the same
percentile of the distribution do not have the same idiosyncratic productivity x. I explain
the method in detail in appendix 1.C.1. The results are cutoff functions dσLB (p), d
σ
MB (p), and
dσUB (p). They provide a measure for the log of the three cutoffs as functions of the percentile
p, given a certain level of idiosyncratic volatility σ.
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Figure 1.8: Wait-and-see effect: change in cutoffs after a 10% increase in uncertainty.
Figure 1.8 shows how these three cutoff functions change, when idiosyncratic volatility is
increased. The cutoffs at the lower bound fall, which means that comparable firms will create
fewer positions in the presence of higher uncertainty. In contrast to that, the cutoffs at the
upper bound increase, which makes firms fire fewer workers. The reason is that at the lower
cutoff the concavity of the marginal continuation value dominates such that higher uncertainty
reduces the continuation value. At the upper cutoff instead, the convexity dominates such
that higher uncertainty increases the expected continuation value. The direction of the shift
at the medium cutoff is ambiguous. As the medium cutoff is determined by the condition
whether a firm wants to fill empty positions or not, there are two opposing effects. On the
one hand, the firm incurs a cost if it hires new workers. This is similar to a firm at the lower
cutoff which creates positions and hires new workers. Higher uncertainty makes firms more
reluctant to hire new workers, which would shift down the cutoff. On the other hand, if the
firm decides not to hire new workers, it shuts down the empty positions. This is similar to a
firm at the upper cutoff, which not only fires workers but also shuts down empty positions.
Higher uncertainty makes firms also more reluctant to do so. This would shift the medium
cutoff upwards. Whether the medium cutoff shifts upwards or downwards is then determined
by the size of the creation cost relative to the filling cost. The higher the cost to create a position,
the more reluctant a firm is to shut it down. Therefore, for sufficiently high H, the cutoff will
shift upwards as can be seen for H = 5 in figure 1.8. In contrast, when there is only a small cost
to create positions, the reluctance of the firm to fill empty positions becomes dominant, and
the cutoff will shift down. In particular, in the absence of creation cost (H = 0), the medium
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and lower cutoffs coincide such that they move down as drawn in the left panel of figure 1.8.
Now, it is possible to calculate the implications of the wait-and-see effect isolated from the
other effects when uncertainty increases. To do so, I calculate the differences dσj (p) for low
uncertainty (σL) and high uncertainty (σH) in partial equilibrium. Then, I shift the cutoffs
nj (x) by the change of these difference to get the resulting cutoffs nW&Sj for the wait-and-see
effect:
log nW&Sj
(
F−1σx (p)
)
= log nj
(
F−1σx (p)
)
+
[
dσ
H
j (p)− dσ
L
j (p)
]
,
j ∈ {LB, MB, UB} .
For example, if higher uncertainty increases the difference dσ between the lower cutoff nLB (x)
and the perfect insurance cutoff n˜LB (x) by 4% for firms at the 75th-percentile, then the wait-
and-see effect is calculated by reducing the lower cutoff nLB (x) by 4% at the 75th-percentile.
This means that the cutoffs are shifted by the amount shown in figure 1.8, but there is no actual
change in volatility when the economy is simulated. The latter effect is the realized volatility
effect described in the next subsection.
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Figure 1.9: Decomposition of a 10% increase in uncertainty into wait-and-see effect (green curves with crosses), real-
ized volatility effect (difference between red curves with dots and green curves with crosses), and general equilibrium
effect (difference between solid blue curves and red curves with dots).
Figure 1.9 shows the change of employment, separation rate and demand and supply of
newly hired workers after a 10% increase in uncertainty as a function of creation cost H. The
separation rate falls unambiguously, because the firing cutoff shifts upwards. The size of the
effect is increasing in H, because the wait-and-see effect becomes stronger as argued above.
The aggregate demand for newly hired workers falls as well. This is driven by the downward
shift of the creation cutoff nLB (x).
Note that the middle cutoff nMB (x) also determines how many firms want to fill their
empty positions. This cutoff shifts up for larger H as seen above. The willingness of more
1.5. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE MODEL 35
firms to fill their vacant positions increases demand for new hires. But it is dominated by the
change in the creation cutoff. Intuitively, any downward shift of the creation cutoff means
that fewer new positions are created. Each position that is not created reduces the demand
for new hires by one worker. In contrast, an upward shift in the middle cutoff means that
only positions that are empty are then filled as well. As only a small fraction of positions is
vacant at the beginning of the period, a shift of the middle cutoff has smaller effects on labour
demand than a similar shift of the creation cutoff.
Taking the changes of the separation rate and of the number of new hires together, one
can calculate the effect on employment. As the two effects run in opposite directions, the re-
sulting change in employment is ambiguous. It turns out that the reduced separation rate
dominates for high H and employment rises slightly. In the fourth subplot of figure 1.9, the
implied change of the supply of newly hired is drawn. Note that market tightness remains un-
changed such that changes in supply are entirely driven by an increase or decrease of the pool
of unemployed. Therefore, whenever employment increases, there are fewer unemployed and
the matching function implies that the number of new matches changes proportionally to this
change in unemployment.
1.5.2.2 Realized volatility effect
The realized volatility effect captures the effects of higher uncertainty through the increase in
the cross-sectional dispersion. When volatility increases, there are more firms that get hit by
sufficiently negative or positive shocks that lead them to fire workers or to create new posi-
tions. Hence, the realized volatility effect captures the changes due to larger shocks occuring,
holding the cutoffs fixed, whereas the wait-and-see effect accounts for the change of cutoffs.
The combined impact of wait-and-see effect and realized volatility effect is given by the partial
equilibrium response after an increase in uncertainty. This means that market tightness is held
constant, but firms optimally adjust their cutoffs and experience larger shocks. These partial
equilibrium responses are drawn in figure 1.9. The difference between the partial equilibrium
effect and the wait-and-see effect is then due to the realized volatility effect. If firms get hit
by larger shocks, but did not adjust their cutoffs, they are more likely to be below the creation
cutoff or above the firing cutoff at the beginning of the period. This can be seen in figure 1.9
as an increase in the separation rate and an increase in the demand for newly hired workers.
The higher separation rate has a negative effect on employment, whereas more newly hired
workers would increase employment. It can be seen from the first subplot that the former
effect dominates and employment falls for all values of creation cost. This fall is increasing
in H. Lower employment increases the pool of unemployed, which in turn increases the sup-
ply of new matches, as can be seen in the fourth subplot. Note that for larger values of H,
the increase in the supply of new workers exceeds the increase in demand for new workers.
Therefore, market tightness has to fall to get market clearing, as explained in the next subsec-
tion.
1.5.2.3 General equilibrium effect
Whenever changes in uncertainty do not change supply of new matches as given by the match-
ing function by the same proportion as aggregate demand of firms for new matches, market
tightness has to adjust to clear the market. In the subsection above, it could be seen that higher
1.5. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE MODEL 36
uncertainty leads to an excess supply of workers except for very small values of H. There-
fore, market tightness falls in general equilibrium. This reduces the supply of new matches,
because the job-finding rate for unemployed falls. Aggregate demand increases, because it be-
comes easier and thus cheaper for firms to fill their empty positions. In addition, lower market
tightness reduces the wage and thus increases profits.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Fσx (x)
lo
g−
ch
an
ge
 o
f c
ut
of
fs
H=5
 
 
d
σ
H
UB
− d
σ
L
UB
d
σ
H
MB
− d
σ
L
MB
d
σ
H
LB
− d
σ
L
LB
Figure 1.10: General equilibrium effect: change in cutoffs due to a change in market tightness that is necessary to clear
markets after a 10% increase in uncertainty.
Figure 1.10 shows the change in cutoffs that is due to the change in market tightness. It
turns out that the biggest change in cutoffs occurs at the middle cutoff nMB. This cutoff is
determined by the condition that a firm is indifferent between filling their empty positions
and shutting them down. Market tightness determines the cost of filling the position, which
makes it an important determinant for the cutoff. The creation cutoff nLB instead is determined
by the condition that a firm is indifferent between creating and filling a new position or not.
When the creation cost is large relative to the filling cost, a lower filling cost makes it more
profitable for the firm to create and fill new positions, but the total cost is not affected as
much in relative terms as it is for the middle cutoff. Note that the quantitative shift of cutoffs
depends on the change in market tightness. For low values of H, the market clearing condition
is almost satisfied in partial equilibrium. Then, market tightness does not adjust much, which
in turn leads to a small shift of cutoffs.
Figure 1.9 also draws the general equilibrium effects of higher uncertainty. Relative to
the partial equilibrium outcome, market tightness falls for all but the very small values of H.
This primarily increases demand for newly hired workers, while the separation rate is hardly
affected. The result is that employment increases relative to partial equilibrium. Both lower
market tightness and lower unemployment reduce the supply of new matches. In general
equilibrium, the change of demand and supply of new hires must be the same. Note that the
excess supply of workers was increasing in H in partial equilibrium. This leads to a bigger fall
of market tightness when H is large. As a result, the job-finding rate falls in the presence of a
large creation cost as could be seen in the partial equilibrium exercise in figure 1.6.
It is important to distinguish between the job-finding rate and the number of newly hired
workers, which is given by the product of job-finding rate and the number of unemployed.
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While higher uncertainty reduces the job-finding rate when H is large, the absolute number of
new matches increases, because unemployment increases.33
1.5.3 IRFs of uncertainty shocks
In this subsection, I compute impulse response functions after an increase in idiosyncratic
uncertainty in the full model. I show that higher uncertainty leads to a fall in employment. In
the absence of creation costs, this fall in employment is entirely driven by a higher separation
rate. The higher the creation cost H becomes, the more the job-finding rate falls similar to
the results in the comparative statics exercise above. This means that the job-finding rate
contributes more to changes in employment. In the full model with time-varying aggregate
shocks, the response of endogenous variables after a shock depends on the distribution of
firms when the shock hits. For example, in some periods an increase in uncertainty leads
to a fall in employment that is twice as strong as the fall after a shock in other periods. In
particular, I show that the response of employment becomes stronger, when a shock hits in
periods of high unemployment.
Figure 1.11 shows the median response of labour market variables for different values of
the creation cost.34,35 Similar to the results in the comparative statics exercise above, the job-
finding rate hardly responds in the absence of creation costs. In the presence of higher creation
costs H the job-finding rate falls. The increase in the separation rate becomes stronger as well,
but the peak change of the job-finding rate becomes larger relative to the peak change of the
separation rate. When H = 10, the peak change of the job-finding rate is more than 70% of
the peak change in the separation rate. Compared to the US data in figure 1.2, the peak fall
in the job-finding rate is still too small, as it was found to be about twice as big relative to the
increase in the separation rate. The model can capture well the timing of the peak responses.
The job-finding rate peaks after around 5 quarters in the model and in the data, whereas the
separation rate peaks early after the shock.
Labour productivity increases slightly for low values of the creation cost, while it falls for
higher values. Note that the idiosyncratic volatility shock is constructed such that labour pro-
ductivity would not change in a frictionless economy. It changes in the model, because the
distribution of positions across firms changes. When the creation cost is higher, the wait-and-
see effect becomes stronger. This increases the dispersion of the distribution of positions over
33In steady state, unemployment rate u, job-finding rate f , and separation rate s satisfy u = ss+ f . Then the change
of newly hired workers f u is given by
d log ( f u) = (1− u) d log s + ud log f .
As (1− u) is considerably larger than u, the number of newly hired will increase unless the job-finding rate falls by
more than a multiple of the increase in the separation rate:
d log ( f u) > 0, if − d log f < 1− u
u
d log s.
34I calculate the responses after a one standard deviation increase of σx at 500 different times along a randomly
drawn time path of aggregate shocks. Then I take the median value of these realizations of the respective variable at
each point in time.
35When comparing the IRFs with the ones estimated in the US data in figure 1.2, note that a change in idiosyncratic
volatility has bigger effects on the transition rates than a change in the empirical volatility measure in the data. It is not
surprising that the empirical measure obtained from implied volatilities is not directly comparable to changes in the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock, which is not observed in the data. Therefore, my focus is on analysing
to what extent the separation rate and the job-finding rate drive changes in employment. In section 6, I use a scaled
down version of the empirical volatility measure into my model to compare the model’s performance with time series
data from the US.
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Figure 1.11: Impulse response functions for idiosyncratic volatility shock in the model.
firms with the same idiosyncratic productivity, and reduces measured labour productivity.
This effect dominates the implications of decreasing returns to scale, which increase the aver-
age product when employment falls. Note that this fall is qualitatively different compared to
the comparative statics exercise, where labour productivity increased in figure 1.6. Quantita-
tively, the initial drop in labour productivity for high H is comparable to the IRF estimated in
the US data, when the size of the shock is chosen to get the same peak response of employ-
ment. The confidence intervals, however, are wide in the empirical IRF, such that the drop
is not significant. But also in the model the change in labour productivity can vary much
depending on the state in which the shock hits, as can be seen in figure 1.12.
Whereas figure 1.11 plots the median impulse response functions in the model, the ob-
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Figure 1.12: Impulse response functions for idiosyncratic volatility shock in the model. Solid lines depict the median
change of the respective variable. Dashed lines draw the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the responses.
served responses can vary significantly depending on the initial state. In the model, the cross-
sectional distribution of positions and idiosyncratic productivity is a state variable. As it is
solved using non-linear methods, the response to shocks can differ depending on the initial
distribution. In particular, for higher values of the creation cost H, the dependence on the
initial state becomes more relevant. Figure 1.12 repeats the median IRFs from figure 1.11 for
H = 0 and H = 5. In addition, it also shows the 5th and the 95th percentile of the responses
in dashed lines. One can see that for H = 0 these bands are relatively narrow around the
median response. In contrast, they are much wider for H = 5. For example, the peak drop in
employment can be twice as much in the 95th percentile as it is in the 5th percentile. In theory,
the whole distribution at the initial state matters. One moment of this distribution, which is
easily observable, is the unemployment rate when the shock hits. On average, employment
falls more after an increase in uncertainty when the unemployment rate was already high at
the time the shock hits.
d log n
H nL nM nH
0 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004
2 −0.008 −0.007 −0.006
5 −0.011 −0.009 −0.008
10 −0.015 −0.012 −0.011
Table 1.5: State dependence of impulse response functions. The sample of IRFs is divided into three equal parts according to employ-
ment when the volatility shock hits. (nL , nM , nH correspond to the lowest, middle, and highest third, respectively.) Then the average
peak changes of log-employment in the subsamples are calculated and reported depending on creation cost H.
Table 1.5 reports the peak change in employment, when the sample of impulse responses
is divided into three equally sized parts according to initial unemployment. The initial unem-
ployment rate is more important for high values of H. For example when H = 10, employment
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falls by 1.5% when the unemployment rate was in the highest third, and by only 1.1% when
the unemployment rate was in the lowest third. One reason, why shocks affect employment
more when the unemployment rate is high, is implied by the matching function, as discussed
in Michaillat (2014). When the unemployment rate is low, the same relative change of market
tightness affects the unemployment rate less. Equation (1.44) in appendix 1.A.2 shows that
changes in log-employment are approximately proportional to the unemployment rate, when
the job-finding rate or the separation rate are changed by the same relative amount.
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Figure 1.13: Each dot corresponds to the peak response of log-employment in one impulse response function after a
positive uncertainty shock for H = 5.
But even if the initial unemployment rate is taken into account, some state dependency
remains. Figure 1.13 plots the observed peak responses of employment as a function of initial
employment for H = 5. It can be seen that the range of possible values conditional on initial
employment is still large. These differences are due to characteristics of the cross-sectional
distribution that are not captured well by aggregate employment. For example, it could be
that in some periods there are more firms close to (one of) the cutoffs, such that they are more
responsive to additional shocks. Figure 1.13 also gives an indication that the first moment of
the distribution is not enough to forecast aggregate outcomes. Section 1.7 explains the algo-
rithm that I develop to get more accurate forecasts of market tightness without adding many
characteristics of the cross-sectional distribution as additional state variables.
1.6 Comparison with US time series
In this section, I compare the model with the US time series from 1998 to 2013. First, I argue
that a model with productivity shocks alone cannot match the observed unemployment rate
after 2004 well. Then, I show that the unemployment rate can be matched much better when
idiosyncratic volatility shocks are added. In addition, when the creation cost is large, the
model also performs better in matching the observed job-finding rate.
In the exercises of this section, I back out the aggregate productivity shock such that labour
productivity in the model equals labour productivity in the data. In the first exercise I assume
that idiosyncratic volatility is constant. The resulting series of the unemployment rate, the
job-finding rate, and the separation rate are drawn in figure 1.14. At a first glance, the un-
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employment rate is not as volatile in the model as in the data.36 This shortcoming could be
alleviated if the model was recalibrated to produce a larger volatility of employment. In par-
ticular, a lower value of ω2 in the wage equation could be used. Then, the wage reacts less to
changes in market tightness. Hence, the marginal profit of positions become more volatile and
firms will react more strongly in response. Similarly, Hall (2005) has shown that wage stick-
iness can help to overcome too little employment volatility in matching models. The results
are shown in figure 1.32 in appendix 1.D. Note, however, that even if the unemployment rate
reacted more to productivity shocks, it would be difficult to match the observed unemploy-
ment rate after 2004. Whereas it was low in 2007, the model would predict the lowest value
for unemployment already in 2004. In addition, unemployment increases in the model from
2011 onward, while a steady decline was observed in the data.
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Figure 1.14: Model without uncertainty shocks: Aggregate productivity is estimated in each quarter to match labour
productivity in the model to the data (linear trend removed).
Uncertainty shocks seem a good candidate to explain the low unemployment rate in 2007,
as well as the decline in unemployment since 2010. In the data, uncertainty was low in the
mid 2000s, it peaked in 2008, and it has been falling since then. In the model, low uncertainty
reduces unemployment. Therefore, in a second exercise I use the estimated index of implied
36Too little employment volatility has been documented in standard search and matching models, for example, in
Costain and Reiter (2008) and Shimer (2005).
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volatility, shown in figure 1.1.37 Whereas the idiosyncratic volatility shock is feeded into the
model according to observed variations in the implied volatility index, the aggregate produc-
tivity shock is still estimated in each quarter to match labour productivity in the model to the
data.
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Figure 1.15: Model with aggregate productivity and uncertainty shocks: Aggregate productivity is estimated in each
quarter to match labour productivity in the model to the data. Log-changes in idiosyncratic volatility are 20% of
changes of the implied volatility index estimated in section 2. Linear trends are removed from US data series.
Figure 1.15 shows the resulting time series for the unemployment rate, the job-finding rate
and the separation rate. While the model without creation costs performs better when the
uncertainty shock is added, it still cannot reproduce the low unemployment rate in 2007. Fluc-
tuations of the job-finding rate are too small as well. When creation cost H = 10 instead, the
model closely tracks the unemployment rate in the 2000s. It can explain a steep fall in the
job-finding rate after 2007. But the job-finding rate is still a bit less volatile than in the data,
whereas the separation rate is too volatile. In terms of the timing, the unemployment rate and
the job-finding rate lead their respective empirical counterparts. This indicates that market
tightness reacts more sluggishly in the data than in the model. If the creation cost H was made
dependent on the aggregate number of positions created in each period as in Fujita and Ramey
(2007), the response of aggregate creation to aggregate shocks would become smoother. This
37I use a scaled down version of the log-changes in implied volatility because employment in the model reacts
more strongly to the same relative change in idiosyncratic volatility than employment in the data reacts to changes in
implied volatility.
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could improve the fit of the model.
The model has difficulties to explain the low unemployment rate in the run-up of the 2001
recession. The reason is that observed volatility was above trend and labour productivity was
close to the trend. Then, the model predicts the unemployment rate to be above trend. It
is possible to back out the idiosyncratic volatility shocks that would be needed to match the
unemployment rate. The resulting shocks are in figure 1.33 in appendix 1.D. It can be seen that
uncertainty would have to be lower than observed before 2001 to explain the unemployment
rate. Nevertheless, over the whole sample the correlation between the backed out volatility
shocks and the empirical measure for uncertainty is 0.46 for H = 0 and 0.59 for H = 10.
1.7 Algorithm to solve the model
In the presence of aggregate shocks, market tightness depends on the distribution of positions
and idiosyncratic productivity across firms, which is an infinite-dimensional object, as is com-
mon in models with heterogeneous agents. One method to solve the model numerically is to
follow Krusell and Smith (1998) by approximating the infinite-dimensional state space using a
finite number of aggregate state variables characterizing the distribution. I extend the Krusell
and Smith (1998) algorithm by adding one specific additional state variable to capture omitted
characteristics of the distribution: I add the residual in the law of motion for market tightness
as a state variable. Thereby, I can increase the accuracy of the law of for market tightness
significantly, and at the same time ensure that the market clears in each period. The next sub-
section describes the algorithm in a general way before I describe how I apply it to the specific
model.
1.7.1 General description of the residual method
In a heterogeneous agents model with aggregate uncertainty, current and future prices can in
general depend on the whole cross-sectional distribution of agents’ characteristics. Krusell and
Smith (1998) suggest to approximate this distribution by using some of its moments, denoted
by m. A law of motion for m, which can also depend on exogenous state variables z, describes
their transition from one period to the next:
m′ = Ψm (m, z) . (1.23)
In addition, it might be necessary to approximate a set of prices p as a function of the state
variables:38,39
p = Ψp (m, z) . (1.24)
These laws of motion are used to find the optimal individual policy functions. But when
the model is simulated, the approximation leads to residuals xi such that for the simulated
38For example this could be the rental rate of capital or the wage. If labour supply is endogenous, the wage can
potentially depend on the whole distribution of agents. In my model, I need a law for market tightness.
39Note the following difference between laws of motion for moments m and those for prices p. Laws of motion for
m describe the intertemporal transition of moments from one period to the next. In contrast, laws for prices describe
a price in the current period depending on the current period’s state variables.
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moments m˜ and prices p˜ the following equations hold:
m˜′ = Ψm (m˜, z˜) + xm, (1.25)
p˜ = Ψp (m˜, z˜) + xp. (1.26)
The residual captures the information of the cross-sectional distribution that was omitted or is
not captured well by the functional form imposed on Ψi. Since the omitted moments are typ-
ically autocorrelated, also the residual will be autocorrelated. For example, if the residual xp
is positive in one period, this means that the market clearing price is higher than what would
have been predicted based on the aggregate state variables (m˜, z˜). Then it is likely that in the
next period, the market clearing price will again be above its predicted counterpart based on
next period’s state variables (m˜′, z˜′). I propose to make use of this information contained in
the residual when forecasting future variables. I do so by adding the variables x ≡ (xm, xp) to
the set of state variables. The laws of motion that are used in the individual’s problem become
m′ = Ψm (m, z) + xm, (1.27)
p = Ψp (m, z) + xp, (1.28)
x′ = Ψx (m, z, x) . (1.29)
Given these law of motions, the individual optimization problem can be solved using standard
techniques. Adding the variable xi affects this in the same way as adding any other aggregate
state variable would.
Once the optimal policy functions are found, one could simulate the economy like in the
standard Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm. Then, adding a residual as a state variable is
equally costly as adding one higher moment. The advantage is that by not being restricted to
a specific moment, accuracy could be improved by more, because the residual summarizes the
error made due to omitting all higher moments.
A further way to make use of the residuals in the simulation part comes from the additional
degree of freedom that is obtained, because the residuals xi are not predetermined. Usually
state variables are directly calculated from the simulated distribution, for example the first or
higher moments thereof. The residual xi, however, can be determined in the period itself. As
it affects the agents’ policy functions, it can be chosen such that market clearing holds, if it is
added to law of motions for prices as in equation (1.28). If it is added to intertemporal law
of motions like in equation (1.27), the residual can be used to get next period’s value m′ to
be equal to its forecast value. In both cases, there is a condition that should hold exactly in
each period of the simulation. One can meet this condition by solving for the residual. As
individual policy functions depend on it, the residual can be adjusted until the conditions are
met.
The residual is thus used as a state variable in the individual problem, but it is endoge-
nously determined in the simulation part. This is similar to the determination of prices in
general equilibrium. They are taken as given by individuals but they can be chosen such that
markets clear. Similarly, the algorithm lets the price vary until markets clear.
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1.7.2 Application of the residual method in this model
In my model, I use the residual method in the law for market tightness. Market tightness is
an important variable, because it determines how costly it is for firms to fill their vacancies.
When aggregating, the market clearing condition (1.17) must hold:∫
ni,−1
∫
xi
(n∗ (ni,−1, xi, s)− (1− λ) ni,−1)+ dFs (ni,−1, xi) = a (θ (s)) u (s) . (1.30)
I denote by xθ the residual in the law of motion for market tightness. The other aggregate
state variables are aggregate productivity (z), volatility of idiosyncratic productivity (xσ), the
1
1−α -moment of idiosyncratic firm productivity (m
x), and the aggregate number of positions at
the beginning of the period (N−1).
Note that the laws for z, xσ, and mx only depend on the exogenous processes chosen for
aggregate productivity, idiosyncratic productivity, and the volatility of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity. Hence they are known (z, xσ), or can be estimated (mx) without solving the model.
For θ, xθ , and N, I specify laws that are (log-)linear in all state variables:
log θ = Ψθ,0 +Ψθ,1 log z +Ψθ,2 log N−1 +Ψθ,3xσ +Ψθ,4mx + xθ , (1.31)
xθ = Ψxθ ,0+Ψxθ ,1 log z−1+Ψxθ ,2 log N−2+Ψxθ ,3xσ−1+Ψxθ ,4m
x
−1+Ψxθ ,5xθ−1, (1.32)
log N = ΨN,0+ΨN,1 log z−1+ΨN,2 log N−1+ΨN,3xσ−1+ΨN,4mx−1+ΨN,5xθ−1. (1.33)
Given these laws of motion (together with the known transition matrices for the aggregate
shocks), one can find the optimal cutoffs in each state on the aggregate grid by iterating the
marginal value function. From the cutoffs, one can calculate the number of positions each firm
wants to fill, which depends on the idiosyncratic and aggregate state variables:
(n∗ (ni,−1, xi, z, xσ, mx, N−1, xθ)− (1− λ) ni,−1)+ . (1.34)
Then, I simulate the economy using the histogram method developed by Young (2010).40
In the simulation, I impose the market clearing condition (1.30) using the residual method. All
arguments except xθ are predetermined in (1.34). I can solve for the unknown xθ such that the
market clearing condition (1.30) holds. Using the simulated values, the coefficients in the laws
of motion (1.31), (1.32), and (1.33) can be estimated and updated. This procedure of solving the
individual problem, simulating the economy, and updating the coefficients is repeated until
the updated coefficients in one step are close to the ones estimated in the previous step.
Figure 1.16 demonstrates the advantage of adding the residual state variable compared to
higher moments of the distribution. Using the simulated 2nd to 10th central moments of the
distribution of positions, an alternative law of motion for market tightness can be estimated. In
the upper part of figure 1.16, it can be seen that even adding these 9 additional characteristics
of the distribution leads to a worse fit of the market clearing values of market tightness. The
difference between the market clearing values and the fitted values are shown in the lower
part of the plot.41
40This means that instead of simulating a large number of firms, the cross-sectional distribution of positions and
idiosyncratic productivity is characterized by a histogram over a fine grid. The advantage of this non-stochastic
simulation method is that it avoids sampling error.
41The predicted value of market tightness is based on current state variables (z, N−1, xσ ,mx) and the predicted
residual xˆθ according to equation (1.31). The predicted residual is given by equation (1.32) using lagged state variables.
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Figure 1.16: The upper part plots an example of market clearing values for market tightness in a simulation when
H = 5. The dashed blue line draws the estimated values for market tightness using the residual method and the first
moment of the distribution of positions. The red solid curve draws the estimated values for market tightness based
on the first 10 moments of the distribution of positions without using the residual. The respective relative deviations
are drawn in the lower subplot.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analysed the effects of uncertainty on labour market variables in a model
with frictional labour markets and costs of creating positions. I demonstrated that in the ab-
sence of creation costs, uncertainty shocks hardly affect the job-finding rate. Then, higher
uncertainty lowers employment solely by increasing the separation rate. In the data, however,
uncertainty shocks reduce employment also by lowering the job-finding rate. When costs of
creating positions are added to the model, the job-finding rate responds negatively to higher
uncertainty, which brings the model closer in line with the data. I demonstrated that the
model without uncertainty shocks cannot match the behavior of the US unemployment rate in
the 2000s. In contrast, my full model with idiosyncratic volatility shocks and costs of creating
positions can match the observed unemployment rate well. In addition, it can also account for
a large share of the steep drop in the job-finding rate after 2007.
This chapter focuses on the demand for labour of heterogeneous firms, while it assumes
that workers are risk neutral. If workers were risk averse and could not perfectly insure them-
selves against unemployment risk, it would become important whether changes in the unem-
ployment rate are driven by changes in the separation rate or by changes in the job-finding
rate. When workers are borrowing constrained, for example, it is likely that they prefer many
short spells of unemployment over infrequent longer spells. In other words, their welfare is
higher, when the same level of unemployment is caused by a high separation rate as opposed
Hence, the forecast error is the difference between the predicted residual xˆθ and the realized residual xθ . Note that
when market clearing is imposed using the residual method, firms know the exact value of market tightness in the
current period, and they also base their decisions on predicted future values of market tightness according to equation
(1.32), using the realized residual xθ .
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to a low job-finding rate. Hence, this chapter suggests that higher uncertainty is particularly
bad for workers, because it decreases their chances of finding a job when they become unem-
ployed. In chapter 2, we study the implications of longer unemployment spells on precau-
tionary savings of risk averse agents. In the presence of nominal wage stickiness, an increased
demand for safe assets can push up real wages and deepen recessions.
My model has also shown that similar shocks can have quantitatively very different re-
sponses depending on when the shock hits. For instance, an increase in uncertainty leads to
a particularly large drop in employment, when the unemployment rate is already high. This
suggests that policy makers should react differently to shocks depending on the state of the
economy. Future work could explore the effectiveness of government policy in booms com-
pared to recessions. The state-dependency found in this chapter suggests that macroeconomic
variables will react stronger in response to policy interventions in times of higher unemploy-
ment.
Appendices to Chapter 1
1.A Empirical part
1.A.1 Data description
The following time series are used for the estimation of the VAR and when comparing the
model to the US data.
Labour productivity. YL is obtained from the series of seasonally adjusted nonfarm output
(PRS85006043) and employment (PRS85006013) from the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS).
Index of implied volatilities. Implied volatility data from OptionMetrics’ Ivy DB database,
available from 1996 until the second quarter of 2013, is used. Call options, whose underlying
security is not an index, with a maturity of 30 days are used. Quarterly averages of log implied
volatility are taken for each of the underlying securities. This gives between 1,758 and 3,836
observations per quarter. Then coefficients of dummy variables for each quarter are estimated,
allowing for fixed effects for the securities. These dummy variables, which capture the average
implied volatility, form the index of implied volatilities used in this chapter.
Unemployment rate, job-finding rate, and separation rate. They are constructed using
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
is constructed by the BLS (LNS14000000). The job-finding rate and separation rate are calcu-
lated using the level of unemployed (LNS13000000) and the number of unemployed for less
than 5 weeks (LNS13008396). I account for the redesignment of the unemployment duration
question in the CPS, which led to a discontinuous drop of short term unemployment in 1994,
as discussed in Shimer (2012). Therefore, the number of newly unemployed is multiplied by
the constant 1.1 from 1994. I adjust for time aggregation as emphasized by Shimer (2012) to
account for the possibility that workers experience more than one switch between unemploy-
ment and employment per month. The monthly job-finding probability is given by42
Ft = 1−
ut+1 − uSt+1
ut+1
, (1.35)
which gives the job-finding rate in a continuous time environment:
ft = − log (1− Ft) . (1.36)
The separation rate in continous time st is then implicitly given by
ut+1 =
1− exp (− ft − st) st
ft + st
lt + exp (− ft − st) ut. (1.37)
Quarterly averages of the monthly unemployment rate, job-finding rate and separation rate
are taken.
42In what follows, ut denotes unemployment, uSt denotes unemployment less than 5 weeks, and lt denotes employ-
ment.
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Figure 1.17: Impulse response functions after a shock to labour productivity in US data
1.A.2 Approximation of changes in unemployment
The law of motion of the unemployment rate is given by
ut+1 = st (1− ut) + (1− ft) ut. (1.38)
If the separation rate st and the job-finding rate ft are constant, the unemployment rate con-
verges to its steady state value
u¯ =
s¯
s¯ + f¯
. (1.39)
The rate of convergence is determined by the sum of s¯ and f¯ :
ut+1 − u¯ =
[
1− (s¯ + f¯ )] (ut − u¯) . (1.40)
For example, when the monthly separation rate and job-finding rate sum to 50%, which is
roughly the case for the US, any gap between the initial unemployment rate and the steady
state value u¯ is reduced by 87.5% within a quarter. Therefore, the unemployment rate can be
approximated well by only using the current separation rate and job-finding rate, as observed
for example by Shimer (2012):
ut+1 ≈ stst + ft . (1.41)
Log-linearizing this relationship around u¯, s¯, and f¯ , yields
log
ut+1
u¯
≈ log st
s¯
− 1
st + ft
(
st log
st
s¯
+ ft log
ft
f¯
)
=
ft
st + ft
(
log
st
s¯
− log ft
f¯
)
= (1− u¯)
(
log
st
s¯
− log ft
f¯
)
, (1.42)
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where the last equality uses the definition of the steady state unemployment rate.
An analogous relationship can be derived for employment:
nt+1 ≈ ftst + ft , (1.43)
log
nt+1
n¯
≈ (1− n¯)
(
− log st
s¯
+ log
ft
f¯
)
= u¯
(
− log st
s¯
+ log
ft
f¯
)
. (1.44)
This states that relative changes of employment are proportional to the unemployment rate,
when the separation rate and the job-finding rate change by the same relative amount. In
particular, same relative changes of market tightness have bigger effects on employment when
the unemployment rate is high. This is due to the convexity of the quasi labour supply function
given by the matching function, as emphasized by Michaillat (2014).
1.A.3 Robustness checks
This section shows that the impulse response function in figure 1.2 is robust to alternative
identification, to an alternative volatility measure, and to alternative detrending of the vari-
ables. In figure 1.18, the volatility index is ordered first in the Cholesky decomposition, which
implies that labour productivity can react instantaneously to volatility shocks. Figure 1.19 uses
the volatility index VIX instead of the constructed index based on single stocks. Figures 1.20
and 1.21 use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to remove trends instead of removing a linear trend in
the baseline. Figure 1.20 uses the smoothing parameter λ = 100, 000 as preferred by Shimer
(2005), whereas figure 1.21 uses the usual value of λ = 1, 600 for quarterly data.
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Figure 1.18: Impulse response functions after a volatility shock in US data using an alternative identification, in which
volatility is ordered first in the Cholesky decomposition
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Figure 1.19: Impulse response functions after a volatility shock in US data. Instead of the volatility measure con-
structed from single stocks, the VIX is used as the volatility measure.
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Figure 1.20: Impulse response functions after a volatility shock in US data. Instead of detrending using a linear trend,
the series are detrended using the HP-filter with parameter λ = 100, 000.
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Figure 1.21: Impulse response functions after a volatility shock in US data. Instead of detrending using a linear trend,
the series are detrended using the HP-filter with parameter λ = 1, 600.
1.B. COMPARATIVE STATICS 53
1.B Comparative statics
1.B.1 Sensitivity analysis
The purpose of this section is to show that the main result of this chapter is not sensitive to
the choice of parameters. In the absence of creation costs (H = 0), the job-finding rate hardly
reacts to changes in idiosyncratic volatility, and as the creation cost increases, the falling job-
finding rate contributes increasingly to the fall in employment. This is shown in the lower
right subplot of the comparative statics graphs in this section.
In the following exercises unless specified otherwise, the three parameters that are cali-
brated (σ¯x, ω3, and the mass of firms) are recalibrated such that the targets in steady state
(unemployment rate, job-finding rate, filling cost relative to average wage) are met exactly.
Destruction cost instead of creation cost. In this exercise, there is no cost of creation, but a
cost H has to be paid, whenever a position is shut down voluntarily. The results in figure 1.22
are almost identical to the cost paid upon creation. The reason is that firms are forward looking
and take into account that they have to pay the destruction cost when they want to close the po-
sition in the future. As a result, the marginal value of a position shifts down and the three rel-
evant values defining the cutoffs in equation (1.13) become
(
−H,−H + (1− λ) cq , (1− λ) cq
)
instead of
(
0, (1− λ) cq , H + (1− λ) cq
)
.
Same absolute increase of idiosyncratic volatility. In this chapter, shocks to uncertainty
are interpreted as relative changes of idiosyncratic volatility. The calibration strategy results in
steady state volatility σ¯x to be increasing in creation cost, because a higher creation cost makes
firms more reluctant to fire. In order to meet the target for the separation rate, volatlity has
to be increased. This implies that a 10% increase of volatility increases volatility by a larger
absolute amount when H is high, which explains the stronger response of employment. Figure
1.23 shows how the results differ when volatility is increased by 0.02, independent of H. Then
the response of employment becomes almost flat, but the contribution of the job-finding rate
to its change is hardly affected. Both the separation rate and the job-finding rate react less for
large values of H.
Cyclical creation cost. Pissarides (2009) has shown that fluctuations of unemployment in
the standard search and matching model are amplified if the total vacancy posting cost consists
of a payment that is independent of market tightness. Without this assumption, higher market
tightness in a boom makes it more costly for firms to fill their positions, which dampens the
increase of vacancy posting. In my model, the cost of creating a position is assumed to be
constant. This is not directly comparable with the assumption in Pissarides (2009) because the
cost does not have to be paid when an empty position needs to be filled. The cost of finding
workers in my model depends on market tightness as in a standard search and matching
model. It is not clear whether the cost of creating (or destroying) positions should be higher
when labour market tightness is high. If that were the case, higher costs of creating positions
would dampen booms in addition to the higher filling cost. Note, however, that this does
not affect the result that the job-finding rate does not move in response to uncertainty shocks
when H = 0, because if market tightness does not react, it is irrelevant whether the cost of
creating positions depends on market tightness. Figure 1.24 shows the results when the cost
of creating positions is proportional to the filling cost cq(θ) .
43 The result is that for high values
43Remember that in the initial steady state without aggregate uncertainty, cq(θ) is normalized to be 1. Now, H
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of H, the cost of creation falls relative to the baseline scenario. Consequently, firms become
more willing to shut down positions, because it is cheaper to create them in the future and the
separation rate increases. For the same reason, the job-finding rate is reduced because firms
are less willing to fill their empty positions. As a result, the job-finding rate contributes less
to the fall in employment, which becomes larger. Both lower employment and the reduced
importance of the wait-and-see effect lead to an increase in measured labour productivity.
Filling cost. If it is more costly to fill positions, the wait-and-see effect becomes stronger
even in the absence of a creation cost. Figure 1.25 shows that even doubling the target of the
filling cost relative to average wages increases the contribution of the job-finding rate to less
than 5% when H = 0. For larger values of H, the job-finding rate actually falls less than with
the lower filling cost. The reason it that firms become more sensitive to changes in market
tightness, because the filling costs are more important for them. This increases labour demand
more in response to falling market tightness such that in general equilibrium the job-finding
rate falls less.
Exogenous turnover. Figure 1.26 shows the solution for alternative values of the rate of
obsolescence δ and quits λ. If both parameters are set to 0 as in Elsby and Michaels (2013),
both the job-finding rate and the separation rate react more to higher uncertainty, and the job-
finding rate contributes slightly less to changes in employment. In constrast, if λ was doubled,
both labour market transition rates react less and the job-finding rate contributes more. Note
that the calibration strategy ensures, that the separation rate is the same in steady state. This
means that there are more endogenous separations when δ and λ are small. Then a shock that
increases endogenous separations by the same relative amount, leads to a bigger increase of
total separations.
Alternative wage equation. Figure 1.27 shows the results for alternative parameters in the
wage equation (1.18). The red dashed solution halves the parameter ω2. This makes the wage
less responsive to changes in market tightness. Therefore, market tightness and the job-finding
rate need to fall more for high values of H to ensure market clearing. In the green dash-dotted
solution, the parameter ω1 is set to 1, which means that the wage does not depend on firm size.
Increasing only ω1 means that firms become more profitable as if they had a permanently
higher productivity. This scales up their demand for labour and the average firm size. A
corresponding decrease of the mass of firms could perfectly offset this, and the results would
be identical to the baseline scenario. The only reason that they differ is that the wage coefficient
ω3 is recalibrated to meet the target for the filling cost relative to the wage. This has only minor
consequences for the contribution of the job-finding rate to changes in employment.
Curvature of production function. In the literature of multi-worker firm models with de-
creasing returns to scale, a wide range of parameter values for the elasticity of the production
or revenue function has been used. In the baseline scenario, I use an intermediate value of
α = 0.75. Figure 1.28 confirms that lowering it to 0.6 as in Elsby and Michaels (2013) or in-
creasing it to 0.85 as in Schaal (2012) hardly affects the contribution of the job-finding rate to
changes in employment. What α does affect is the response of employment, because it de-
termines how much the marginal profit of the firm increases with fewer workers. When α is
low, firms adjust their desired number of workers by less in response to shocks than for higher
values of α.
Arrival rate of idiosyncratic shock. Figure 1.29 shows the results for different values of
changes in proportion to changes in cq(θ) in the new steady state.
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the arrival rate of the idiosyncratic shock. Because the idiosyncratic productivity draws are
uncorrelated in the baseline scenario, a higher arrival rate makes firms less responsive to their
current level of productivity. Then they also react less to changes in idiosyncratic volatility.
This primarily affects changes in employment, but it also reduces the contribution of the job-
finding rate.
Distribution of idiosyncratic shock. Figure 1.30 shows that the contribution of the job-
finding rate to changes in employment is not sensitive to the assumed distribution of idiosyn-
cratic productivity. The red dashed curves show the result when a Pareto distribution instead
of the log-normal distribution is used as in Elsby and Michaels (2013). The green dash-dotted
curves assume that idiosyncratic productivity changes in each period, but it is autocorrelated
as in Schaal (2012). In both cases, employment reacts less to uncertainty shocks, but the con-
tribution of the job-finding rate increases slightly.
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Figure 1.22: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. In the alternative
solution, the cost is not paid upon creation but upon voluntary destruction of a position.
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Figure 1.23: Responses after a permanent 10% increase compared with a 0.02 increase of idiosyncratic volatility for
varying H.
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Figure 1.24: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. In the alternative
solution, the creation cost H is proportional to the filling cost cq .
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Figure 1.25: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. In the alternative
solution, the target for the filling cost is doubled relative to the baseline scenario. The creation cost remains unchanged,
such that H = 10 now corresponds to the creation cost being 5 times the filling cost in steady state.
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Figure 1.26: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. The red dashed
solution solves the model without depreciation of positions and without quits. The green dash-dotted solution solves
the model for a doubled rate of quits.
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Figure 1.27: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. The red dashed
solution uses a wage equation that is less sensitive to changes in market tightness, and the green dash-dotted solution
makes the wage independent of firm size.
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Figure 1.28: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. The alternative
solutions use different values of curvature in the production function.
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Figure 1.29: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. In the alternative
solutions, the arrival rate of the idiosyncratic shock is varied.
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Figure 1.30: Responses after a permanent 10% increase of idiosyncratic volatility for varying H. The red dashed
solution uses a Pareto distribution instead of the log-normal distribution for the idiosyncratic productivity draw. The
green dash-dotted solution assumes that shocks arrive in each period but that productivity is autocorrelated.
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1.C Decomposition exercise
1.C.1 Derivation of change in cutoffs for the wait-and-see effect
The goal is to compare how the cutoffs of firms at the same percentile of the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity distribution change when idiosyncratic volatility changes. It is not possible to just
compare the change in cutoffs, because firms at the same percentile have a different value of
x depending on the standard deviation of the cross-sectional distribution. In order to account
for this mean effect, I will consider how the firm’s cutoff changes relative to the “perfect in-
surance” solution. In this context, “perfect insurance” means the assumption that a firm can
always sell an existing position or existing workers to other firms and thereby transfer the po-
sition or worker to this other firm. In equilibrium, other firms would be willing to pay exactly
the cost that they would otherwise incur to create a position or to hire a worker, respectively.
Hence, in terms of the marginal value of a position, firms are perfectly insured against idiosyn-
cratic shocks. If they become less productive, they can sell some of their existing positions and
workers to other firms until the marginal value of a position equals the price at which it could
be sold. Then, equation (1.11) simplifies, and the number of positions is determined by
ω1αzxnα−1 − (ω2θ +ω3) + β (1− δ) H + β (1− δ) (1− λ)E
[
c
q(θ(s′)) |s
]
= H + cq(θ(s)) . (1.45)
This states that the marginal product minus the marginal wage plus the discounted expected
marginal value must be equal to the cost of creating and filling a position. The marginal value
of a position created and filled today in the next period consists of the value of the position,
(1− δ) H, taking into account the exogenous destruction of a share δ of positions, and the
value of the worker filling it, (1− δ) (1− λ)E
[
c
q(θ(s′)) |s
]
, taking into account that a share λ
of workers in not exogenously destroyed positions will leave the firm. Note that the only
risk remaining for the firm is aggregate risk, which determines market tightness and hence
the filling rate q′. For the remainder of this section, I will abstract from the effects expected
changes in market tightness have on firms, and assume that q′ = q. Then one can solve for the
number of positions as a function of idiosyncratic productivity:
log n˜LB (x) =
log x+log(ω1αz)−log
{
ω2θ+ω3+[1−β(1−δ)]H+[1−β(1−δ)(1−λ)] cq
}
1−α . (1.46)
This shows that the number of positions n˜LB (x) is log-linear in idiosyncratic productivity in
the “perfect insurance” case. We can compare this solution to the creation cutoff nLB (x) in the
model. In general, nLB (x) ≤ n˜LB (x) holds, because the continuation value in the model with
idiosyncratic risk never exceeds the continuation value in the perfect insurance model. The
difference between the creation cutoff and the perfect insurance number of positions can be
interpreted as the amount of positions that a firm creates less in the presence of idiosyncratic
risk, because it fears that the marginal value of the newly created positions falls in the future.
One can show that limx→0 (nLB (x)− n˜LB (x)) = 0 holds, because for low values of idiosyn-
cratic productivity it becomes increasingly unlikely that an even lower value of productivity
is drawn in the next period. In particular, if there is a minimum value in the support of the
distribution of idiosyncratic productivity, nLB (xmin) = n˜LB (xmin). Then, a firm knows for
sure that productivity can’t fall in the next period, and that the continuation value is equal to
the creation and filling cost as in the perfect insurance economy. Figure 1.31 draws the perfect
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insurance cutoff in addition to the creation cutoff for H = 5 and H = 0. Note that the differ-
ence between the two is larger for H = 5, because the continuation value could potentially fall
by more. In the limiting case of no creation cost and no search frictions (c = 0), the two cutoffs
would coincide as well.
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Figure 1.31: Optimal cutoffs (solid) and comparison cutoffs (dashed), that assume a fixed marginal continuation value.
Now, I can define analogous measures for the middle cutoff nMB (x), which determines
whether a firm wants to fill empty positions, and for the upper cutoff nUB (x), which deter-
mines how many workers a firm wants to fire. According to equation (1.10), the middle cutoff
is given by the condition
J (nMB (x) , x, s) = ω1αzxnMB (x)
α−1 − (ω2θ +ω3)− λ cq (θ (s)) + ... (1.47)
β (1− δ)E [J ((1− δ) nMB (x, s) , x′, s′) |x, s] (1.48)
= (1− λ) c
q (θ (s))
.
I want to compare it to a hypothetical cutoff, n˜MB (x), that assumes that the expected marginal
continuation value is equal to the current period’s marginal value:44
E
[
J
(
(1− δ) n˜MB (x) , x′, s′
) |x, s] = J (n˜MB (x) , x, s) . (1.49)
Then the cutoff n˜MB (x) can be calculated:
log n˜MB (x) =
log x + log (ω1αz)− log
{
ω2θ +ω3 + [1− β (1− δ) (1− λ)] cq(θ(s))
}
1− α . (1.50)
A comparison of this cutoff with the perfect insurance cutoff in equation (1.46) shows that it is
obtained by a parallel upward shift in the (log x, log n)-space. Note that the cutoff nMB (x) is
above n˜MB (x) for low values of productivity and below it for high values of x. The reason is
44Note that if both the aggregate and idiosyncratic state remain unchanged, J ((1− δ) nMB (x) , x′, s′) >
J (nMB (x) , x, s) holds because of depreciation (δ > 0). The underlying assumption for the decomposition exercise
is that this bias does not depend much on the size of idiosyncratic volatility.
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that low-productivity firms are more likely to get a positive productivity shock, which leads to
a continuation value above (1− λ) cq . Therefore, the expected continuation value for firms sub-
ject to idiosyncratic risk is higher than (1− λ) cq in the definition of n˜MB (x). This implies that
nMB (x) > n˜MB (x) for low x. In contrast, high productivity firms are more likely to experience
a negative productivity shock, that results in a continuation value below (1− λ) cq . Hence, the
expected continuation value is below (1− λ) cq for those firms and nMB (x) < n˜MB (x). Finally,
note that in the absence of creation costs the middle cutoffs coincide with the low cutoffs as
shown in the right panel of figure 1.31.
The upper cutoff is implicitly defined by equation (1.6)
J (nUB (x, s) , x, s) = (1− λ)
{
ω1αzx [(1− λ) nUB (x, s)]α−1 − (ω2θ +ω3) +
+β (1− δ)E [J ((1−δ)(1−λ)nUB(x,s),x′ ,s′) |x, s]
}
(1.51)
= 0.
Analogous to above, I define n˜UB (x) under the assumption that
E
[
J
(
(1− δ) (1− λ) n˜UB (x) , x′, s′
) |x, s] = 0. (1.52)
Then the cutoff is given by
log n˜UB (x) =
log x + log (ω1αz)− log (ω2θ +ω3)
1− α − log (1− λ) . (1.53)
This cutoff is parallel to n˜MB (x) and n˜LB (x) in the (log x, log n)-space45. In general, nUB (x) ≥
n˜UB (x), because the marginal continuation value that is relevant for nUB (x) is nonnegative,
whereas it is 0 by assumption for n˜UB (x). The difference between the two cutoffs can be
interpreted as the amount of workers that are not fired, and whose positions are not shut
down, because the firm has a chance to get a positive productivity shock. The difference is
getting smaller for high levels of productivity because it becomes less likely for the firm to
become even more productive in the future46.
Let dσj (p) be the log-difference between cutoffs nj and n˜j, evaluated at the 100p
th-percentile,
when the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity is σ.47 Denoting the inverse cumu-
lative distribution function of the idiosyncratic shock by F−1σx (.), the three differences can be
written as
dσLB (p) = log nLB
(
F−1σx (p)
)
− log n˜LB
(
F−1σx (p)
)
≤ 0, (1.54)
dσMB (p) = log nMB
(
F−1σx (p)
)
− log n˜MB
(
F−1σx (p)
)
, (1.55)
dσUB (p) = log nUB
(
F−1σx (p)
)
− log n˜UB
(
F−1σx (p)
)
≥ 0. (1.56)
45In theory, n˜UB (x) could be smaller than n˜MB (x). In my calibration, λ is small enough relative cq such that
n˜UB (x) > n˜MB (x) holds.
46In general it is not true that limx→∞ (nUB (x)− n˜UB (x)) = 0 holds. This is because in the presence of depreciation
and attrition of workers, a firm’s size shrinks over time. This increases marginal profits leading to a positive expected
continuation value even if J (nUB (xmax) , x, s) = 0 and x′ ≤ xmax.
47To keep notation simpler, I use subscript j, whenever an expression applies to all three cutoffs LB, MB, and UB.
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1.C.2 Asymmetry of wait-and-see effect
The shifts of the cutoffs for the wait-and-see effect in figure 1.8 are not parallel. First, the ef-
fects are hump-shaped. They are smaller for p close to 0 or p close to 1, because then most
new productivity shocks lead to the firm being at the lower or upper cutoff, respectively. For
example, take a firm in a low percentile of current productivity. When a new shock arrives,
it is likely to become significantly more productive. In that case, the firm is going to create
positions after the good productivity draw even if it was currently (close to) firing workers.
Thus the marginal continuation value of a position is likely to be at its upper bound after a
new productivity draw. Increasing uncertainty still increases the expected continuation value
by a bit, which leads to an increase of dσUB (p), but the effect is quantitatively small. Second,
the change in cutoffs peaks at lower productivity values for the upper bound and at higher
productivity values for the lower bound. The reason for this asymmetry is that
∣∣dσLB (p)∣∣ is
larger for more productive firms as could be seen in figure 1.31. For those firms a future fall in
productivity is more likely, which makes them more cautious in creating positions. Higher un-
certainty exacerbates the potential losses and increases
∣∣dσLB (p)∣∣. In contrast, low-productivity
firms are unlikely to get even less productive in the future. Therefore, higher uncertainty in-
creases
∣∣dσLB (p)∣∣ by less. A similar argument can be applied for the upper cutoff: dσUB (p) is
small for very productive firms, because they are unlikely to become even more productive.
Therefore, changes in uncertainty affect dσUB (p) less. Note that this asymmetry increases the
effects relative to a symmetric shift of the cutoffs, because there a more high-productivity firms
close to the lower cutoff and more low-productivity firms close to the upper cutoff. Third, the
effects are quantitatively stronger in the presence of creation cost. The larger the creation cost,
the bigger becomes the difference between the upper and the lower bound of the continuation
value, and the more likely it is for a firm to be in the interior region after a shock. This means
that potential gains or losses from an increase in uncertainty become larger and firms adjust
their cutoffs by more. As a result, the wait-and-see effect becomes more relevant when H is
large.
1.D Comparison with US time series
This appendix provides additional graphs for the excercise matching the US time series in
section 1.6.
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Figure 1.32: Model without uncertainty shocks: Aggregate productivity is estimated in each quarter to match labour
productivity in the model to the data (linear trend removed). Relative to the baseline calibration, using ω2 = 0.5, a
lower value of ω2 = 0.2 is used, which makes the wage less responsive to changes in market tightness.
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Figure 1.33: Model with aggregate productivity and uncertainty shocks: Aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic
volatility are estimated in each quarter to match labour productivity and unemployment rate in the model to the data
(linear trend removed). The top right panel compares the backed out volatility shocks with the empirical volatility
index by normalising all series to have variance 1.
Chapter 2
Unemployment (Fears) and
Deflationary Spirals: The Role of
Sticky Nominal Wages
2.1 Introduction
The empirical literature documents that workers suffer substantial earnings losses and reduc-
tions in consumption levels during unemployment spells. For example, Kolsrud, Landais,
Nilsson, and Spinnewijn (2015) document using Swedish data that consumption drops on av-
erage by 32% during the first year of an unemployment spell.1 This observed inability to insure
against unemployment spells has motivated several researchers to build business cycle mod-
els with incomplete markets. The hope (and expectation) has been that such models would not
only generate more realistic behavior for individual variables, but also would be able to gener-
ate sufficiently volatile and prolonged business cycles without relying on large and persistent
exogenous shocks hitting the economy. In these models, individual consumption is typically
much more volatile than aggregate consumption, but the laws of motion for aggregate vari-
ables are often not that different from the outcomes in the corresponding representative-agent
version. Exemplary papers are Krusell and Smith (1998) and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin
(2010). Moreover, McKay and Reis (2013) document that reductions in unemployment bene-
fits actually reduce the volatility of aggregate consumption. The reason is that workers build
up larger buffer stocks of assets when unemployment benefits are reduced, which makes the
economy as a whole better equipped to smooth consumption.
We develop a model in which the inability to insure against unemployment risk gener-
ates business cycles which are much more volatile than the corresponding complete-markets
(i.e., representative-agent) version in which all agents’ consumption levels are identical in each
and every period. This result is obtained by combining incomplete markets with incomplete
adjustment of the nominal wage rate to changes in the price level.2 The mechanism is strength-
ened by Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search frictions in the labor market.
1See section 2.3.2 for a more detailed discussion of the empirical literature investigating the behavior of individual
consumption during unemployment spells.
2Empirical motivation for this assumption is discussed in section 2.3.1.
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Before explaining why the combination of incomplete markets and sticky nominal wages
amplifies business cycles, we first explain why these features by themselves dampen business
cycles in our model in which aggregate fluctuations are caused by productivity shocks. First,
consider the model in which there are complete markets, but nominal wages do not respond
one-for-one to price level changes. A negative productivity shock operates like a negative sup-
ply shock and increases prices, which—when nominal wages are sticky—would put down-
ward pressure on real wages, which would dampen the reduction in profits caused by the
direct negative effect of the reduction in productivity. Next, consider a model in which nomi-
nal wages are flexible, but workers cannot fully insure themselves against unemployment risk.
Forward-looking agents understand that persistent negative productivity shocks increase their
chances of being unemployed in the near future. If workers are not fully insured against this
risk, then this would increase precautionary savings. In our general equilibrium model, this
increased desire to save will lead to an increased demand for all assets including productive
(and risky) assets such as firm ownership. This would dampen the reduction in the demand for
productive assets triggered by the direct negative effect of reduced productivity levels.
Why does the combination of incomplete markets and sticky nominal wages lead to the
opposite results? As mentioned above, the increase in the expected probability of being un-
employed in the near future increases agents’ desire to save more. Agents are particularly
keen to increase savings by holding more of the liquid asset (money), which puts downward
pressure on the price level, which in turn increases real wage costs and reduces profits. This
effect dominates any positive effect that increased precautionary savings might have on the
demand for productive investments. Once started, this channel will reinforce itself. That is,
if precautionary savings lead—through downward (upward) pressure on prices (real wage
costs)—to increased unemployment, then this in turn will lead to a further increase in pre-
cautionary savings. In our numerical examples, this downward spiral is (eventually) reversed
by non-linearities in the matching market, that is, it becomes more attractive to invest in new
firms when there are many unemployed workers searching for a job.
The property that workers are forward looking implies that concerns about future unem-
ployment risk are preceded by increased real wage costs when nominal wages are sticky. The
matching friction in the labor market magnifies this channel. The reason is that firms that
foresee a future with higher real wage costs will reduce vacancy posting now and bring the
concern about unemployment risk closer to the present.
We use our framework to study the advantages of alternative unemployment insurance
(UI) policies and document that the effects of changes in unemployment benefits on the be-
havior of aggregate variables and on the wellbeing of workers differ from the effects in other
models. For example, in the model of Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) most agents ben-
efit from reductions in unemployment benefits even when benefits are reduced to very low
levels. We consider an increase in unemployment benefits from the benchmark value of 50% to
55% of the prevailing wage rate and document that this increase in UI benefits improves the
welfare of all agents when the switch occurs at the beginning of a recession and this is even
true if wage rates adjust upwards to take into account the strengthened bargaining position of
workers.3
There are quite a few factors that are important for this result. As a preview of the analysis,
we mention here some factors that operate in our model and have not been emphasized in
3Wage increases have negative welfare consequences because they reduce job creation.
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the literature. If unemployment benefits are increased during a recession, then this obviously
benefits the unemployed directly. But the employed benefit too. Understandably, they benefit
because they are better insured against future unemployment risk. Moreover, by reducing the
negative downward spiral discussed above, the employed are less likely to be unemployed in
the near future. Perhaps more surprisingly, they also benefit because the dampening of the
downward spiral implies that the value of their equity holdings does not drop by that much
relative to the case in which unemployment benefits are not increased.
As mentioned above, an increase in unemployment benefits has a negative effect on aver-
age investment, because agents save less if they are better insured. This leads to a reduction in
the average employment rate. This channel is important in our model as well. In the version
of our model with aggregate uncertainty, however, there are two quantitatively important fac-
tors that push average employment in the opposite direction and dominate the negative effect
due to the reduction in precautionary savings. The first is that the demand for the produc-
tive asset increases, because asset prices are less volatile as increased unemployment benefits
dampen the mechanism responsible for generating volatile business cycles. The second is that
the non-linearity in the matching friction is such that increases in employment during booms
are smaller than reductions during recessions. Consequently, a reduction in volatility would
lead to an increase in average employment.
There is no interaction between the presence of sticky nominal wages and a permanent
change in the level of unemployment benefits, except possibly during the transition phase.
We document that there is a beneficial interaction when the change in the UI regime involves
the introduction of a countercyclical component to UI benefits. An increase in UI benefits during
recessions implies that precautionary saving does not increase by as much, which means that
the price level does not drop by as much (and possibly even increases). Since this change in UI
benefits and its induced effects on the price level are temporary, real wage costs are affected
when nominal wages are sticky. In particular, there is less upward pressure on real wage
costs, since prices drop by less. Another advantage of countercylical benefits is that it does not
increase workers’ bargaining position by as much which also implies that there is less upward
pressure on real wages.
In our model, precautionary savings can end up in the productive asset (firm ownership)
and the unproductive asset (money). This complicates the analysis, because it means that the
model simultaneously solves for agents’ portfolio choices and equilibrium prices. Our numeri-
cal analysis ensures that the market for firm ownership (equity) is in equilibrium and all agents
owning equity discount future equity returns with the correct, that is, their own individual-
specific, marginal rate of substitution.4 By contrast, typical assumptions in the literature are
that workers jointly own the productive asset at equal shares, that these shares cannot be sold,
and that discounting of the returns of this asset occurs with some average marginal rate of
substitution or a marginal rate of substitution based on aggregate consumption.5,6 Exceptions
are Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) and Bayer, Lu¨tticke, Pham-Dao, and Tjaden (2014),
who—like us—allow trade in the productive asset and discount the agents’ returns on this
4See section 2.2.7 for a detailed discussion.
5Examples are Shao and Silos (2007), Nakajima (2010), Gorneman, Kuester, and Nakajima (2012), Favilukis, Lud-
vigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013), and Ravn and Sterk (2015).
6An alternative simplifying assumption is that the only agents who are allowed to invest in the productive asset
are agents that are not affected by idiosyncratic risk (of any kind). Examples are Rudanko (2009), Bils, Chang, and
Kim (2011), Challe, Matheron, Ragot, and Rubio-Ramirez (2014), and Challe and Ragot (2014).
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asset with the correct marginal rate of substitution.7
In section 2.2, we describe the model. In section 2.3, we provide empirical motivation for
the key assumptions underlying our model, sticky nominal wages and workers’ inability to
insure against unemployment risk. In this section, we also discuss the relationship between
savings and idiosyncratic uncertainty. In section 2.4, we discuss the calibration of our model.
In sections 2.5, and 2.6, we describe the behavior of individual and aggregate variables, re-
spectively. In section 2.7, we discuss how business cycle behavior is affected by alternative UI
policies.
2.2 Model
The economy consists of households, firms, and a government. The mass of firms is equal to
qt and all firms are identical. There is a unit mass of households and these differ in their em-
ployment status (employed or unemployed) and in their asset holdings. There are two types
of assets, firm ownership (equity) and a liquid asset with a risk-free nominal value (money). In
this section, we describe the behavior of the three different agents and the two asset markets.
Notation. Upper (lower) case variables denote nominal (real) variables. The subscript i refers
to household i. Variables without a subscript i are either aggregate or variables that are iden-
tical across agents, such as prices.
2.2.1 Households
Each household consists of one worker who is either employed, ei,t = 1, or unemployed,
ei,t = 0. The period-t budget constraint of household i is given by
Ptci,t + Jt (qi,t+1 − (1− δ) qi,t) + Mi,t+1
= (2.1)
(1− τt)Wtei,t + µ (1− τt)Wt (1− ei,t) + Dtqi,t + Mi,t,
where ci,t denotes the consumption of household i, Pt the price of the consumption good, Mi,t
the amount of the liquid asset held at the beginning of period t (and chosen in period t− 1), τt
the tax rate on wage income, Wt, the nominal wage rate, and µWt the level of unemployment
benefits. The variable qi,t is the amount of equity held at the beginning of period t. These
ownership shares pay out nominal dividends Dt. Each period, a fraction δ of all firms go out
of business and this leads to a corresponding loss in equity.8 When qi,t+1 − (1− δ) qi,t is larger
(smaller) than zero, then the worker is buying (selling) equity and the nominal value of this
transaction is equal to Jt (qi,t+1 − (1− δ) qi,t), where Jt is the nominal price of equity.
Households are not allowed to take short positions in equity, that is
qi,t+1 ≥ 0. (2.2)
7The procedure in Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) is exact if the aggregate shock can take on as many
realizations as there are assets and no agents are at the constraint. Our procedure does not require such restrictions,
which is important, because the fraction of agents at the constraint is nontrivial in our model.
8In our benchmark model, we assume that households hold a diversified portfolio of equity, which means that all
investors face the same loss, δ.
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The household maximizes the following objective function:9
Et
 ∞∑
j=0
βj

 c1−γi,t+j − 1
1− γ
+ χ
(Mi,t+1+j
Pt+j
)1−ζ − 1
1− ζ

 .
The first-order conditions are given by the budget constraint, the short-sale constraint and
c−γi,t = βEt
[
c−γi,t+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
+ χ
(
Mi,t+1
Pt
)−ζ
, (2.3)
c−γi,t ≥ βEt
[
c−γi,t+1
(
Dt+1 + (1− δ) Jt+1
Jt
)
Pt
Pt+1
]
, (2.4)
0 = qi,t+1
(
c−γi,t − βEt
[
c−γi,t+1
(
Dt+1 + (1− δ) Jt+1
Jt
)
Pt
Pt+1
])
. (2.5)
In this model, agents hold money to facilitating transactions, but also to insure themselves
against unemployment risk. Telyukova (2013) documents that households hold on average
50% more liquidity than they spend on average each month. The utility specification implies
that agents will always choose positive real money balances. That is, there is no borrowing.
Short positions in the liquid asset would become possible if the argument of the utility function
is equal to (Mi,t + Φ)/Pt with Φ > 0 instead of Mi,t/Pt. At higher values of Φ, agents can
take larger short positions in money and are, thus, better insured against unemployment risk.
Increases in χ—while keeping Φ equal to zero—have similar implications, since higher values
of χ imply higher levels of financial assets.
2.2.2 Firms
An existing firm produces zt, which is identical across firms. The value of zt follows a first-
order Markov process with a low (recession) and a high (boom) value. The partition into a
recession and a boom regime simplifies characterizing model properties.10
There is one worker attached to each firm. Thus, the number of firms, qt, is equal to the
economy-wide employment rate. The nominal wage rate, Wt, is the only cost to the firm.
Consequently, nominal firm profits, Dt, are given by
Dt = Ptzt −Wt. (2.6)
The nominal wage rate is set according to
Wt = ω0
( zt
z
)ωz
z
(
Pt
P
)ωP
P, (2.7)
where z is the average productivity level, Pt is the price level, and P is the average price level.
Since the focus of this paper is on the responsiveness of nominal wages, Wt, to nominal prices,
Pt, we need a wage setting rule with which we can vary this responsiveness. If ωP = 1
9If money and consumption enter the utility function additively, then money does not enter the Euler equation of
other assets directly. This is consistent with the empirical results in Ireland (2004) who finds that the coefficient of
money in the IS curve is very small (the standard error is quite sizable, however, so other specifications cannot be
ruled out).
10Although we can solve the model for richer processes, this simple specification for zt clearly helps in keeping the
computational burden manageable.
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(ωP < 1), then wages adjust fully (partially) to changes in Pt. The coefficient ω0 indicates
the fraction of output that goes to the worker when zt and Pt take on their average values and
the coefficient ωz indicates the sensitivity of the wage rate to changes in productivity. The
value of ωz controls how wages vary with business cycle conditions. This sensitivity is a key
question in the labor search literature. In particular, Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue that the
popular Nash bargaining framework makes wages to cyclical by making the relevant reference
point the value of being unemployed.11
2.2.3 Government
The government taxes wages to finance unemployment benefits. Since the level of unemploy-
ment benefits is equal to a fixed fraction of the wage rate and taxes are proportional to wage
income, the government’s budget constraint can be written as
τtqtWt = (1− qt) µ (1− τt)Wt. (2.8)
From this equation we get an expression for taxes, τt, which only depend on the employment
rate. That is,
τt = µ
1− qt
qt + µ (1− qt) . (2.9)
An increase in qt means that there is an increase in the tax base and a reduction in the number
of unemployed. Both lead to a reduction in the tax rate.
2.2.4 Firm creation and equity market12
Agents that would like to increase their equity position in firm ownership, i.e., agents for
whom qi,t+1 − (1− δ) qi,t > 0, can buy equity at price Jt from agents that would like to sell
equity, i.e., from agents for whom qi,t+1 − (1− δ) qi,t < 0. Alternatively, agents who would
like to buy additional equity can also acquire new firms by creating them. The creation of new
firms requires making an investment vi,t. How many new firms are created with a certain in-
vestment level depends on the number of unemployed workers, ut, and the aggregate amount
invested, vt. In particular, the total number of new firms created is equal to
ht ≡ qt − (1− δ) qt−1 = ψvηt u1−ηt (2.10)
and an individual investment of vi,t results in (ht/vt)vi,t new firms. In equilibrium, the cost of
creating one new firm, vt/ht, has to be equal to the real market price, Jt/Pt, since new firms
11Under Nash bargaining, workers’ wages vary with their individual wealth level, which would increase the com-
putational burden. One could question whether this is an empirically relevant feature. Moreover, the results in
Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) indicate that this complication may only have a substantial effect on the wages
of the poorest agents.
12Our representation of the matching market looks somewhat different than usual. As documented in appendix
2.C, however, it is identical to the standard setup. Our way of ”telling the story” has three advantages. First, in
our model, there is only one type of investor, namely the household. That is, we do not have zombie entrepreneurs
who fulfill a crucial role in the standard setup, but do not get any positive net benefits out of this. Second, all agents
in our economy have access to the same two assets, namely firm ownership and money. By contrast, households
and enterpreneurs have different investment opportunities in the standard setup. Third, we have one parameter less
and avoid the feature of the standard setup that different combinations of the vacancy posting cost and the scalings
coefficient of the matching function lead to identical results for all variables except the level of vacancies, for which
the data does not give good guidance anyway.
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are identical to existing firms. Setting vt/ht equal to Jt/Pt and using equation (2.10) gives
vt =
(
ψ
Jt
Pt
)1/(1−η)
ut, (2.11)
that is investment in new firms/jobs is increasing in Jt and increasing in the mass of workers
looking for a job.
Equilibrium in the equity market requires that the supply of equity is equal to the demand
of equity, that is,
ht +
∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
((1− δ) qi − q (ei, qi, Mi; st))+ dFt (ei, qi, Mi)
= (2.12)∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
(q (ei, qi, Mi; st)− (1− δ) qi)+ dFt (ei, qi, Mi) ,
where (x)+ equals x when x ≥ 0 and equals 0 when x < 0. Also, Ft (ei, qi, Mi) is the period-t
cumulative distribution function of the cross-sectional distribution of the three individual state
variables: the employment state, ei, money holdings, Mi, and equity holdings, qi. The variable
st denotes the set of aggregate state variables and its elements are discussed in section 2.2.6.
Combining the last three equations gives
ψ1/(1−η)
(
Jt
Pt
)η/(1−η)
ut =
∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
(q (ei, qi, Mi; st)− (1− δ) qi) dFt (ei, qi, Mi) . (2.13)
The supply of new equity (the left-hand side) is increasing in Jt and the net demand for equity
(right-hand side) is decreasing in Jt.
2.2.5 Money market
Similarly, equilibrium in the market for money holdings requires that the net demand of
households wanting to increase their money holdings is equal to the net supply of households
wanting to decrease their money holdings. That is,
∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
(M (ei, qi, Mi; st)−Mi)+ dFt (ei, qi, Mi)
= (2.14)∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
(Mi −M (ei, qi, Mi; st))+ dFt (ei, qi, Mi) .
In section 2.7.2, we describe how liquidity injections would affect model outcomes and whether
central banks are likely to pursue such policies.
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2.2.6 Equilibrium and model solution
In equilibrium, the following conditions hold: (i) asset demand is determined by the house-
holds’ optimality conditions, (ii) the cost of creating a new firm equals the market price of an
existing firm, (iii) the demand for equity from households that want to buy equity equals the
creation of new firms plus the supply of equity from households that want to sell equity, (iv)
the demand for the liquid assets from households that want to increase their holdings is equal
to the supply from households that want to reduce their holdings and (v) the government’s
budget constraint is satisfied.
The state variables for agent i are his asset holdings, his employment status, and the ag-
gregate state variables. The latter consist of the aggregate productivity level, zt, and the cross-
sectional joint distribution of employment status and asset holdings. We use an algorithm
similar to the one used in Krusell and Smith (1998) to solve for the laws of motion of aggregate
variables. Details on the numerical procedure are given in appendix 2.B.1.
2.2.7 Discounting firm profits correctly with heterogeneous ownership
With incomplete markets and heterogeneous firm ownership, the question arises how to dis-
count future firm profits. In our model, each and every firm owner discounts firm profits cor-
rectly. The reason is that agents can buy and sell equity. This means that the Euler equation for
equity holds with equality for all investors holding equity, which implies that all firm owners
discount the proceeds of the equity investment with the correct, i.e., their own individual-
specific, marginal rate of substitution.13 In our model (and in our numerical algorithm) the
market price and quantities are determined simultaneously such that both the equilbrium
condition and each agent’s Euler equation are satisfied. In our model, agents can choose to
invest in the liquid, less risky, and unproductive asset and in the riskier and productive asset.
Models with heterogeneous agents often assume that agents can only trade in the unproduc-
tive asset and assume that there is some form of communal ownership of the productive asset
with ownership shares that remain fixed through time.14 Investment decisions in the produc-
tive asset are then based on an Euler equation using a marginal rate of substitution based on
aggregate consumption, an average of the marginal rate of substitution of all agents, or risk
neutral discounting. Another approach is to assume that investments in the productive asset
are made by another type of agents who is not affected by uncertainty.15 Both approaches
simplify the analysis a lot, but both direct any possible consequences of precautionary savings
induced by idiosyncratic risk towards the unproductive asset only.
A long outstanding and unresolved debate in corporate finance deals with firm decision
making when owners are heterogeneous and markets are incomplete. This is not an issue
here, because firms do not make decisions with intertemporal consequences.16 If firms had to
13Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) also describe a procedure to discount firm profits (almost) correctly. They
assume that the number of assets is equal to the number of realizations of the aggregate shock. Firm profits can then be
discounted with the prices of the two corresponding contingent claims and this would be exactly correct if borrowing
or short-sell constraints are not binding for any investor. Our procedure allows investors to be constrained and the
number of realizations of the aggregate shock can exceed the number of assets.
14Examples are Shao and Silos (2007), Nakajima (2010), Gorneman, Kuester, and Nakajima (2012), Favilukis, Lud-
vigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013), and Ravn and Sterk (2015).
15Examples are Rudanko (2009), Bils, Chang, and Kim (2011), Challe, Matheron, Ragot, and Rubio-Ramirez (2014),
and Challe and Ragot (2014).
16Note that firm creation is a static decision and all agents in the economy would compare the cost of creating one
firm, vt/ht, and its market value, Jt/Pt, in the same way.
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make such decisions, we would have to deal with this challenging issue and specify how firm
decisions are made. Conditional on this specification, however, our approach can still be used
and firm owners would still discount firm revenues correctly.17
2.3 Empirical motivation
In this section, we discuss some key empirical observations that motivate our analysis. First,
we discuss the evidence in favor of sticky nominal wages and whether that has or has not
affected wage costs during the recent economic downturn. Second, we discuss the inability
of individuals to insure themselves against unemployment spells. Third, we discuss whether
savings respond to an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty. The discussion mainly highlights
the behavior of key Eurozone variables during the recent financial crisis, although we will also
discuss evidence from other periods and countries outside the Eurozone. Details on the data
sources are given in appendix 2.A.
2.3.1 Deflationary pressure and sticky nominal wages
In our heterogeneous-agent model, precautionary savings motives put upward pressure on
the demand for money, which in turn puts downward pressure on prices. If nominal wages
do not fully respond to changes in prices, then this puts upward pressure on real unit wage
costs during recessions.
There are four elements in this story. First, there is downward pressure on prices.18 Second,
nominal wages do not fully adjust for inflation. Third, real unit wage costs increase, that is,
upward pressure on real wages is not offset by increases in labor productivity.19 Fourth, the
increase in wage costs is also relevant for new jobs. These four elements are discussed next.
Deflationary pressure. Our paper focuses on recessions during which households’ inability
to fully insure themselves against increased idiosyncratic risk increases households’ desire
to save, which puts downward pressure on prices. The top panel of figure 2.1 plots the GDP
deflator for the Eurozone (18 countries as of 2014) together with the time path that the deflators
would have followed if inflation during the period following the fourth quarter of 2007 had
been equal to the average inflation rate over the five preceding years. The figure shows that
the growth in the price level slowed considerably during the crisis.20
17This remains a tricky problem, even if the firms’ objective function is given and all firms have the same objective.
For example, suppose that all firms maximize current market value. Identical firms could then very well end up
making different decisions. To see why, suppose that all firms make the same intertemporal decision. By deviating
and providing different future payoff realizations, a firm can create value by ”completing the market”. As discussed
in Ekern and Wilson (1974), if firms decisions do not alter the set of returns available to the whole economy, then
investors can ”undo” the effects of firm decisions on the payoffs of their individual portfolio. Consequently, investors
would agree on what choices the firm should make. Carceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009) show that this happens
in their model in which firms have constant return to scale technology and there are no binding borrowing constraints.
18Our story does not require prices to be procyclical. That is, the channel we identify is also present when the
precautionary motive only dampens countercyclical behavior.
19Our model has ambiguous predictions for the cyclicality of real wages. If nominal wages respond little to lower
inflation and little to lower productivity, then it is possible that the real wage rate increases during a recession. In our
benchmark model, real wages initially increase following a negative productivity shock and then start to decrease.
20Remarkable deflationary pressure is also visible in the US consumer price index (CPI). It dropped by 3.4% during
the period from September 2008 to December 2008.
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Figure 2.1: Key Eurozone variables before and after the financial crisis.
Notes. Panel (a) illustrates the GDP deflator for the Eurozone (18 countries as of 2014) together with its pre-crisis
trend. Panel (b) illustrates nominal hourly earnings, the GDP deflator, and their associated pre-crisis trends.
Panel (c) illustrates nominal unit labor costs together with the GDP deflator.
Source: OECD.
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Nominal wage stickiness and inflation. There are many papers that document that nominal
wages are sticky.21 Important for our paper is the question to what extent nominal wages ad-
just to aggregate shocks and in particular to changes in the aggregate price level. Well suited
for our purpose is Druant, Fabiani, Kezdi, Lamo, Martins, and Sabbatini (2009) which pro-
vides survey evidence for a sample of European firms with a focus on the wages of the firms’
main occupational groups; these would not change for reasons such as promotion. Another
attractive feature of this study is that it explicitly investigates whether nominal wages adjust
to inflation. In their survey, only 29.7% of Eurozone firms indicate that they have an inter-
nal policy of taking inflation into account when setting wages and only half of these firms
do so using automatic indexation. Moreover, most firms that take inflation into account are
backward looking. Both findings imply that real wages increase (or decrease by less) when
inflation rates fall. Even though there are not that many firms that have an automatic policy in
place, inflation is the prevalent factor triggering wage adjustment. In particular, around 50%
of Eurozone firms adjust wages to inflation yearly and around 6% do this more frequently.22
Papers that document nominal wage rigidity typically highlight the importance of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity. Suppose there is downward, but no upward nominal wage rigid-
ity. Does this imply that all nominal wages respond fully to changes in aggregate prices as long
as aggregate prices increase? The answer is no. The reason is that firms are heterogeneous and
a fraction of firms can still be constrained by the inability to adjust nominal wages downward.
In fact, downward nominal wage rigidity is supported by the empirical finding that the his-
togram of firms’ nominal wage changes has a large peak at zero.23 The fraction of firms that
is affected by the constraint that nominal wages cannot be adjusted downward would be in-
creasing if the aggregate price level increases by less. In fact, Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking (2012)
document that the fraction of US workers with a constant nominal wage increased from 11.2%
in 2007 to 16% in 2011, whereas the fraction of workers facing a reduction in nominal wages
was roughly unchanged.24 This indicates that there is upward pressure on real wages when
the inflation rate falls even if it remains positive and nominal wages are only rigid downward.
To investigate whether nominal wages followed the slowdown in inflation, we plot in the
second panel of figure 2.1 nominal hourly earnings together with the GDP deflator. The figure
also plots the realizations of both variables if they would have grown at a rate equal to the
average observed in the five years before the crisis. We find that nominal wages continued to
grow at pre-crisis rates, despite a substantial reduction in inflation rates. This means that real
wages actually increased relative to trend.25
Real wage costs. The observed increases in real wages are not necessarily due to a combi-
nation of low inflation and downward nominal wage rigidity. It is possible that solid real
21See, for example, Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2010), Dickens, Goette, Groshen, Holden, Messina, Schweitzer,
Turunen, and Ward (2007), Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking (2012), Daly and Hobijn (2013), and Druant, Fabiani, Kezdi,
Lamo, Martins, and Sabbatini (2009).
22The actual number may be a bit higher, since roughly 30% of firms select as their answer the residual category,
which includes ”don’t know” in addition to ”never”.
23See Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2010), Dickens, Goette, Groshen, Holden, Messina, Schweitzer, Turunen, and
Ward (2007), Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking (2012), and Daly and Hobijn (2013).
24Similarly, at http://nadaesgratis.es/?p=39350, Marcel Jansen documents that from 2008 to 2013 there was a mas-
sive increase in the fraction of Spanish workers with no change in the nominal wage. There is some increase in the
fraction of workers with a decrease in the nominal wage, but this increase is small relative to the increase in the spike
of the histogram at constant nominal wages.
25Similarly, Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking (2012), Daly and Hobijn (2013), and Rendahl (2012) document that real wages
increased during the recent recession in the US.
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wage growth reflects an increase in labor productivity, for example, because workers that are
not laid off are more productive than those workers that left employment. To shed light on
this possibility, we compare the nominal unit wage cost with the price level.26 The results are
shown in the bottom panel of figure 2.1. The figure shows that nominal unit labor costs have
grown faster than prices in the private sector since the onset of the crisis, whereas the opposite
was true before the crisis. This indicates that real labor costs increased during the crisis even
if one corrects for productivity.27
The observations are consistent with the hypothesis that the combination of deflationary
pressure and nominal wage stickiness increased wage costs. In principle, it is still possible that
nominal wages in the Eurozone did respond fully to prices. However, in that case, it must be
true that the reduction in employment is mainly due to an outflow of workers that earn low
wages and could produce at low real unit labor cost, since both real wages and real unit labor
costs increased. That is, it must be the case that the workers who left employment were the
ones who had a wage that was low relative to their productivity. That does not seem a very
plausible possibility.
Wages of new and existing relationships. What matters in labor market matching models
is the flexibility of wages of newly hired workers. Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013)
argue that wages of new hires respond almost one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.
Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2014) argue that this result reflects changes in the composition
of new hires and that—after correction for such composition effects—the wages of new hires
are not more cyclical than wages of existing workers. More importantly, what matters for our
paper is whether nominal wages respond to changes in the price level and this question is
not addressed in either paper. As mentioned above, Druant, Fabiani, Kezdi, Lamo, Martins,
and Sabbatini (2009) find that many firms do not adjust wages to inflation. Since their survey
evidence focuses on firms’ main occupational groups one would think that their results apply
to new as well as old matches.
2.3.2 Inability to insure against unemployment risk
An important feature of our model is that workers cannot fully insure against unemploy-
ment risk. They are limited to do so because there are only two assets, neither of which has
individual-specific payoffs. Moreover, short positions are not allowed. Consequently, work-
ers’ consumption levels drop when agents become unemployed.
Using Swedish data, Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, and Spinnewijn (2015) document that ex-
penditures on consumption goods drop sharply during the first year of an unemployment
spell after which they settle down at a level that is 34% lower than the pre-displacement level.
This sharp drop is remarkable given that Sweden has quite generous unemployment benefits.
As discussed in section 2.4, one reason is that the amount of assets workers hold at the start
of an unemployment spell is low. Another reason is that average borrowing actually decreases
during observed unemployment spells.
26The nominal unit wage cost is defined as the cost of producing one unit of output, i.e., the nominal wage rate
divided by labor productivity. The price index used as comparison is the price index used in defining labor produc-
tivity.
27The observation that real unit labor costs are not constant over the business cycle is interesting in itself. If the
real wage rate is equal to the marginal product of capital and the marginal product is proportional to average labor
productivity—properties that hold in several business cycle models—then real unit labor costs would be constant.
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Stephens (2004) and Saporta-Eksten (2014) provide empirical support using US data. Using
the four 1992-1996 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Stephens (2004) finds that
annual food consumption is 16% lower when a worker reports that he is no longer working
for the employer of the previous wave either because of a layoff, business closure, or business
relocation, that is, the worker was displaced between two waves. Stephens (2004) finds simi-
lar results using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).28 Using the 1999-2009 biannual
waves of the PSID, Saporta-Eksten (2014) finds that job loss leads to a drop in total consump-
tion of 17%. In particular, a drop of about 9% occurs before job loss and a drop of about 8%
around job loss. The drop before job loss suggests that either the worker anticipated the lay-
off or labor income was already under pressure. Moreover, this drop in consumption is very
persistent and is only slightly less than 17% six years after displacement.
2.3.3 Savings and idiosyncratic uncertainty
The idea that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays an important role in the savings decisions of
individuals has a rich history in the economics literature. The theoretical literature shows
that idiosyncratic uncertainty increases savings when the third-order derivative of the util-
ity function with respect to consumption is positive and/or the agent faces borrowing con-
straints.29 Moreover, idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding unemployment is more important
for recessions—like the recent recession—which are characterized by a prolonged downturn
and an increase in the average duration of unemployment spells. Krueger, Cramer, and Cho
(2014) document that the number of long-term unemployed increased during the recent reces-
sion in all countries considered, except in Germany. The results are particularly striking for the
US. During the recent recession, the amount of workers who were out of work for more than
half a year relative to all unemployed workers reached a peak of 45%, whereas the highest
peak observed in previous recessions was about 25%.
Several papers have provided empirical support for the hypothesis that increases in id-
iosyncratic uncertainty increases savings. Using 1992-98 data from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), Benito (2004) finds that an individual whose level of idiosyncratic un-
certainty would move from the bottom to the top of the cross-sectional distribution reduces
consumption by 11% ceteris paribus. An interesting aspect of this study is that the results
hold both for a measure of idiosyncratic uncertainty based on individuals’ own perceptions
as well as on an econometric specification.30 Empirical evidence for this relationship dur-
ing the recent downturn can be found in Alan, Crossley, and Low (2012) who argue that the
observed sharp rise in the savings ratio of the UK private sector is driven by increases in un-
certainty, rather than other explanations such as tightening of credit standards. In line with
the mechanism emphasized in this paper, Carroll (1992) argues that employment uncertainty
is especially important because unemployment spells are the reason for the most drastic fluc-
tuations in household income. He provides empirical evidence that the fear of unemployment
leads to an increased desire to save even when controlling for expected income growth.
28Stephens (2004) also reports that the amount of the drop does not depend much on whether the job loss was
expected or not. This result raises the question whether savings always do significantly increase in anticipation of an
increased probability of job loss.
29See Kimball (1992).
30Although the sign is correct, the results based on individuals’ own perceptions are not significant.
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2.4 Calibration
In this section, we motivate the parameter values used to generate the results. The section
starts with a discussion of the parameter values that play a key role in generating the results
followed by a discussion of the remaining parameter values. The model period is one quarter.
Targets are constructed using Eurozone data from 1980 to 2012.31
Key parameter values. Regarding the choice of key parameter values, our strategy is to show
that our main results can be generated with conservative choices. For example, we set the
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 2. Even though risk aversion is not that high, the
differences between our heterogeneous-agent model and the representative-agent version are
substantial.
The incidence and duration of unemployment spells are obviously important. The proba-
bly of job destruction, δ, and the parameter characterizing efficiency in the matching market, ψ,
are chosen to ensure that the unemployment rate and the expected duration of an unemploy-
ment spell in the economy without aggregate risk match their observed counterparts, which
are equal to 10.7% and 3.57 quarters.32 The latter corresponds to a worker matching proba-
bility of 28%. These numbers imply a 3.36% job separation rate and a value for ψ equal to
0.574.
The generosity of the unemployment insurance regime is a key variable affecting the sever-
ity of unemployment spells. They vary a lot across countries in Europe. Esser, Ferrarini, Nel-
son, Palme, and Sjo¨berg (2013) report that net replacement rates for insured workers vary
from 20% in Malta to just above 90% in Portugal. Most countries have net replacement rates
between 50% and 70% with an average duration of around one year. Coverage ratios vary
from about 50% in Italy to 100% in Finland, Ireland, and Greece. Net replacement rates for
workers that are not covered are much lower. In most countries, these are less than 40% and in
some countries substantially so. In the model, unemployment benefits are set equal to 50% and
—for computational convenience—are assumed to last for the duration of the unemployment
spell no matter how long. The 50% used in the model is possibly a bit less than the average
observed, but this is compensated by the longer duration of unemployment benefits in the
model.
The inability to fully insure against unemployment risk plays a key role in our model. It
is, therefore, important that the model generates a realistic drop in consumption during an
unemployment spell. The best empirical counterpart for us is provided in Kolsrud, Landais,
Nilsson, and Spinnewijn (2015) who use Swedish data. They find that consumption drops on
average by 34% during the first year of an unemployment spell. A key parameter to target
this number is the scale parameter, χ = 4 · 10−5, which characterizes the liquidity benefits of
money. This parameter affects the level of financial assets held and, thus, the ability of the
agent to insure against unemployment spells. The literature also provides some evidence on
pre-displacement wealth levels. For example, Gruber (2001) provides evidence for the US. In
31Average unemployment duration data are based on all of Europe, since no Eurozone data is available for this time
period. Details about data sources are given in appendix 2.A.
32We use the model without aggregate risk for this part of the calibration, because finding the right parameter values
requires solving the model numerous times, which is computer intensive for the model with aggregate risk. With
aggregate risk, the average unemployment rate is 11.7% and the average expected duration of an unemployment
spell is 4.03 quarters.
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section 2.5, we will show that our calibration is conservative. That is, we generate the targeted
consumption drop without making agents unrealistically poor.
The main focus of this paper is on the interaction between sticky nominal wages and de-
flationary pressure induced by uncertain job prospects. Consequently, a key role is played by
ωP, the parameter that indicates how responsive nominal wages are to changes in the price
level. If ωP is equal to 0, then nominal wages do not respond to changes in the price level at all
and if ωP is equal to 1, then nominal wages respond fully so that real wages are not affected by
inflation. We set ωP equal to 0.70, but we will report results for other parameter values as well.
This value is conservative for a quarterly model. As mentioned above, Druant, Fabiani, Kezdi,
Lamo, Martins, and Sabbatini (2009) report that only 6% of European firms adjust wages (of
their main occupational groups) more than once a year to inflation and only 50% do so once a
year.33
Finally, the curvature parameter in the utility component for liquidity services, ζ, plays an
important role, because it directly affects the impact that changes in future job security have
on the demand for the liquid asset. With more curvature, the demand for the liquid asset is
less sensitive and increased concerns about future job prospects will generate less deflationary
pressure. We set ζ equal to 2, which corresponds to a money demand elasticity with respect
to the nominal interest rate equal to −0.5, which is the preferred value in Lucas (2000).34 The
elasticity of money demand with respect to transactions by the household, consumption, is
equal to γ/ζ, which equals 1 for our choices for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, and
ζ.
Other parameter values. Based on the empirical estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001),
the elasticity of the matching probability with respect to tightness, η, is set equal to 0.5. The
average share of the surplus received by workers, ω0, and the elasticity of the wage rate with
respect to changes in aggregate productivity, ωz, are set such that the standard deviation of
employment relative to the standard deviation of output are in line with their empirical coun-
terpart. Our mechanism creates additional volatility, but not enough to get enough volatility in
employment for a wide range of values for ω0 and ωz.35 If ωz is increased and wages become
more flexible, then the same level of employment volatility can be achieved by increasing the
value of ω0. In our benchmark calibration, we use ω0 = 0.97 and ωz = 0.3.
In our model, the presence of idiosyncratic risk lowers average real rates of return. If we
would set β equal to 0.99, then average return would be unrealistically low.36 Therefore, we
33Moreover, even if firms adjust for inflation they typically do so using backward looking measures of inflation,
which reduces the responsiveness to changes in inflationary pressure.
34The first-order condition for a bond with a risk-free nominal interest rate is given by
1 = β (1+ Rt) βEt
[(
ci,t+1
ci,t
)−γ
Pt/Pt+1
]
.
Using (1+ Rt)
−1 ≈ 1− Rt, we get
ln (Mi,t+1/Pt) ≈ −ζ−1 ln Rt + ζ−1 (lnχ+ γ ln ci,t) .
35One would think that very large employment fluctuations are possible in a model with deflationary spirals. As a
researcher, however, one faces limits when one explores possibilities to increase the magnitude of such a mechanism.
One limitation is computational. As fluctuations increase, it becomes more difficult to obtain an accurate numerical
solution. Another limitation is that at some point the true model solution could very well be non-stationary. This
would of course be interesting, but would require development of a new set of numerical solution algorithms.
36In particular, it is important that we avoid the situation in which the average rate at which agents are willing
2.5. AGENTS’ CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO DECISIONS 81
set β equal to 0.985.
Aggregate productivity zt is equal to 0.978 in a recession and 1.023 in a boom. The proba-
bility of switching from boom to recession and vice versa is equal to 2.5%.37
Without loss of generality, we use aggregate money holdings M = 0.13 to normalize Pt = 1
in the economy without aggregate risk.
Parameters values in the representative-agent model. We will compare the results of our
model with those generated by the corresponding representative-agent economy. Param-
eter values in the representative-agent model are identical to those in the heterogeneous-
agent model, except for β. In the representative-agent economy, the value of β is set equal
to βEt
[
(ci,t+1/ci,t)
−γ] for agents holding equity when there are no aggregate shocks.38 With-
out this adjustment, the agent in the representative-agent economy would have a more short-
sighted investment horizon and average employment would be lower.
2.5 Agents’ consumption, investment and portfolio decisions
In section 2.5.1, we describe key aspects of individual consumption and in particular its behav-
ior during an unemployment spell. In section 2.5.2, we focus on the individual’s investment
decisions.
2.5.1 Post-displacement consumption
In this section, we discuss the reduction of individual consumption following displacement
and the key factors that are behind the substantial drop generated by the model. Two key
factors are the stance of the business cycle (boom versus recession) and the level of pre-
displacement asset holdings.
Magnitude of the post-displacement drop in consumption. Figure 2.2 plots changes in post-
displacement consumption relative to consumption in the last period of employment. The
model’s parameters are calibrated such that the one-year drop equals its empirical equivalent,
that is 34%. Although not targeted, the model predicts a proportional decrease over the first
year similar to what is observed in the data.39 The model’s predictions differ from the data
after the first year as the average consumption drop only settles down after two years, whereas
the data indicates that this happens after one year. However, there are not that many agents
who are unemployed for more than one year. This is documented in figure 2.3, which plots
the distribution of the duration of unemployment spells.
There are several reasons why the drop in consumption is of such a nontrivial magnitude.
One reason is that unemployment benefits are only half as big as labor income. The second key
factor affecting the magnitude of the drop is the average level of wealth at the beginning of the
unemployment spell. Using US data, Gruber (2001) finds that the median agent holds enough
to hold risk-free real bonds is negative. This is not only realistic, but also problematic for our model in which the
marginal utility of money is always positive and there is no inflation. These two features put an upper bound on
Et
[
(ci,t+1/ci,t)
−γ] and a lower bound on average real interest rates.
37The process is chosen such that E [ln zt] = 0, Et [ln zt+1] = 0.95 ln zt, and std (ln zt+1 − 0.95 ln zt) = 0.007 hold.
38Without aggregate shocks, this value is the same across all agents, because equity is risk-free in that case.
39See Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, and Spinnewijn (2015).
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of consumption drop over the unemployment spell.
Notes. The black line illustrates the consumption drop of an individual that becomes unemployed in period 0
conditional on a boom at the time of displacement. The grey line illustrates the equivalent path conditional on
a recession.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the unemployed.
Notes. The black bars measure the fraction of unemployed at various durations conditional on a boom at the
time of displacement. The grey bars provide the corresponding measure conditional on a recession.
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Figure 2.4: Financial assets at the beginning of an unemployment spell.
gross financial assets to cover 73% of the average net-income loss during an unemployment
spell. Moreover, in terms of net financial assets, the median agent does not even have enough
to cover 10% of the average net-income loss.40 One would expect that agents accumulate
less savings in Europe where unemployment benefits are higher.41 In our model, the median
agent’s asset holdings are equal to 54% of the average net-income loss during unemployment
spells. This is true for both gross and net asset holdings, since there is no debt in our model.
Thus, relative to these observed levels, the median agent is less wealthy in terms of gross
financial assets and a lot wealthier in terms of net financial assets. Figure 2.4 plots the complete
cumulative distribution function of wealth levels at the beginning of unemployment spells as
a function of the average net-income loss. Agents in the bottom of the wealth distribution
are substantially richer than their real world counterparts, even if we focus on gross assets.
For example, Gruber (2001) documents that 38% of all workers do not have enough assets to
cover 25% of the average net-income loss and that fraction is only 7% in our model. Thus,
it is not the case that one needs unrealistically low wealth levels to generate the nontrivial
post-displacement drops in consumption that are observed in the data.
Another aspect affecting consumption during unemployment spells is the ability to borrow.
In our model, agents cannot go short in any asset and agents would presumably hold less
financial assets if they had the option to borrow. Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, and Spinnewijn
(2015) report, however, that the amount of consumption that is financed out of an increase
40Gross financial assets would be the relevant measure if debt can be rolled over during an unemployment spell,
whereas net financial assets would be the relevant measure if that is not the case. Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, and
Spinnewijn (2015) find that average debt decreases during unemployment spells, which means that the observed
gross measure overestimates the amount of funds agents have to cover income losses.
41In contrast to Gruber (2001), Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, and Spinnewijn (2015) do not provide pre-displacement
wealth levels as a function of expected earnings losses. But some information is available. In particular, using an
average unemployment spell duration of 4 months, the median Swedish agent’s level of gross financial assets is equal
to roughly 13% of average net-income loss. In our model, calibrated to an average level of European unemployment
benefits, net income drops by more (by half as opposed to one third in Sweden), but agents that become unemployed
are wealthier.
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Figure 2.5: Consumption drop upon unemployment.
in debt actually decreases following a displacement. More importantly, we think that the key
feature to capture is the level of the consumption drop, not whether this is accomplished by
no borrowing or some borrowing and a lower level of financial assets.
State dependence of consumption drop. Figure 2.5 presents a scatter plot of the reduction in
consumption and beginning-of-period cash on hand, where both are measured in the period
when the agent becomes unemployed.42 There are two distinct scatter plots, one for booms
and one for recessions.43
Consistent with figure 2.2, figure 2.5 documents that the consumption drop is much more
severe if the unemployment spell starts in a recession. The drop in consumption varies from
18.9% for the richest agent to 35.1% for the poorest agent during recessions. The range in-
creases during a boom: The richest agent faces a consumption drop of ”only” 8.8% whereas
the drop for the poorest agent is very similar, namely 33.9%. There are several reasons why
consumption drops by more during recessions. First, job finding rates are lower during reces-
sions, which means that agents anticipate a longer unemployment spell. For a given amount
of cash on hand, they will therefore reduce consumption by more during recessions. A second
factor is that the amount of cash on hand is substantially lower during recessions, because the
value of equity holdings is subtantially lower during recessions. The value of cash on hand
held by a newly unemployed agent is on average equal to 1.26 in a recession and on average
equal to 1.68 in a boom.
In reality, workers may not face such a large drop in the value of their equity portfolio when
the economy enters a recession. After all, quite a few workers do not own equity. We think
42Cash on hand is equal to the sum of non-asset income (here unemployment benefits), money balances, dividends,
and the value of equity holdings.
43The level of employment is also important for the observed consumption drop, which explains the scatter of
observations. In particular, the consumption drop is usually lower at the beginning of a boom and steeper at the
beginning of a recession.
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Figure 2.6: Portfolio shares in liquid asset.
that the cyclicality of the consumption drop associated with unemployment spells driven by
the cyclical behavior of equity prices in our model do capture real world phenomena. First,
although clearly not all workers hold equity, many hold assets such as housing that also have
volatile and cyclical prices. Second, unemployed workers may receive handouts and or loans
from affluent family members, friends, or financial intermediaries whose ability and willing-
ness to help may be affected by the value of their assets, which could very well be cyclical.
Figure 2.5 also underscores the non-trivial role of agents’ wealth levels for the post-displacement
consumption drop when they become unemployed.
2.5.2 Investment decisions
In this section, we first discuss how portfolio shares vary with agents’ wealth levels and em-
ployment status. Next, we discuss agents’ holdings of money and equity during unemploy-
ment spells.
Portfolio composition and cash-on-hand levels. Figure 2.6 presents a scatter plot of the
share of the liquid asset in the agent’s investment portfolio (y-axis) and beginning-of-period
cash-on-hand levels (x-axis). The graph documents that there are three distinct patterns de-
pending on the stance of the business cycle (boom or recession) and the agent’s employment
status. Although, the model predicts intricate and non-monotonic relationships, the model
basically predicts that the share of the portfolio invested in the liquid asset (i) is higher during
recessions (at the same cash-on-hand level), (ii) is higher for unemployed than for employed
agents (again at the same cash-on-hand level), and (iii) is higher when the agent’s cash-on-
hand level is lower.
More precisely, the following four observations can be made. The first observation is that
the fraction invested in the liquid asset is higher during recessions for almost all beginning-of-
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period cash-on-hand levels for both employed and unemployed workers. The reason is that
agents save less during recessions and diminishing returns of money’s transactions services
imply that agents that invest less would invest a larger fraction in money. The second observa-
tion is that the poorest employed agents with lower cash-on-hand levels hold a larger fraction
in the liquid asset than unemployed agents with the same cash-on-hand levels. This can also
be explained by diminishing returns. The reason is that these poor employed agents carry few
financial assets into the next period. High marginal transaction benefits at low levels of money
holdings induces these agents to hold most of their financial assets as money. In fact, some are
constrained by the short-sell constraint and only hold money. An unemployed agent with the
same amount of cash on hand as an employed agent saves more and would—according to the
same argument—hold a smaller fraction as money.
The third observation is that the last observation is only true for the lowest cash-on-hand
levels that we observe for employed agents: At higher cash-on-hand levels, unemployed
agents hold a larger fraction in liquid assets than employed agents. Moreover, the difference is
increasing with the agent’s wealth level and the difference becomes huge. For example, at the
highest cash-on-hand levels observed for an unemployed agent, i.e., around 2.15, the unem-
ployed agent holds 67% of his portfolio in the liquid asset, whereas the employed agent only
holds 17%. The fourth observation is that the relationship between the share invested in the
liquid asset and beginning-of-period cash-on-hand levels is not monotonic.
These last two observations cannot be explained with diminishing transaction benefits to
holding money. These observations can be explained by another factor that works in the oppo-
site direction, that is, there is a reason why poor agents want to invest more in the risky asset.44
That other factor is risk. Keeping beginning-of-period resources the same, an unemployed
agent invests more (in money and equity) than an employed agent, since expected labor in-
come is lower for the unemployed. As asset income increases relative to non-asset income,
the agent’s total income becomes riskier. The unemployed agent invests more in the safer as-
set to reduce this risk, which explains the third observation. Risk also explains the observed
non-monotonic behavior. For simplicity, suppose that the safer asset does not have any trans-
action benefits. If the amount invested is low relative to non-asset income, then investment
risk is of second-order importance whereas the higher expected return on the risky asset is of
first-order importance. This latter effect is dominated by diminishing returns of money at low
investment levels, but this is not the case as the cash-on-hand level of the unemployed agent
becomes bigger and the agent starts investing more.
The discussion does not give a complete picture, because it ignores general equilibirum
effects such as changes in prices, which will dampen the effects discussed and are important
for the quantiative outcomes.
Money demand and cash on hand. This paper investigates the possibility whether concerns
about future unemployment affect the demand for money, which in turn would affect the price
level, which—in the presence of sticky nominal wages—would affect real wage costs, which
in turn would affect unemployment. Consequently, it is key to fully understand the demand
for money and in particular how the aggregate demand for money varies over the business
cycle. Figure 2.7 presents a scatter plot of the demand for real money balances and beginning-
of-period cash-on-hand levels. There are four distinct patterns depending on the stance of the
44Surely, this channel is affecting the other observations as well, but is then dominated by the diminshing returns.
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Figure 2.7: Money demand (real).
business cycle (boom or recession) and the agent’s employment status. As discussed above,
almost all unemployed workers hold larger shares of their portfolio in the liquid asset than
employed workers and both employed and unemployed workers typically hold a larger share
in the liquid asset during recession than during booms. Figure 2.7 shows that both properties
are also true when we consider the amount of real money balances as opposed to the share of
money in the portfolio.45 The figure also illustrates that—everything else equal—the demand
for real money balances increases with beginning-of-period cash on hand.
This paper argues that the interaction between sticky nominal wages and the inability to
insure against unemployment risk deepens recessions. Key in understanding the underlying
mechanism is the cyclical behavior of the demand for real money balances. When the econ-
omy enters a recession, then aggregate money demand is pushed in opposite directions by
different factors. During recessions aggregate cash on hand falls. This would reduce aggregate
demand for real money balances. Figure 2.7 documents, however, that there are two reasons
why aggregate demand for money increases in our economy with incomplete markets during
recessions. First, all agents demand more money for given cash-on-hand levels during reces-
sions. Second, unemployed agents demand more money (for given cash-on-hand levels) and
there are more unemployed during recessions. In the next section, it will become clear that the
last two effects dominate and aggregate money demand increases during recessions, whereas
aggregate money demand decreases during recessions in the representative-agent version of
our economy.
To see that this is a remarkable result, consider the partial equilibrium version of our model
in which the price level and the equity price are fixed. Also assume that there is no short-sale
constraint. Markets are still incomplete because the agent cannot insure against unemploy-
ment risk. Now consider a decrease in the job finding probability. Could this lead to an in-
45Whereas the observations are typically true when the share invested in the liquid asset is considered, the observa-
tions are always true when the level of money demand is considered.
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Figure 2.8: Post displacement equity holdings.
Notes. The black line illustrates the path for equity holdings of an individual that becomes unemployed in period
0 conditional on a boom at the time of displacement. The grey line illustrates the equivalent path conditional on
a recession.
crease in the demand for real money balances? The answer is no. In this economy, demand
for real money balances, Mi,t+1/Pt, and consumption, ci,t always move in the same direc-
tion. Since agents will lower ci,t in respond to a decrease in the job finding probability, money
demand will decrease as well. The reason is the following. Equation (2.4)—which now holds
with equality—implies thatEt
[
(ci,t+1/ci,t)
−γ] is not affected. Equation (2.3), then directly im-
plies that ci,t and Mi,t+1/Pt move in the same direction. By contrast, in our model—in which
prices adjust to clear markets and the short-sale constraint is always binding for some agents—
aggregate money demand and aggregate consumption do move in different directions.
Financial assets during unemployment spells. Consumers dampen the drop in consump-
tion following displacement by selling financial assets. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 document what this
means for equity and money holdings, respectively. Although the total amount of financial as-
sets and the amount invested in equity sharply decrease, the amount held in the liquid asset
actually increases during the first two periods of an unemployment spell. The loss of wage
income means that workers’ cash-on-hand levels drop when they become unemployed. This
reduces the demand for real money balances. For a given cash-on-hand level, however, the
unemployed actually hold more money. Figure 2.9 documents that the last effect dominates in
the beginning of an unemployment spell.
2.6 Business cycle properties
In the previous section, we showed that the inability of agents to insure against unemployment
risk meant that workers face a sharp drop in consumption when they become unemployed.
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Figure 2.9: Post displacement money holdings.
Notes. The black line illustrates the path for real money holdings of an individual that becomes unemployed
in period 0 conditional on a boom at the time of displacement. The grey line illustrates the equivalent path
conditional on a recession.
We also discussed how this imperfect insurance affects money demand in ways that are not
present in an economy with complete markets. In this section, we disuss what this means for
business cycles. In particular, we document and explain why the interactions between sticky
nominal wages, gloomy outlooks regarding future employment prospects, and the inability to
insure against unemployment risk deepen recessions. We first discuss business cycle proper-
ties of the benchmark economy and compare those with the analogues in an economy with
full risk sharing. Next, we compare economies with and without sticky nominal wages.
2.6.1 Benchmark: Business cycles with sticky nominal wages
Figure 2.10 plots the responses of key aggregate variables to a negative productivity shock for
our benchmark economy and for the corresponding representative-agent economy.46 The two
panels in the top row of the figure display the responses for output and employment. These
two panels document that the economy with incomplete risk sharing faces a much deeper
recession than the economy with complete risk sharing. In particular, output drops by 7.2% in
the heterogeneous-agent economy and by only 4.3% in the representative-agent economy.
The key in understanding this large difference in the depth of the recession is the behavior
of the price level. In the representative-agent economy, the reduction in real activity decreases
the demand for money and increases the price level. In our benchmark economy, ωP = 0.7,
that is, a 1% increase in the price level leads to only a 0.7% increase in nominal wages and thus
46In our benchmark calibration, productivity takes on only two values. The IRFs are calculated as follows. The
starting point is period τ when productivity takes on its boom value and employment is equal to its mean value
conditional on being in a boom. We then calculate the following two time paths for each variable. The ”no-shock”
time path is the expected time path when productivity takes on the high value in period τ + 1. The ”shock” time path
is the expected time path when the productivity switches to the low value in period τ + 1. The IRF is the difference
between these two time paths.
2.6. BUSINESS CYCLE PROPERTIES 90
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.08
−0.07
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
Lo
g 
de
vi
at
io
n
Output and productivity (dashed line)
 
 
Incompl. markets
Compl. markets
0 10 20 30 40 50
−4
−3.5
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Pp
t. 
de
vi
at
io
n
Employment
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.7
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Lo
g 
de
vi
at
io
n
Time (quarters)
Asset prices
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Time (quarters)
Lo
g 
de
vi
at
io
n
Price level
Figure 2.10: Impulse responses with sticky nominal wages.
Notes. These graphs plot the expected time paths of the indicated variable when the economy enters a recession
(low-productivity regime) in period 1 relative to the expected time paths when the economy remains in a boom.
ωP = 0.7, i.e., nominal wages increase with 0.7% when prices increase with 1%.
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a 0.3% decrease in real wages. Thus, the direct effect of the reduction of productivity, zt, on real
wages is strengthened because nominal wages do not fully respond to changes in the price
level. That is, our starting point is an economy in which the sluggish response of nominal
wages to changes in prices actually dampens the economic downturn.
By contrast, the price level falls in the heterogeneous-agent economy, which is caused by
an increase in the aggregate demand for the safer asset, i.e., money. To understand this differ-
ent outcome, consider again figure 2.7, which plots the relationship between the demand for
money as a function of beginning-of-period cash-on-hand levels during booms and recessions
for both employed and unemployed agents. The reduction in real activity lowers cash-on-
hand levels which reduces the demand for money by both employed and unemployed agents.
The drop in cash-on-hand levels is substantial because the value of equity drops sharply. Nev-
ertheless, aggregate money demand increases in the heterogeneous-agent economy, because
there are strong forces pushing aggregate money demand up. As discussed above, both em-
ployed and unemployed agents hold more money during recessions for the same cash-on-
hand level. Second, there are more unemployed agents during recessions and unemployed
agents have larger money holdings, again for the same cash-on-hand level.
Whereas sticky nominal wages reduce the depth of recessions in the representative-agent
economy, they worsen recessions in the heterogeneous-agent economy. Moreover, this is a
quantitatively important effect, because a reduction in the price level (for any reason) starts
the following self-reinforcing process that deepens recessions: The reduction in the price level
puts upward pressure on real wages, which reduces profits, which in turn reduces investment
in new jobs, which in turn reduces employment.47 Since this reduction in employment is per-
sistent it worsens employment prospects which leads to an increase in the demand for money
when agents cannot insure themselves against unemployment risk. The impulse responses
show that this mechanism is powerful enough to completely overturn the dampening effect
that sticky nominal wages have in an economy with complete risk sharing.
Although it is a powerful mechanism, there is a counterforce. That is, as unemployment
increases, the probability a firm finds a worker increases. For the results reported here, this
counterforce is strong enough to ensure stability. For some parameter values, the numerical
algorithm does not converge. This happens even if we use the homotophy approach to move
very slowly to these parameter values (and every other trick that we could think of). It is
possibly that the algorithm could not find a solution, because the model does not have a non-
explosive solution at the parameter values used. Perturbation methods impose that aggregate
shocks will not destabilize the economy as long as really small shocks do not do so.48 Our
experience suggests that this may impose stability where there is none.49
2.6.2 Business cycles with flexible nominal wages
In this section, we discuss business cycle properties when changes in the price level leave real
wages unaffected. Figure 2.11 plots the IRFs for the heterogeneous-agent economy and the
47The negative productivity shock still has a direct negative effect on real wages. Which effect is stronger depends
on parameter values. In our benchmark economy, the impulse response function of real wages is positive for the first
two years and then turns negative.
48For example, the technique developed in Reiter (2009) to solve models with heterogeneous agents relies on a
perturbation solution for changes in the aggregate shock, which implies that the solution is imposed to be stable for the
shocks considered as long as the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are satisfied.
49We cannot prove this statement, since the inability to find a stable solution may also be due to the fact that one
should try (even) harder or develop a better algorithm.
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Figure 2.11: Impulse responses with flexible nominal wages.
Notes. These graphs plot the expected time paths of the indicated variable when the economy enters a recession
(low-productivity regime) in period 1 relative to the expected time paths when the economy remains in a boom.
ωP = 1, that is, nominal wages respond 1-for-1 to price changes.
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IRFs for the corresponding representative-agent economy. There are several similarities with
our benchmark results, but also one essential difference. We start with the similarities.
A negative productivity shock still has a direct negative effect on profits, which leads
to a reduced demand for equity (firm ownership), which in turn means that fewer jobs are
created. Also, increased concerns about employment prospects still induces agents in the
heterogeneous-agents economy to increase their demand for money holdings, which again
is strong enough to push the price level down, while it increases in the representative-agent
economy.
There is also a striking difference. In the economy with flexible nominal wages, recessions
are less severe when agents cannot insure themselves against unemployment risk. The reason
is the following. In principle, a desire to save more because of precautionary motives could
also increase the demand for equity. If this effect was present, then increased precautionary
savings would dampen the reduction in the demand for equity induced by the direct negative
effect of the productivity shock on profits. The IRFs document that this happens when ωP = 1,
that is when nominal wages respond one-for-one to changes in the price level. The magnitude
of the dampening effect is nontrivial. Whereas the biggest drop in employment is 3.3 per-
centage points in the representative-agent economy, it is equal to 2.7 percentage points in the
heterogeneous-agent economy. These results make clear that a researcher would bias model
predictions if this dampening aspect of precautionary savings during recessions is not allowed
to operate. Increased uncertainty about the future increases the expected value of the marginal
rate of substitution. Thus, increased uncertainty affects the first-order condition of the liquid
asset as well as the first-order condition of the productive investment and both investments
are therefore valued more. We argue that it is important to use the correct individual-specific
marginal rate of substitution to discount all agents’ future revenues and to let the model de-
termine how increased idiosyncratic uncertainty affects the economy.
In our benchmark economy, we do allow this channel to operate, but it is dominated by the
interaction between sticky nominal wages and uninsured unemployment risk. Increased un-
certainty may increase the demand for equity, but it will also increase the demand for money.
The latter decreases the price level, which increases real wages when nominal wages are sticky.
The latter reduces profits, which in turn lower the demand for equity. The latter dominates
any positive effect that precautionary savings may have on the demand for equity.
Robustness of the dampening effect. In all cases considered, we find that recessions are
less severe in the heterogeneous-agent economy than in the representative-agent economy if
nominal wages respond one-for-one to change in the price level. That is, this dampening effect
is very robust. During the nineties, several papers argued that an increase in idiosyncratic risk
could lead to a reduction in the demand for the risky investment when investors can save
through a risky and a risk-free investment even though it would increase total savings.50 This
effect is referred to as temperance. We find that this result is quite fragile for several reasons.
The first reason is that it is a partial equilibrium result. In general equilibrium prices would
adjust. This is important. Suppose that the economy as a whole can increase savings through
the risky investment, but not through the risk-free investment, then the price of the risk-free
asset would increase making the riskier asset more attractive. This plays a role in our economy,
because the only way the economy as a whole can in the current period take action to get more
50See Kimball (1990), Kimball (1992), Gollier and Pratt (1996), and Elmendorf and Kimball (2000).
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goods in the future is by investing more in the productive asset, that is, in the risky asset. There
are several other features, typically present in macroeconomic models, that make temperance
less likely. One such reason is that the temperance result relies on idiosyncratic risk to be
completely independent of investment risk. In macroeconomic models, that is not the case.
The amount of idiosyncratic risk depends on the level of the wage rate.51 But the level of the
wage rate is clearly correlated with the return of the risky asset, since both are affected by
the same shocks.52 Another feature that works against the temperance result is the short-sale
constraint on equity, which directly prevents a reduction in the demand for equity, at least
for some agents. In our model, diminishing returns on the transactions aspect of money also
work against temperance. This makes increased investment in the risk-free asset less attractive
relative to a framework in which the return remains fixed. Finally, in our model, money is not
nearly as risky as equity, but it is also not completely risk-free.
It may be the case that temperance can be generated in models with different utility func-
tions, for example, if the utility function is such that the price of risk increases during reces-
sions.53 We leave this for future research.
2.7 Government policy
In this section, we discuss the two components of government policy in this model: unem-
ployment insurance and monetary policy.
2.7.1 Unemployment-insurance (UI) policies
In this section, we analyze the impact of alternative unemployment-insurance policies. In our
model, changes in such policies affect the economy quite differently than in many other mod-
els. For example, in the standard labor search model with a representative agent and flexible
nominal wages an increase in unemployment benefits results in more volatile business cycles.
By contrast, it would dampen business fluctuations in our environment. In the labor-market
matching model with incomplete markets of Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010), almost
all agents (everyone except for the very poorest unemployment workers, who are borrowing
constraint) benefit from a 25% reduction in unemployment benefits relative to the benchmark
value. In fact, even an almost complete elimination of unemployment benefits (to only 1%
of the benchmark value) is preferred by 92% of all workers. Our model is also characterized
by a labor-market search friction and incomplete markets. Our model differs from the one in
Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010), however, in that the inability to insure against unem-
ployment risk interacts with sticky nominal wages in such a way that it does not only affect
the behavior of individual variables, but also makes aggregate variables behave quite differ-
ently than they do when there are complete markets. The consequence is that we draw very
different conclusions regarding the desirability of changing unemployment benefits.
We start with a discussion of the impact of an increase in the level of unemployment-
insurance when we all other parameter values remain constant, including those of the wage
setting rule. In section 2.7.1.1, we discuss the case for our benchmark economy in which
51In the extreme case when the wage rate is zero or equal to the value of home production, there is no unemployment
risk.
52In the model, considered here they are both directly affected by zt.
53We considered models with different degrees of risk aversion, but this does not seem to matter for this issue.
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ωP = 0.7, i.e., an x% change in the price level leads to an 0.7x% (0.3x%) increase (decrease) in
the nominal (real) wage rate. In section 2.7.1.2, we discuss the results when there is no nominal
wage stickiness, that is, ωP = 1. In section 2.7.1.3, we consider the results when the increase
in the level of unemployment benefits does affect wage setting. In these first sections, we
compare separate economies with different unemployment benefits. In section 2.7.1.4, we ad-
dress the question how the economy would respond when µ is increases and we also address
the question whether workers would prefer this switch taking into account transition dynam-
ics. Finally, we document that the introduction of only a small countercyclical component in
the level of unemployment benefits can achieve similar welfare improvements as much larger
increases in the average level.
2.7.1.1 Higher UI when nominal wages are sticky, ωP = 0.7.
In this section, we consider an increase in the level of unemployment benefits, µ, from 0.5 to
0.55 in the benchmark economy when nominal wages only partially respond to changes in
the price level. The increase in µ leads to a substantial decrease in the volatility of individual
consumption. In particular, the standard deviation of individual log consumption drops by
15.3%.
The increase in µ also has a big impact on the behavior of aggregate variables. For exam-
ple, the standard deviation of aggregate employment drops sharply by 49.7%. Moreover, the
increase in µ leads to an increase in the average employment rate of 0.31ppt. By contrast, we
find that the increase in µ leads to a reduction in average employment of 0.52ppt in the ver-
sion of our model without aggregate uncertainty. Such comparative statics typically result in
similar answers for economies with and without aggregate uncertainty, because aggregate un-
certainty is relatively small. Volatility of the only aggregate random variable, productivity, is
indeed modest in our model. Nevertheless, the induced volatility in asset prices and the non-
linearity of the matching function are important enough to get these two opposite implications
for the change in average employment when µ increases.
In the economy with aggregate uncertainty, there are two effects associated with the in-
crease in µ that increase the demand for equity and, thus, increase job creation. The first effect
is that an increase in µ reduces the risk of holding equity, because the increase in µ not only
reduces the volatility of real activity, it also leads to a substantial reduction in the volatility of
stock prices. In fact, the standard deviation of the log of real equity prices drops with 49.8%.
This reduction in risk leads to more job creation and an increase in average employment of
0.42ppt.54 The second effect that pushes average employment up is related to the nonlinearity
of the matching function, that is, increases in firm value have a smaller effect on employment
than decreases in firm value. This means that decreases in the volatility of firm value increase
average employment. This effect increases average employment with 0.41ppt.55 Combining
54We calculate this as follows. If there is no aggregate uncertainty, then the increase in µ leads to a decrease in
employment of 0.52ppt and a decrease in real equity value of 5%. If there is aggregate uncertainty, then the same
change leads to a decrease in the average real equity value by only 1%. This lower drop in equity value is due to
the fact that there also is a decrease in aggregate uncertainty. Assuming that these effects are linear, the difference
between the 5% and the 1% drop corresponds to an increase in average employment of 0.416ppt (= 4/5× 0.52ppt).
55We calculate this as follows. When µ = 0.5, then the introduction of aggregate uncertainty leads to a reduction in
employment of 1.01ppt of which 46ppt can be explained by the reduction in the average equity price. The remainder of
0.55ppt is, thus, due to the nonlinearity of the matching function. When µ = 0.55, then this nonlinearity effect is only
0.14ppt. Thus, when µ increases from 0.5 to 0.55 in the economy with aggregate uncertainty, then there is a reduction
of the impact of the nonlinearity on average employment of 0.55ppt−0.14ppt=0.41ppt.
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the two positive effects on average employment related to the decrease in aggregate volatil-
ity with the negative effect related to the reduction in savings because of better individual
insurance, we get an increase in average employment of 0.31ppt.
The direct effect of an increase in µ is an increase in the tax rate. This direct effect is damp-
ened by the increase in the tax base induced by the increase in employment.56 The indirect
effect is not strong enough to decrease average tax rates, but it is strong enough to do so during
recessions. The reason is that the smaller business cycle fluctuations and the higher average
employment rate imply that the tax base at the higher level of µ is especially higher during
recessions. If tax rates would be distortionary—which they are not in our model—then lower
tax rates during recessions could lead to a further dampening of business cycle fluctuations.
2.7.1.2 Higher UI when nominal wages are flexible, ωP = 1
The consequences of an increase in µ are quite different when nominal wages respond one-for-
one to changes in the price level, i.e., when ωP = 1. Individual consumption becomes again
less volatile, but the reduction in the standard deviation of individual log consumption is only
8.4%, whereas the drop is equal to 15.3% in our benchmark economy. Even bigger differences
are observed for the impact of the increase in µ on aggregate variables. Whereas the standard
deviation of the aggregate employment rate dropped by almost 50% in the benchmark econ-
omy, the standard deviation increases with 9.3% when ωP = 1. As discussed in section 2.6.2,
increased precautionary savings dampens business cycles when ωP = 1. At higher values of µ,
agents are better insured and precautionary savings increase by less during recessions. Con-
sequently, there is also less dampening and business cycle fluctuations become more volatile
as µ increases.
2.7.1.3 Higher UI when average real wages adjust
The discussion above considered an increase in unemployment insurance while keeping the
wage setting rule the same. This is not unreasonable given that several empirical papers find
that UI benefits do not have a significant effect on wages.57 Schmieder, von Wachter, and
Bender (2014) find that UI benefits have a significant negative effect on wages. This could
happen if higher UI benefits prolong unemployment spells and increases skill loss. Nekoei
and Weber (2015) find that UI benefits have a positive effect on re-employment wages. This
could happen because an increase in UI benefits increases workers’ outside option or because
it allows workers to find a better match. If it is the former, then higher UI benefits would
decrease the surplus of the match and the share that accrues to firm owners, which in turn
would negatively affect job creation.
Even though the empirical evidence is inconclusive, it is interesting to see how results
change if wages do adjust following an increase in UI benefits. In our next exercise, ω0—
and thus average wages—increase when µ increases according to the following mechanism.
For the firm owner, the value of being in a match with a worker is equal to that period’s
dividend plus the market value of the firm, adjusted for the probability that the firm may be
in its last period; his outside option is zero. For both employed and uncemployed agents,
56In our model, taxes are only used to finance unemployment benefits and are, thus, very low. When average tax
rates were higher, the increase in revenues because of an increase in the tax base would be higher.
57See, for example, Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007), Lalive (2007), van Ours and Vodopivec (2008), and Le Barban-
chon (2012).
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we can calculate expected utility as a function of their financial wealth. Consequently, we
can also calculate the cash equivalent of the difference between the expected utility of being
employed and being unemployed, ai,t. Worker i’s implied Nash bargaining weight is then
equal to fi,t = ai,t/ (ai,t + Dt/Pt + (1− δ) Jt/Pt). Since all workers receive the same wage, but
have different wealth levels, the value of fi,t, is worker specific. An increase in µ leads to a
decrease in ai,t and a decrease in fi,t, if the wage setting rule remains the same. Here we adjust
ω0 such that the average implied bargaining weight is not affected by the increase in µ. As
pointed out in Hall and Milgrom (2008), fi,t may overstate the importance of fluctuations in
the value of unemployment, because the worker’s threat in bargaining is typically not leaving
the relationship and becoming unemployed, but prolonging the negotiations. Consequently,
our procedure may overstate the upward pressure on wages following an increase in µ. By
considering the case when wages do not respond at all as well as a case when wages respond
probably too much, we can bound likely outcomes of the increase in µ.
When the increase in µ goes together with an increase in ω0, then the standard deviation
of individual consumption drops by 8.9% instead of 15.3% and the standard deviation of ag-
gregate employment drops by 40% instead of 49.7%.58 Volatility does not drop by as much
because an increase in ω0 lowers average profits and makes profits more sensitive to changes
in productivity, which in turn makes job creation and employment more volatile. The de-
crease in average profits, induced by the increase in ω0, would lower average employment.
In fact, whereas employment increased with 0.3ppt when ω0 remains constants, it decreases
with 0.56ppt when ω0 changes.
2.7.1.4 Transition dynamics and desirability of switching to higher UI levels
In the previous sections, we compared different economies that are identical except for the
unemployment regime. In this section, we analyze how an economy responds to a one-time
increase in µ that is completely unexpected and is believed to be a permanent change. The
long-run results were discussed above. Here we discuss the transition paths. In addition, we
ask the question which workers prefer this change in UI policy.
We focus on a change in UI policy when the economy has just entered a recession and we
consider the increase in µ when wage setting does and does not adjust. Figure 2.12 plots the
time paths for employment when the economy moves from a boom to a recession and back
to a boom. It plots the series when the UI does and when it does not change. The results
above made clear that an increase in µ leads to smaller fluctuations and a higher average
employment level if ω0 remains the same. Consequently, employment should drop by less if
µ is increased at the start of a recession. The same turns out to be true if ω0 does increase.
That is, the negative effect of the induced increase in ω0 on average employment is smaller
than the dampening effect of this change in parameter values on business cycle fluctuations.
When the economy gets out of the recession, however, the recovery is dampened by the higher
unemployment benefits, both when ω0 does and when ω0 does not adjust. When µ remains
equal to 0.5, then the employment level exceeds the employment level when µ and ω0 both
increase in the first quarter of the recovery and exceed the employment level corresponding
to the case when only µ increases after two quarters. The result that higher unemployment
benefits can damage economic activity is consistent with Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and
58The value of ω0 increases to 0.973 which means that average firm profits decrease by 10%.
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Figure 2.12: Switch to higher unemployment insurance at the start of the recession.
Notes. This graph compares the benchmark time path of employment with the time path when µ increases
(unexpectedly and permanently) to 0.55, both when ω0 does and when ω0 does not adjust upwards.
Mitman (2015) who argue that the extension of unemployment benefits in the US increased
unemployment in 2011—when the US recovery had started—by 2.5 percentage points.59
We now turn to the question whether agents prefer the increase in µ. It is clear that agents
are affected quite differently by the policy change. Unemployed workers benefit immediately
from the increase in unemployment benefits. Employed workers benefit from the increase in µ
because (i) the dampening of the downturn increases the value of their equity holdings, (ii) the
higher µ increasew their income if they become unemployed, and when ω0 does not increase
(iii) the long term average employment increases which means that all workers can expect to
be less affected by unemployment. Moreover, although average tax rates increase, they are
lower during this initial and future recessions when ω0 does not increase.
To evaluate whether agents like the increase in µ, we calculate the expected utility when µ
changes and when it does not change. To make the utility changes comparable across agents,
we calculate the cash equivalent.60 Figure 2.13 displays the cash equivalent of the proposed
change as a function of the agent’s beginning-of-period cash-on-hand level.61 The figure doc-
uments that all unemployed and all employed agents prefer the switch to the higher level of
unemployment benefits, both when ω0 does and when ω0 does not adjust. For the same cash-
on-hand levels, an unemployed worker benefits more than an employed worker. This is not
surprising given that an unemployed worker benefits directly from the higher unemployment
benefits. Rich agents benefit more than poor agents. One reason is that they hold more eq-
uity and, thus, benefit from the fact that stock prices drop by less when µ is increased. All
59Amaral and Ice (2014) argue that the extension only had a minor impact and part ot the increase in the unemploy-
ment rate was due to a reduction in the number of unemployed leaving the labor force (and thus unemployment).
60To be able to do this, we calculate expected utility as a function of beginning-of-period cash-on-hand levels.
61Cash on hand is measured at the point when it is known that the economy has entered a recession, but before it is
known that µ has changed
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Figure 2.13: Welfare gains from changing unemployment insurance in the first period of a recession.
Notes. Welfare gains are measured as cash-on-hand equivalents. The average welfare gain with ω0 unchanged
equals 1.04. The average welfare gain with ω0 = 0.973 equals 0.32. The average welfare gain when unem-
ployment insurance is made cyclical equals 0.93. Welfare gains are drawn for the four possible combinations of
employment status in the previous and current period, because an agent’s portfolio of assets in the beginning
of the current period depends on his employment status in the last period.
agents benefit less for the case when both µ and ω0 increase. This is even true for employed
workers who hold no equity. The simultaneous increase in ω0 implies that the downturns in
real activity and stock prices are not dampened by as much. The value of poor worker is not
affected by changes in stock prices since he does not hold equity. He does benefit from the
higher wage brought about by the increase in ω0. But negative aspects of the increase in ω0,
such as worsened future employment prospects, weigh more heavily.62
If the change in µ occurs at the beginning of a boom, then the calculated cash equivalents
are lower for all workers. The reason is that an increase in µ not only dampens recessions, it
also dampens booms since the upward pressure on prices induced by a reduction in precau-
tionary savings is smaller at higher levels of µ. It is still the case that all workers prefer the
change when ω0 does not increase. When ω0 does increase, however, the richer employed and
the richer unemployed workers do not prefer the increase in µ.
2.7.1.5 Higher UI benefits and unemployment duration
As discussed above, it is not clear from empirical studies whether changes in UI benefits affect
wages. There is much more empirical support for the hypothesis that more generous UI bene-
fits increase unemployment duration.63 Our framework can explain increased unemployment
duration even though search intensity is fixed and, thus, not affected by the level of UI benefits
both when wages do and when wages do not depend on the level of UI benefits.
If wages depend on the level of UI benefits, then average employment and the average
62At our calibration, employment is below the socially optimal level.
63A long list of papers is given in Le Barbanchon (2012).
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job finding rate are lower with higher UI benefits. Higher UI benefits do still lead to a higher
employment level and a higher job finding rate during recessions.
If wages do not depend on the level of UI benefits, then higher UI benefits can negatively
affect employment and the job finding rate during recoveries. For our benchmark calibration,
they do not negatively affect employment and the job finding rate on average. But this outcome
was the results of different aspects pushing job creation in different directions. For parameter
values that are such that the negative effect, which is caused by workers saving less if they
are better insured, is stronger, then higher UI benefits could have a negative effect on average
employment and the average duration of unemployment spells even if wages do not depend
on UI benefits.
2.7.1.6 Cyclical UI
Here we consider a cyclical unemployment insurance regime under which benefits increase
during recessions and decrease during booms. In particular, the value of µ is equal to 0.51 in a
recession and equal to 0.49 in a boom. Quantitatively, this is a smaller change than the increase
in µ from 0.5 to 0.55 considered above. Moreover, the average value of µ stays the same.
This more modest change in the unemployment insurance policy reduces business cycle
fluctuations by almost the same and does better in terms of its effect on average employment.
As discussed above, there are factors which push up average employment when µ in-
creases. There is also a reason why average employment decreases: An increase in the value
of µ implies that workers are better insured against unemployment risk, which in turn implies
that they invest less (in creating new jobs), which reduces average employment.64 By keeping
the average level of µ constant we reduce this downward effect on employment. That is, aver-
age employment when µ equals 0.55 is 0.31ppt above average employment when µ equals 0.5.
In the economy with the cyclical UI policy average employment is 0.74ppt higher.
The cyclical UI policy is almost as effective in dampening business cycles as the UI policy
with a constant µ equal to 0.55. In particular, whereas the standard deviation of the employ-
ment rate drops from 0.026 to 0.013 when µ is increased from 0.5 to 0.55, it drops to 0.015 for
the economy with the cyclical UI policy.
The combination of a higher average employment level and an only slightly higher level
of cyclical employment fluctuations means that the employment level in the economy with
the cyclical UI policy is higher than the employment level in the economy in which µ equals
0.55 in every period. Figure 2.14 compares the time paths for employment when the economy
switches in the first period of the recession to either the policy with µ equal to 0.55 or to the
cyclical UI policy. In both cases, starting from an economy in which µ is constant and equal
to 0.5. The graph clearly documents that the modest but cyclical change in UI policy reduces
business cycle fluctuations by almost as much as the larger acyclical change. The graphs also
shows that employment levels are always higher in the economy with the cyclical UI policy.65
The third panel of figure 2.13 shows that all agents prefer a switch to cyclical unemployment
insurance.
64Above, we documented that average employment increases when µ increases (and ω0 does not), because an in-
crease in µ reduces the risk of investment and the non-linearity of the matching function reduces average employment
by less if business cycles are dampened.
65This is even true in the first period, when the economy has not yet fully benefitted from the fact that agents invest
more when the average value of unemployment benefits is lower.
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Figure 2.14: Switch to cyclical UI policy at the start of the recession.
Notes. This graph compares the benchmark time path of employment with the time path when µ increases
(unexpectedly and permanently) to 0.55 and with the time path when the unemployment insurance scheme
(unexpectedly and permanently) changes to a cyclical scheme in which µ = 0.51 in recessions and µ = 0.49 in
booms. The value of ω0 is kept the same.
Relative to the economy in which µ equals 0.55, the economy with the cyclical UI policy
does also better in that tax rates are lower in every period. The reason is that unemployment
benefits are lower in every period and the employment rate is higher.
2.7.2 Monetary policy
Could the severity of recessions that occur in our model possibly be alleviated by monetary
policy?66 If the central bank could respond to changes in zt instantaneously and if the central
bank could increase the money supply by ”helicopter drops”, then the central bank could
prevent deflationary pressure on the price level and upward pressure on real wages when
nominal wages are sticky. In practice, however, there are several reasons why it may not be that
easy for central banks to offset the harmful effects caused by the interaction of precautionary
savings and sticky nominal wages.
In our heterogeneous-agent model, this interaction leads to a drop in the price level fol-
lowed by a period of sustained inflation. Suppose that the central bank cannot prevent this
initial drop, because it cannot respond instantaneously to the drop in productivity. To undo
the harmful effects of nominal wage stickiness, the central bank would have to increase infla-
66Several papers with heterogeneous-agent models adopt the cashless-economy approach. In a representative-
agent economy, there are different ways to motivate a cashless economy. One is to assume that the level of real money
balances does not interact with the real economy and that the central bank performs open market operations to ensure
that the quantity of money outstanding is such that the desired interest rate is achieved. In other words, one could
model the demand for money and equilibrium on the market for money, but this block would be independent of
the other equations. At least, this motivation for the cashless economy is unlikely to carry over to a model with
heterogeneous agents, since asset holdings, including money are essential for modelling precautionary savings and,
thus, for understanding the role of money holdings for real activity. In this paper, there definitely is no such separation
between demand for liquid assets and real activity.
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tion when expected inflation is already higher than normal. That is, the central bank would
have to adopt a regime of price-level targeting instead of a regime of inflation targeting. But
price-level targeting may not be the best policy when the economy faces other problems. So
the first reason why monetary policy may not eliminate the channel identified in this paper is
that they may not be willing to adopt a price-level targeting regime.
Another aspect is, of course, that helicopter drops of money are not part of the usual set
of central bank instruments. The typical way for a central bank to increase liquidity in the
economy is to purchase government bonds from banks. This increases the liquidity position
of banks. If the extra liquidity induces banks to issue more loans, then bank deposits will
increase. That is, money holdings of the private sector will increase. Note, however, that the
liability of the private sector to the financial sector has increased with the same amount. It is
possible that this combined increase of liquid assets and debt eases workers concerns about
future unemployment, for example, because the loans are (perceived to be) long-term loans. If
workers care about their net-liquidity position, however, then this monetary stimulus would
not undo workers desire to hold more money balances and there still would be downward
pressure on the price level during recessions. This latter case would be especially relevant if
bank loans cannot be rolled over if the worker becomes unemployed.
Monetary policy that undoes changes in the price level to offset nominal wage stickiness
will have distributional consequences. In our model, all workers are ex ante identical. But
suppose that there is another group of workers, who also have nominal sticky wages, but who
are never unemployed. These workers would not like the central bank to decrease real wages
by pushing up the price level.
Finally, another factor that is likely to make it difficult to figure out the right monetary
response is a lack of information about the state of the economy and a lack of information
about the ”true” model. In our economy, changes in the price-level deepen the recession when
nominal wages are sticky and there is an inability to insure against unemployment risk. When
these two features are not present or when they are not strong enough, then changes in the
price-level dampen recessions. Since the strenght of different channels may change over time,
it wouldn’t be clear whether it always would be good if the central bank tried to undo any
changes in the price level.
Appendices to Chapter 2
2.A Data Sources
• Eurozone GDP implicit price deflators are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED). Data are seasonally adjusted.
• Eurozone private sector hourly earnings are from OECD.STATExtracts (MEI). The target
series for hourly earnings correspond to seasonally adjusted average total earnings paid
per employed person per hour, including overtime pay and regularly recurring cash
supplements. Data are seasonally adjusted.
• Unit labor costs are from OECD.STATExtracts. Data are for the total economy (employ-
ment based). Unit labour costs are calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to real
output. Data are seasonally adjusted.
• Average unemployment rate: Average unemployment rate for the four large Eurozone
economies, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Data is from OECD.STATExtracts (ALFS).
• Average unemployment duration: Average unemployment duration for Europe from
OECD.StatExtracts. This is annual data. The data series for Europe is used because no
data for the Eurozone is available, nor data for the big Eurozone countries. Starting
in 1992, separate data is given for Europe, the European Union with 21 countries, and
the European Union with 28 countries, and the series are quite similar over this sample
period.
2.B Solution algorithm
2.B.1 Solution algorithm for heterogeneous agent model
In appendix 2.B.1.2, we document how we solve the individual problem taking as given per-
ceived laws of motion for prices and aggregate state variables. In appendix 2.B.1.1, we docu-
ment how to generate time series for the variables of this economy, including the complete
cross-sectional distribution, taking the individual policy rules as given. The simulation is
needed to update the laws of motion for the aggregate variables and to characterize the prop-
erties of the model. We make a particularly strong effort in ensuring that markets clear exactly
such that there is no “leakage” during the simulation. This is important since simulations play
a key role in finding the numerical solution and in characterizing model properties.67
67If equilibrium does not hold exactly, then the extent to which there is disequilibrium is likely to accumulate over
time, unless the inaccuracy would happen to be exactly zero on average. Such accumulation is problematic, since long
time series are needed to obtain accurate representation of model properties.
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2.B.1.1 Simulation and solving for laws of motion of key aggregate variables
The perceived laws of motion for the real stock price, J˜/P˜ and the price level, P˜, are given by
the following two polynomials (using a total of 12 coefficients):
ln J˜/P˜ = a0 (z) + a1 (z) ln q + a2 (z) (ln q)
2 , (2.15)
ln P˜ = b0 (z) + b1 (z) ln q + b2 (z) (ln q)
2 . (2.16)
Note that q is not only the level of employment, but also the number of firms, and the aggregate
amount of equity shares held. We only use the first moment of the distribution of equity
holdings, as in Krusell and Smith (1997), but we use a nonlinear function.68 To update the
coefficients of this law of motion, we run a regression using simulated data. In this appendix,
we describe how to simulate this economy taking the policy rules of the individual agents as
given. We start by describing the general idea and then turn to the particulars.
General idea of the simulation part of the algorithm. Policy functions are typically func-
tions of the state variables, that is, functions of predetermined endogenous variables and ex-
ogenous random variables. These functions incorporate the effect that prices have on agents’
choices, but this formulation does not allow for prices to adjust if equilibrium does not hold
exactly when choices of the individuals are aggregated. If used the true policy functions, then
equilibrium would hold exactly by definition. Unfortunately, this will not be true for numeri-
cal approximations, not even for very accurate ones. Since long simulations are needed, errors
accumulate, driving supply and demand further apart, unless these errors happen to be ex-
actly zero on average. Our simulation procedure is such that equilibrium does hold exactly.
The cost of achieving this is that actual prices, J and P, will be different from perceived prices,
J˜ and P˜ and some of the actual individual choices will be different from those according to
the original policy functions.69 These are errors too, but there is no reason that these will
accumulate.
Preliminaries. To simulate this economy, we need laws of motions for perceived prices,
J˜(q, z) and P˜(q, z), as well as individual policy functions, qi and M′i , which are calculated
as described in appendix 2.B.1.2. At the beginning of each period, we would also need the
joint distribution of employment status, ei, and cash on hand, xi. This distribution is given
by ψ(x˜i, ei), where the tilde indicates that cash on hand is evaluated at perceived prices. The
distribution is such that, ∫
ei
∫
x˜i
x˜idψi = zq + (1− δ)q
J˜
P˜
+
M
P˜
, (2.17)
where the dependence of prices on the aggregate state variables has been suppressed. Below,
we discuss how we construct a histogram for the cross-sectional distribution each period and
show that this property is satisfied. We do not specify a joint distribution of equity and money
holdings. As discussed below, we do know what level of beginning-of-period equity holdings,
qi, corresponds with what level of beginning-of-period cash on hand, x˜i, in each period. In
68Note that the first-moment of money holdings is constant, since money supply is constant.
69Throughout this appendix, perceived variables have a tilde and actual outcomes do not.
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particular, the distribution satisfies ∫
ei
∫
x˜i
qidψi = q. (2.18)
A household’s cash on hand is given by
x˜i = ei(1− τ)W˜
P˜
+ (1− ei)µ(1− τ)W˜
P˜
+ qi
(
D˜
P˜
+ (1− δ) J˜
P˜
)
+
Mi
P˜
, (2.19)
and the household can spend this on consumption and asset purchases, that is,
x˜i = ci + q′i
J˜
P˜
+
M′i
P˜
. (2.20)
The government has a balanced budget each period, that is,
τ = µ
1− q
q + µ(1− q) . (2.21)
Even if the numerical solutions for q′i, M
′
i , J˜, and P˜ are very accurate, it is unlikely that
equilibrium is exactly satisfied if we aggregate q′i and M
′
i across agents. To impose equilib-
rium exactly, we modify the numerical approximations for equity and money holdings such
that they are no longer completely pinned down by exogenous random variables and prede-
termined variables, but instead depend directly—to at least some extent—on prices.70 In the
remainder of this section, we explain how we do this and how we solve for equilibrium prices.
Modification and imposing equilibrium. To impose equilibrium we adjust q′i, M
′
i , J˜, and P˜.
The equilibrium outcomes are denoted by qi,+1, Mi,+1, J, and P. The individual’s demand for
assets is modified as follows:
qi,+1 =
J˜/P˜
J/P
q′i, (2.22)
Mi,+1 =
P
P˜
M′i . (2.23)
We will first discuss how equilibrium prices are determined and then discuss why this is a
sensible modification. An important accuracy criterion is that this modification of the policy
functions is small, that is, actual and perceived laws of motions are very similar.71
We solve for the actual law of motion for employment, q+1, the number of new firms cre-
ated, h, the amount spent on creating new firms in real terms, v = hJ/P, the market clearing
70The policy functions q(x˜i , ei , q, z) and M(x˜i , ei , q, z) do depend on prices, but this dependence is captured by the
aggregate state variables.
71As explained above, it is important to do a modification like this to ensure that equilibrium holds exactly, even if
the solution is very accurate and the modification small.
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asset price, J, and the market clearing price level, P, from the following equations:72
q+1 = (1− δ) q + h, (2.24)
h = ψvη (1− q)1−η , (2.25)
v = hJ/P, (2.26)
h =
∫
ei
∫
x˜i
(q+1(x˜i, ei, q, z)− (1− δ)qi) dψi
=
∫
ei
∫
x˜i
(
J˜/P˜
J/P
q′(x˜i, ei, q, z)− (1− δ) qi
)
dψi, (2.27)
M =
∫
ei
∫
x˜i
M+1(x˜i, ei, q, z)dψi =
∫
ei
∫
x˜i
P
P˜
M(x˜i, ei, q, z)dψi. (2.28)
Logic behind the modification. Recall that q(x˜i, ei, q, z) and m(x˜i, ei, q, z) are derived using
perceived prices, J˜(q, z) and P˜(q, z). Now suppose that—in a particular period—aggregation
of q(x˜i, ei, q, z) indicates that demand for equity exceeds supply for equity. This indicates that
J˜(q, z) is too low in that period. By exactly imposing equilibrium, we increase the asset price
and lower the demand for equity. Note that our modification is such that any possible misper-
ception on prices does not affect the real amount each agent spends, but only the number of
assets bought.
Throughout this section, the value of cash on hand that is used as the argument of the
policy functions is constructed using perceived prices. In principle, the equilibrium prices that
have been obtained could be used to update the definition of cash on hand and one could
iterate on this until convergence. This would make the simulation more expensive. Moreover,
our converged solutions are such that perceived and actual prices are close to each other, which
means that this iterative procedure would not add much.
Equilibrium in the goods market. It remains to show that our modification is such that the
goods market is in equilibrium as well. That is, Walras’ law is not wrecked by our modification.
From the budget constraint we get that actual resources of agent i are equal to
xi = ei(1− τ)WP + (1− ei)µ(1− τ)
W
P
+
(
D
P
+ (1− δ) J
P
)
qi +
Mi
P
(2.29)
and actual expenditures are equal to
xi = ci +
J
P
qi,+1 +
Mi,+1
P
. (2.30)
The value of ci adjusts to ensure this equation holds. Aggregation gives
x = zq +
J
P
(1− δ) q + M
P
(2.31)
72Recall that we define variables slightly different and v is not the number of vacancies, but the amount spent on
creating new firms.
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and
x = c +
J
P
∫
ei
∫
x˜i
qi,+1dψi +
∫
ei
∫˜
xi
Mi,+1
P
= c +
J
P
q+1 +
M
P
. (2.32)
Equation (2.31) uses the definition of dividends and equation (2.18). Equation (2.32) follows
from the construction of J and p.
Since
J
P
q′ − J
P
(1− δ)q = v, (2.33)
we get
zq = c + v, (2.34)
which means that we have goods market clearing in each and every time period.
Implementation. To simulate the economy, we use the “non-stochastic simulation method”
developed in Young (2010). This procedure characterizes the cross-sectional distribution of
agents’ characteristics with a histogram. This procedure would be computer intensive if we
characterized the cross-sectional distribution of both equity and bond holdings. Instead, we
just characterize the cross-sectional distribution of cash on hand for the employed and unem-
ployed. Let ψ(x˜i,−1, ei,−1) denote last period’s cross-sectional distribution of cash on hand and
employment status. The objective is to calculate ψ(x˜i, ei).
1. As discussed above, given ψ(x˜i,−1, ei,−1) and the policy functions, we can calculate last
period’s equilibrium outcome for the total number of firms (jobs) carried into the current
period, q, job-finding rate, h−1/ (1− q−1), last period’s prices, J−1 and P−1, and for each
individual the equilibrium asset holdings brought into the current period, qi and Mi.
2. Current employment, q, together with the current technology shock, z, allows us to cal-
culate perceived prices J˜ and P˜.
3. Using the perceived prices together with asset holdings, qi and Mi, we calculate per-
ceived cash on hand conditional on last-period’s cash on hand and both the past and the
present employment status. That is,
x˜(ei, x˜i,−1, ei,−1) = ei(1− τ)W˜
P˜
+ (1− ei)µ(1− τ)W˜
P˜
+ qi(x˜i,−1, ei,−1)
(
D˜
P˜
+ (1− δ) J˜
P˜
)
+
Mi(x˜i,−1, ei,−1)
P˜
.
4. Using last period’s distribution ψ(x˜i,−1, ei,−1) together with last-period’s transition prob-
abilities, we can calculate the joint distribution of current perceived cash on hand, x˜i, past
employment status, and present employment status, ψ̂(x˜i, ei, ei,−1).
5. Next, we retrieve the current period’s distribution as
ψ(x˜i, ei) = ψ̂(x˜i, ei, 1) + ψ̂(x˜i, ei, 0). (2.35)
6. Even though we never explicitly calculate a multi-dimensional histogram, in each pe-
riod we do have information on the joint cross-sectional distribution of cash on hand at
2.B. SOLUTION ALGORITHM 108
perceived prices and asset holdings.
2.B.1.2 Solving for individual policy functions
When solving for the individual policy functions, aggregate laws of motion as specified in
appendix 2.B.1.1 are taken as given. Indidivual policy functions for equity, q′i = q(x˜i, ei, q, z),
and money, M′i = M(x˜i, ei, q, z), are obtained by iteration:
1. Using initial guesses for q′i and M
′
i , a policy function for consumption can be calculated
from the agent’s budget constraint:
c(x˜i, ei, q, z) = x˜i −
q′i J˜ + M
′
i
P˜
. (2.36)
2. Conditional on the realizations of the aggregate shock and the agent’s employment state,
cash on hand and consumption in the next period can be calculated:
x˜′(e′i , z
′) = e′i(1− τ′)
W˜ ′
P˜′
+ (1− e′i)µ(1− τ′)
W˜ ′
P˜′
+ q′i
(
D˜′
P˜′
+ (1− δ) J˜
′
P˜′
)
+
M′i
P˜′
, (2.37)
c′(e′i , z
′) = c(x˜′(e′i , z
′), e′i , q
′, z′). (2.38)
3. Using the individual and aggregate transition probabilities, the expectations E
[
c′−γ P˜
P˜′
]
and E
[
c′−γ D˜
′+(1−δ) J˜′
J˜
P˜
P˜′
]
, in the first-order conditions 2.3 and 2.4 can be calculated.
Then, the first-order condition for equity holdings gives an updated guess for consump-
tion of agents holding positive amounts of equity:
cnew(x˜i, ei, q, z) =
(
βE
[
c′−γ D˜
′ + (1− δ) J˜′
J˜
P˜
P˜′
])− 1γ
. (2.39)
The first-order condition for money gives an updated policy function for money:
Mnew(x˜i, ei, q, z) = P˜χ
1
ζ
(
cnew(x˜i, ei, q, z)−γ − βE
[
c′−γ P˜
P˜′
])− 1ζ
. (2.40)
The budget constraint in the current period gives the updated policy function for equity:
qnew(x˜i, ei, q, z) = max
(
0,
x˜i P˜− cnew(x˜i, ei, q, z)P˜−Mnew(x˜i, ei, q, z)
J˜
)
. (2.41)
For agents with a binding short-sale constraint, updated policy functions for consump-
tion and money are instead calculated using only the first-order condition for money and
the budget constraint:
cnew,constraint(x˜i, ei, q, z) =
(
βE
[
c′−γ P˜
P˜′
]
+ χ
(
M′i
P˜
)−ζ)− 1γ
, (2.42)
Mnew,constraint(x˜i, ei, q, z) = x˜i P˜− cnew,constraint(x˜i, ei, q, z)P˜. (2.43)
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4. A weighted average of the initial guesses and the new policy functions is used to update
the initial guesses. The procedure is repeated from step 1 until the differences between
initial and updated policy functions become sufficiently small.
2.C Equivalence with standard matching framework
In the standard matching framework, new firms are created by ”entrepreneurs” who post
vacancies, v˜t, at a cost equal to κ per vacancy. The number of vacancies is pinned down by
a free-entry condition. In the description of the model above, such additional agents are not
introduced. Instead, creation of new firms is carried out by investors wanting to increase their
equity holdings.
Although, the ”story” we tell is somewhat different, our equations can be shown to be
identical to those of the standard matching model. The free-entry condition in the standard
matching model is given by
κ =
h˜t
v˜t
Jt
Pt
, (2.44)
where
h˜t = ψ˜v˜
η
t u
1−η
t . (2.45)
Each vacancy leads to the creation of h˜t/v˜t new firms, which can be sold to households at price
Jt.
Equilibrium in the equity market requires that the net demand for equity by households is
equal to the supply of new equity by entrepreneurs, that is
∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
(q (ei, qi, Mi; st)− (1− δ) qi) dFt (ei, qi, Mi)
= ψ˜v˜ηt u
1−η
t . (2.46)
Using equations (2.44) and (2.45), this equation can be rewritten as
∫
ei
∫
qi
∫
Mi
(q (ei, qi, Mi; st)− (1− δ) qi) dFt (ei, qi, Mi)
= ψ˜
1/(1−η)
(
Jt
κPt
)η/(1−η)
ut. (2.47)
This is equivalent to equation (2.13) if
ψ˜ = ψκη . (2.48)
It only remains to establish that the number of new jobs created is the same in the two setups,
that is,
ht = h˜t (2.49)
or
ψvηt u
1−η
t = ψ˜v˜
η
t u
1−η
t . (2.50)
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From equations (2.44) and (2.45), we get that
v˜t =
(
ψ˜Jt
κPt
)1/(1−η)
ut. (2.51)
Substituting this expression for v˜t and the expression from equation (2.11) for vt into equation
(2.50) gives indeed that ht = h˜t. Moreover, the total amount spent on creating new firms in our
representation, vt, is equal to the number of vacancies times the posting cost in the traditional
representation, κv˜t.
The focus of this paper is on the effect of negative shocks on the savings and investment
behavior of agents in the economy when markets are incomplete. We think that our way of
telling the story behind the equations has the following two advantages. First, there is only
one type of investor, namely, the household and there are no additional investors such as
zombie entrepreneurs (poor souls who get no positive benefits out of fulfilling a crucial role in
the economy).73 Second, all agents have access to investment in the same two assets, namely
equity and the liquid asset, whereas in the standard labor market model there are households
and entrepreneurs and they have different investment opportunities.
73One could argue that entrepreneurs are part of the household, but with heterogeneous households the question
arises which households they belong to.
Chapter 3
Efficiency of On-the-Job Search in a
Search and Matching Model with
Endogenous Job Destruction
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the efficiency of on-the-job (OTJ) search in a search and matching model.
OTJ search has been increasingly incorporated into search models to account for the large
direct flows of workers from one job to another. For instance, Fallick and Fleischman (2004)
find that nearly two fifths of new jobs in the U.S. are taken by previously employed workers.
I use a search model that allows for OTJ search and endogenous job destruction, which
is close to the model outlined in Pissarides (2000). The main assumptions are that search is
random and commitment in terms of wages and OTJ search is limited. Random search means
that there is only one job market for firms and workers. Job seekers, however, differ in terms of
their current employment status: unemployed workers benefit from finding a job more than
employed job seekers, who are looking for a better job. If it were possible to separate these
different groups of job seekers in a directed search model like Menzio and Shi (2011), then
different submarkets would be created. It would be efficient to have relatively more vacancies
for the unemployed to increase their chances to find a job. Without these separate markets,
the efficient level of market tightness takes the potential gains of both the unemployed and
the employed job-seekers into account. In section 3.2, the efficient level of market tightness is
analysed in a simple model with OTJ search. In the spirit of the condition in Hosios (1990), I
derive the optimal level of the worker’s bargaining power. It is shown that, when OTJ search
is present, it exceeds the level indicated by the Hosios rule. This is because the efficient level of
market tightness is lower due to the trade-off described above that translates to the necessity
of a higher worker’s bargaining power.
The assumption of limited commitment creates another possible source of inefficiency: it
is assumed that workers cannot commit to stay with their current firms but they can secretly
perform OTJ search. Thereby, they impose an externality: the firm suffers a loss if its worker
leaves for a better job. In contrast, a certain amount of OTJ search is efficient when the gain
from a better job outweighs the loss of destroying the current job. This chapter finds that in
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general there is too much OTJ search taking place. Only if firms can partially commit to the
wage they pay, the efficient level can be reached. This is possible, because by committing to a
higher wage, the firm can make it less attractive for the worker to perform OTJ search. A result
of this mechanism, as pointed out by Shimer (2006), is that the bargaining set becomes non-
convex; when the firm pays a higher wage, the probability of the worker quitting is reduced,
which increases the surplus of a match. A suitable bargaining game is used to account for this
non-convexity. The outcome reduces inefficient OTJ search and subsequently it is possible for
the efficient level to be obtained.
Pissarides (1994) introduced OTJ search into a search model. My model differs from the
one in Pissarides (2000) insofar as I do not allow for a joint OTJ search decision and I introduce
partial commitment in terms of wages. The efficiency of OTJ search has been discussed in
Stevens (2004). In her model, firms are allowed to post wage contracts that are more or less
restricted. In the unrestricted case, workers pay a fee at the beginning of a match and then they
get the whole rent. To allow for such contracts would yield an efficient OTJ search decision
in my model, because employers do not care when a worker leaves. Hence, workers bear the
full cost of destroying a match and choose the efficient threshold for performing OTJ search.
Yet, Stevens (2004) concludes that turnover is too low, because workers do not incorporate the
benefits a firm has from being matched. This is because she considers a partial equilibrium,
in which firms and workers are matched at a constant rate. In general equilibrium with free
entry of firms, however, these benefits are equal to the expected job creation cost and cancel
out in an analysis of social welfare.
The result that there are too many vacancies is also obtained by Gautier, Teulings, and Van
Vuuren (2010), who consider a circular model of heterogeneity. When posting vacancies, firms
do not take into account the loss of other firms whose employees are to be potentially hired.
In a different context, Moen and Rosen (2011) have adapted the Hosios rule, when workers
have private information. A higher worker bargaining power of workers is desirable as it
induces them to exert more effort. In this sense, they provide an alternative explanation for
the result in proposition 1.
There are two approaches for wage bargaining in models including OTJ search: Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) allow for counter-offers when employed workers get another
job offer. Workers can then benefit from the competition between the two possible employers.
In this chapter, I follow Shimer (2006), for instance, and exclude such competition.
Another approach for modelling OTJ search is the class of directed search models like in
Menzio and Shi (2011) and Menzio and Shi (2010). The main advantage of the so called block
recursive equilibrium they obtain, is the tractability of the solution. Introducing different sub-
markets for job seekers then yields an efficient level of market tightness for each group.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses a simple version of the model
that abstracts from the decisions regarding OTJ search and job destruction and focuses on the
efficient number of vacancies in the pressence of OTJ search. The adaptation of the Hosios
rule needed to obtain the efficient level of market tightness is derived. The full model with
endogenous job destruction and OTJ search decision is analysed in section 3.3. In section 3.4,
partial commitment is introduced, and the bargaining process is adapted to account for the
non-convex bargaining set. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Simple model
3.2.1 Setup
The simple model I consider first is a special case of the endogenous job destruction model
in Pissarides (2000) that allows for OTJ search. It is a continuous time search and matching
model. The mass of workers is normalised to 1. Firms and workers are risk-neutral, having a
discount rate r. Every firm-worker pair can have two possible levels of productivity: all jobs
are created at productivity p. At rate λ, shocks arrive that reduce the productivity to px. Jobs
of either productivity are destroyed at the exogenous rate δ.
Vacancies and jobseekers are matched according to a constant returns to scale matching
function m (u + e, v), where unemployed and employed job seekers are equally likely to be
matched. From the matching function it follows that job seekers find a new job at rate a (θ) =
m (1, θ), where θ ≡ vu+e denotes labour market tightness. This is the ratio of vacancies to the
total number of job seekers, who consist of the unemployed u and the OTJ seekers e. The
function a (θ) is increasing and concave in θ and the Inada conditions shall hold.1 The arrival
rate of employees to a vacancy is then given by the rate q (θ) = a(θ)θ .
The flow cost of maintaining a vacancy for a firm is pc. Unemployed workers receive a
flow payoff of b. When employed workers want to perform OTJ search, they incur the cost ν.2
The purpose of this simple model is to demonstrate how the efficient level of market tight-
ness is influenced by the existence of OTJ search. I derive the generalisation of the Hosios
(1990) rule for the worker’s bargaining power that ensures an efficient market outcome. When
there is OTJ search, the additional surplus of finding a new job for employed workers is lower
than the surplus for the unemployed. Therefore, OTJ seekers are relatively more patient to
find a better job. In a directed search model like Menzio and Shi (2011) this implies that in
equilibrium the market for OTJ seekers features a lower market tightness (i.e. a lower job-
finding rate), but a higher wage. As I do not allow for directed search, it is intuitive that
the optimal market tightness for matching both unemployed and OTJ seekers with vacancies
will lie between the low level of market tightness for OTJ seekers and the high level for the
unemployed in a directed search model. To get an efficient market outcome, the worker’s bar-
gaining power will then have to be higher than the one suggested by the Hosios (1990) rule.
Otherwise, market tightness in the decentralised economy is too high as an OTJ seeker does
not fully incorporate the negative impact a change of jobs has on her previous employer.
As I am interested in this efficient level of market tightness, I want to eliminate other de-
cisions made by the worker and the firm, notably when to perform OTJ search and when to
destroy a job. Therefore, I assume that the parameters are such that it is both socially and indi-
vidually optimal to perform OTJ search and not to destroy the job after a λ-shock has decreased
the productivity of a match.3 In the full model from section 3.3 onwards, this assumption is
relaxed and performing OTJ search becomes an endogenous choice.
First, the efficient solution given by the social planner’s problem is derived, then the market
outcome is derived and the two are compared.
1That is limθ→0 a′ (θ) = ∞ and limθ→∞ a′ (θ) = 0.
2In this section I impose that OTJ search always takes place at the lower level of productivity. Without loss of
generality, OTJ search costs could therefore be set to 0 and be deducted from output, px. I include them to make the
equations better comparable to those in the following sections.
3The latter condition is simply b ≤ px− ν as the low productivity is an absorbing state.
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3.2.2 Social planner’s problem
A social planner solves the following optimal control problem: the state variables are the frac-
tion of unemployed, employed at productivity p, and employed at productivity px denoted by
u, w1, and wx, respectively (u+w1 +wx = 1). The only control variable in the simple model is
labour market tightness θ. Given the initial distribution across states, she wants to maximise
the present discounted value of the flow benefits for the unemployed plus output produced
by employed less the cost of opening vacancies and of OTJ search:
max
∞∫
0
e−rt [ub + p (w1 + xwx)− pcθ (u + wx)− νwx] dt, (3.1a)
u˙ = δ (w1 + wx)− a (θ) u, (3.1b)
w˙1 = − (δ+ λ)w1 + a (θ) (u + wx) , (3.1c)
w˙x = − (δ+ a (θ))wx + λw1. (3.1d)
The stock of unemployed workers increases, because employed workers lose their job at rate
δ, and it decreases, because unemployed find a job at rate a (θ). The inflow into employment
at productivity 1 is given by the fraction of unemployed and OTJ seekers who have found a
new job, whereas a fraction δ+ λ lose their job dues to the shocks. Finally, the inflow into low
productivity jobs is only due to λ-shocks whereas these jobs are lost at a rate δ+ a (θ) due to
job destruction and OTJ search, respectively.
Denote by U, W1, and Wx the respective costates for the three state variables. The Hamil-
tonian in the current-value form is given by
H = ub + p (w1 + xwx)− pcθ (u + wx)− νwx +U [δ (w1 + wx)− a (θ) u]
+W1 [− (δ+ λ)w1 + a (θ) (u + wx)] +Wx [− (δ+ a (θ))wx + λw1] . (3.2)
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of market tightness is given by
a′ (θ) [u (W1 −U) + wx (W1 −Wx)] = pc (u + wx) , (3.3a)
(1− η)
[
u
u + wx
(W1 −U) + wxu + wx (W1 −Wx)
]
=
pc
q (θ)
, (3.3b)
where η ≡ 1 − a′(θ)θa(θ) is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the
number of job seekers. The left hand side of the first equation describes the marginal benefit of
a higher job arrival rate by increasing θ. In optimum it must be equal to the marginal cost on
the right hand side. In the rearranged second line, one can see that the actual benefit of higher
market tightness is given by the weighted average of the gains for an unemployed and for an
employed job seeker, as there is only one market at which job seekers can be matched.
The costates’ differential equations are given by
U˙ = rU − [b− pcθ + a (θ) (W1 −U)] , (3.4a)
W˙1 = rW1 − [p + δ (U −W1) + λ (Wx −W1)] , (3.4b)
W˙x = rWx − [px− pcθ − ν+ a (θ) (W1 −Wx) + δ (U −Wx)] . (3.4c)
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I focus on the description of a steady state, in which the states and costates are constant.
Then the equations reduce to:
rU = b− pcθ + a (θ) (W1 −U) , (3.5a)
rW1 = p + δ (U −W1) + λ (Wx −W1) , (3.5b)
rWx = px− pcθ − ν+ a (θ) (W1 −Wx) + δ (U −Wx) . (3.5c)
The first equation states that the flow value of an unemployed worker is given by the unem-
ployment benefit less the proportional cost of maintaining vacancies plus the option value of
getting matched at rate a (θ). A match at the high level of productivity benefits from output p
but at rate δ the match is destroyed and at rate λ the productivity is downgraded. For a low
productivity match, the output px has to be reduced by the direct OTJ search costs ν and the
cost for the vacancies. A better job is found at rate a (θ) and at rate δ the job breaks down. One
can rearrange these value equations to obtain the respective surplus:
(r + a (θ) + δ) (Wx −U) = px− b− ν, (3.6a)
(r + a (θ) + λ+ δ) (W1 −Wx) = p (1− x) + pcθ + ν, (3.6b)
(r + a (θ) + δ) (W1 −U) = p− b + pcθ + λ (Wx −W1) . (3.6c)
From the laws of motion for the states, one can obtain the distribution across states in a
steady state:
u =
δ
δ+ a (θ)
, (3.7a)
w1 =
a (θ)
δ+ λ+ a (θ)
, (3.7b)
wx =
λ
δ+ a (θ)
w1. (3.7c)
A higher level of market tightness means that job seekers are matched faster, reducing the
steady state value of unemployed and of low quality matches relative to high quality matches.
The share of high quality matches then increases. Substituting the steady state value of the
states and the values obtained from equations (3.6b) and (3.6c) into the first order condition
(3.3b) for θ, implicitly yields the efficient steady state value for market tightness.
3.2.3 Decentralised economy
This subsection determines the equilibrium in the decentralised economy. The value of an
unemployed and an employed worker at the two levels of productivity is denoted by U, W1,
and Wx, respectively. Her wage is denoted by w¯1 and w¯x. This gives the stationary value
equations
rU = b + a (θ) (W1 −U) , (3.8a)
rW1 = w¯1 + δ (U −W1) + λ (Wx −W1) , (3.8b)
rWx = w¯x − ν+ a (θ) (W1 −Wx) + δ (U −Wx) . (3.8c)
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They differ from the social planner’s equations (3.5a), (3.5b), and (3.5c) only insofar as job
seekers do not directly bear the cost of vacancies and employed workers receive a wage instead
of the whole output. They can be rewritten in terms of the surplus:
(r + a (θ) + δ) (W1 −U) = w¯1 − b + λ (Wx −W1) , (3.9a)
(r + a (θ) + λ+ δ) (W1 −Wx) = w¯1 − w¯x + ν. (3.9b)
Firms can open and maintain vacancies at cost pc, getting matched at rate q (θ). The value
of a vacancy is denoted by V. The firm’s value of a match is denoted by J1 and Jx, respectively.
Its flow profits are given by output less wage. A match with high productivity is destroyed at
rate δ and downgraded at rate λ. A low productivity match is destroyed exogenously at rate
δ and destroyed endogenously due to the worker leaving for another firm at rate a (θ). This
yields the following value equations:
rV = −pc + q (θ) (J1 −V) , (3.10a)
rJ1 = p− w¯1 − δJ1 + λ (Jx − J1) , (3.10b)
rJx = px− w¯x − (δ+ a (θ)) Jx. (3.10c)
The last equation can be solved for the value of a low productivity match:
Jx =
px− w¯x
r + δ+ a (θ)
. (3.11)
In equilibrium, rents from opening vacancies are exhausted such that the zero profit con-
dition holds:
J1 =
pc
q (θ)
. (3.12)
Using this condition, one can obtain the analogon of equation (3.9b) for the firm:
(r + a (θ) + λ+ δ) (J1 − Jx) = p (1− x)− (w¯1 − w¯x) + pcθ. (3.13)
The equilibrium wage is determined by Nash bargaining. The worker gets a share β, with
the remainder going to the firm. It is assumed that the wage is continuously renegotiated.
Most importantly, it is adjusted after a negative productivity shock and it is not possible for
the firm to prevent OTJ search by committing to a higher wage. From the sharing rule one
obtains the respective conditions for the two types of matches:
(1− β) (W1 −U) = βJ1, (3.14a)
(1− β) (Wx −U) = βJx. (3.14b)
Taking the difference of the two and substituting from equations (3.9b) and (3.13), one obtains
the equation for the wage differential:
(1− β) (W1 −Wx) = β (J1 − Jx) , (3.15a)
(1− β) (w¯1 − w¯x + ν) = β [p (1− x)− (w¯1 − w¯x) + pcθ] , (3.15b)
w¯1 − w¯x = β [p (1− x) + pcθ]− (1− β) ν. (3.15c)
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Similarly, using equations (3.9a) and (3.10b), the wage at the high productivity is derived:
(1− β) [w¯1 − b + λ (Wx −W1)] = β [p− w¯1 + a (θ) J1 + λ (Jx − J1)] , (3.16a)
(1− β) (w¯1 − b) = β (p− w¯1 + pcθ) , (3.16b)
w¯1 = (1− β) b + β (p + pcθ) . (3.16c)
This is the standard wage equation, which is not affected by the introduction of productivity
shocks and OTJ search, as it is renegotiated after shocks. Substituting it into the equation for
the wage differential gives the wage at the low level of productivity:
w¯x = (1− β) (b + ν) + βpx. (3.17)
The worker is compensated for foregoing unemployment benefits and incurring OTJ search
cost ν. In addition, she gets a share of the output.
The job creation condition is obtained by equating the value J1 from equation (3.10b) in
combination with equation (3.11) to the value from the zero profit condition (3.12):
p− w¯1 + λ px− w¯xr + δ+ a (θ) = (r + δ+ λ)
pc
q (θ)
. (3.18)
Substituting the wage equations derived above into this equation, yields the equilibrium level
of market tightness. Given market tightness, the steady state distribution across employment
states is given by the same equations (3.7a), (3.7b), and (3.7c) as in the social planner’s case.
As labour market tightness is the only control variable in this model, the difference between
the efficient outcome and the decentralised equilibrium can be analysed by comparing θ in the
steady state. This is done in the next subsection.
3.2.4 Efficiency condition
Along the lines of Hosios (1990), I want to find the condition for the bargaining power that
must hold in order to make the decentralised equilibrium efficient. This means that θSP =
θDEC shall hold where superscript SP denotes variables in the social planner’s outcome and
superscript DEC denotes variables in the decentralised equilibrium. The social planner’s first
order condition (3.3b) is
(1− η)
[
u
u + wx
(
WSP1 −USP
)
+
wx
u + wx
(
WSP1 −WSPx
)]
=
pc
q
(
θSP
) . (3.19)
In the decentralised economy, the zero profit condition (3.12) and the Nash sharing rule imply
pc
q
(
θDEC
) = (1− β) (WDEC1 + JDEC1 −UDEC) . (3.20)
Note that when market tightness is the same in both cases the surplus of a job is also the same:
WSP1
(
θSP
)
−USP
(
θSP
)
= WDEC1
(
θSP
)
+ JDEC1
(
θSP
)
−UDEC
(
θSP
)
. (3.21)
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Combining the three equation, yields the condition for efficiency:
(1− η)
[
u
u + wx
(
WSP1 −USP
)
+
wx
u + wx
(
WSP1 −WSPx
)]
= (1− β)
(
WSP1 −USP
)
. (3.22)
This can be rearranged to express the efficient level of bargaining power:
β = η + (1− η) wx
u + wx
WSPx −USP
WSP1 −USP
. (3.23)
The Hosios condition without OTJ search is β = η. This is too low when OTJ search is present
(i.e. wx > 0).4 The expression
WSPx −USP
WSP1 −USP
describes how large the surplus of a low-productivity
job is relative to a new job. The higher this ratio is and the more relevant it is due to more OTJ
seekers, the more relevant is the loss of an existing surplus in low-productivity jobs due to
succesful OTJ search. Consequently, the larger is the optimal bargaining power of the worker.
The intuition behind this result is that a high bargaining power increases wages, thereby re-
ducing the profits of firms and consequently the number of vacancies they open. Otherwise
there would be too many vacancies; firms do not account for the fact that when opening a
vacancy the rate at which jobs are destroyed is endogenously increased, thereby imposing a
negative externality on existing firms. This additional externality is corrected for by adapting
the Hosios rule.
The result above proves the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In an economy with on-the-job search, the efficient level of the worker’s bargaining
power is larger than the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of job seekers:
β = η + (1− η) wx
u + wx
WSPx −USP
WSP1 −USP
.
In this section, I implicitly restricted the parameters such that OTJ search is efficient. In the
next section, I discuss the general model, in which both the decision to destroy jobs and the
decision to perform OTJ search are determined endogenously.
3.3 Model with endogenous job destruction and on-the-job
search
I now relax the assumption that there are only two possible values for the productivity of a
match. The model is similar to the one in chapter 4 of Pissarides (2000). Job destruction is
endogenised along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), which also makes the OTJ
search decision endogenous. I assume that there is a finite number of productivity levels
pxi (x1 = 1 > x2 > . . . > xn) and jobs are still created at the maximum productivity p.
Shocks that arrive at rate λ change the productivity of a match where the new productivity is
drawn according to the probability mass function g (xi) (∑ni=1 g (xi) = 1).
5 Jobs are destroyed
4Note that the value of a low productivity match is bigger than the value of an unemployed by assumption in this
section (i.e. WSPx > USP). In the model with endogenous job destruction it holds endogenously for all jobs that are
not destroyed.
5Note that the simple model above is nested in this more general model by setting x2 = x, x3 = 0, g (x2) = λλ+δ ,
g (x3) = δλ+δ , and λ˜ = λ+ δ.
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endogenously if the new productivity level is below a certain reservation productivity such
that all jobs with a lower productivity are destroyed. At each level of productivity, a worker
can decide whether she wants to perform OTJ search. This will determine a second threshold
such that OTJ search takes place for all matches with a lower productivity.
I start again with the discussion of the efficient solution and then I find the market outcome
and compare the two.
3.3.1 Social planner’s problem
Compared to the simple model in section 3.2.2, the planner has additional controls in the full
model. For each level of productivity, let the dummy variable ei denote the OTJ search decision
such that OTJ search takes place when ei = 1 . Similarly, let the dummy variable di denote the
destruction decision for matches with productivity xi.6 The maximisation problem takes the
following form:
max
∞∫
0
e−rt
[
ub + p
n
∑
i=1
xiwi − pcθ
(
u +
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
)
− ν
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
]
dt, (3.24a)
u˙ = λ
n
∑
i=1
dig (xi)
n
∑
j=1
wj − a (θ) u, (3.24b)
w˙1 = λ
(
g (x1)
n
∑
j=1
wj − w1
)
+ a (θ)
(
u +
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
)
, (3.24c)
w˙i = λ
(
(1− di) g (xi)
n
∑
j=1
wj − wi
)
− eia (θ)wi. (3.24d)
As above, the flow utility is given by unemployment benefits and output less the costs for
opening vacancies and OTJ search costs.7 Similar to the simple model, the inflow into unem-
ployment is given by workers that lose their jobs after a productivity shock, and the outflow is
given by the unemployed that are newly matched. The stock of workers at each level of pro-
ductivity changes, because after a λ-shock workers’ productivity gets changed. Additionally,
there is an outflow if OTJ search takes place and at the highest productivity there is an inflow
due to newly matched unemployed and OTJ seekers.
The value of an unemployed is still denoted by U, and Wi denotes the value of a match
with productivity xi. Appendix 3.A derives the Bellman equations, which are analogous to
equations (3.5a), (3.5b), and (3.5c) in the simple model:
rU = b− pcθ + a (θ) (W1 −U) , (3.25a)
rW1 = p + λ
(
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) [
djU +
(
1− dj
)
Wj
]−W1
)
, (3.25b)
rWi = pxi + ei [a (θ) (W1 −Wi)− pcθ − ν]
+λ
(
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) [
djU +
(
1− dj
)
Wj
]−Wi
)
. (3.25c)
6The linearity of the objective function and the constraints in ei and di ensures that a corner solution is optimal.
7The laws of motion are written for stationary di . If for example an exogenous productivity shock raised the job
destruction threshold, there would be a mass of jobs destroyed, which is not incorporated in the differential equations.
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The main differences compared to the value equations obtained in the simple model are that
the option value of OTJ search is only present when ei = 1 and that there is a new option value
after a λ-shock: the latter is the expectation over getting the value Wj of a match at a new
productivity level or the value U of an unemployed worker, if the job is optimally destroyed
in response to a λ shock.
Appendix 3.A derives the threshold S¯ (θ), such that OTJ search is optimal for all matches
with x ≤ S¯ (θ):
S¯ (θ) = 1− (pcθ + ν) (r + λ)
a (θ) p
. (3.26)
Without fixed OTJ search costs ν, the threshold would be decreasing in θ because of the de-
creasing marginal returns of the matching function.8 The intuition behind this negative re-
lationship is that the expected cost of getting a new job ( pcq(θ) ) is increasing in θ. This makes
OTJ search profitable for fewer types of matches. The threshold for OTJ search determines the
controls ei given θ:
ei =
{
1 if xi ≤ S¯ (θ)
0 if xi > S¯ (θ)
. (3.27)
Now, the threshold for job destruction can be determined. There exists such a threshold,
because matches are identical except for their productivity. Therefore, if matches at some pro-
ductivity level are destroyed, also matches at lower levels of productivity have to be destroyed
in the optimum. I assume that the parameters are such that there is at least some efficient OTJ
search at the worst non-destroyed matches.9 Appendix 3.A derives that matches are destroyed
if
p (1− xi) + ν+ pcθ
r + a (θ) + λ
≥W1 −U. (3.28)
The left hand side is the difference between W1 and Wi which is determined by the actual
difference in productivity and the cost of vacancies and OTJ search multiplied by the average
(discounted) time until OTJ search is successful or a productivity shock has arrived. If this
difference becomes larger than the surplus of a new match, the job is destroyed. Note that
(W1 −U) itself depends on the threshold. Inequality (3.28) thus implicitly determines the
threshold R (θ), which yields the controls:
di =
{
1 if xi ≤ R (θ)
0 if xi > R (θ)
. (3.29)
The steady state distribution across employment states can be obtained analogously to the
simple model, yielding:
u =
δ
δ+ a (θ)
, (3.30a)
w1 = g (x1)
a (θ)
δ+ a (θ)
+
a (θ) (u + e)
λ
, (3.30b)
wi =
{
λ
λ+eia(θ)
g (xi)
a(θ)
δ+a(θ) if di = 0
0 if di = 1
. (3.30c)
8In general sgn [S′ (θ)] = −sgn [ηpcθ − ν (1− η)] so that it is decreasing for θ large enough. Otherwise, the fixed
search cost is too high given a low probability of getting matched.
9If OTJ search costs were prohibitively high, the outcome would be identical to the model without OTJ search.
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For a given value θ, the optimal values for di and ei, the values for the surplus W1 −U and
W1 −Wi, as well as the distribution across states u and wi have thus been determined. Using
this for the first order condition (3.76b), one can find the possible steady states for labour mar-
ket tightness θ. Depending on the parameters, there is not necessarily a unique steady state:
intuitively, multiple steady states can occur, because higher labour market tightness usually
lowers the OTJ search threshold. This could increase the average gain from matching the av-
erage job seeker as workers with higher productivity do not perform OTJ search anymore.
The higher cost arising from more vacancies per job seeker could thus be compensated by a
higher average gain. In the steady state with low market tightness, there would be relatively
more unemployed workers but more employed workers at a high level of productivity as more
workers perform OTJ search. If there is not a unique steady state, the optimal choice might
even depend on the initial distribution across employment states.
3.3.2 Decentralised equilibrium without commitment
In this subsection, the market outcome is determined when there is no commitment in terms
of wages or the OTJ search decision. Workers determine privately, if they want to perform OTJ
search. As the wage is continuously renegotiated, they base their decisions on the market wage
that is prevailing at the different levels of productivity.10 In this case, a higher wage cannot
prevent the worker from OTJ search. This results in too much OTJ search in equilibrium as
the worker does not take fully into account the loss that the firm incurs when she leaves.
In contrast, the decision for job destruction is still constrained efficient, because wages are
determined by Nash bargaining. Then the firm’s or the worker’s surplus is negative if and
only if the combined surplus is negative.
The stationary value equations for the worker are now given by
rU = b + a (θ) (W1 −U) , (3.31a)
rW1 = w¯1 + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (
max
{
Wj, U
}−W1) , (3.31b)
rWi = w¯i + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (
max
{
Wj, U
}−Wi)+max {a (θ) (W1 −Wi)− ν, 0} . (3.31c)
They differ from the simple model’s equations insofar as the worker can choose whether or
not to perform OTJ search, and the value after a λ-shock is given by the expectation over the
outcome in all possible states. The equations can be rearranged to obtain expressions for the
surplus:
(r + λ+ eia (θ)) (W1 −Wi) = w¯1 − w¯i + eiν, (3.32a)
(r + λ+ a (θ)) (W1 −U) = w¯1 − b + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Wj −U, 0
}
. (3.32b)
The firms’ equation for the value of a vacancy does not change. The equations for the firms’
value of a match have to be similarly adjusted to account for the λ-shock. Additionally, a job
10Nevertheless, the privately optimal decision of the worker is anticipated in the bargaining problem, and the
surplus is calculated based on it.
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can be destroyed at rate a (θ) if the worker performs OTJ search (i.e. ei = 1):
rV = −pc + q (θ) (J1 −V) , (3.33a)
rJ1 = p− w¯1 + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (
max
{
Jj, 0
}− J1) , (3.33b)
rJi = pxi − w¯i + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (
max
{
Jj, 0
}− Ji)− eia (θ) Ji. (3.33c)
The first equation implies the same zero profit condition as in the simple problem:
J1 =
pc
q (θ)
. (3.34)
Making use of it, the firms’ surplus of a high productivity match over a lower productivity
match can be calculated in equilibrium:
(r + λ+ eia (θ)) (J1 − Ji) = p (1− xi)− (w¯1 − w¯i) + ei pcθ. (3.35)
The wage is again determined by Nash-bargaining with the worker’s share being β. The
possible problem of a non-convex bargaining set as pointed out in Shimer (2006) does not arise
here: the continuation value and the OTJ search decision only depend on the equilibrium val-
ues. Therefore, the wage bargaining only splits the output less possible OTJ search costs in the
current (infinitesimal) period.11 As the combined surplus is not influenced by the outcome of
the bargaining process, the bargaining set is convex. In the next section, I relax the assumption
of no commitment leading to a possible non-convexity.
The analogon of the wage differential (3.15c) can be derived from equations (3.32a) and
(3.35) using the Nash sharing rule:
w¯1 − w¯i = β [p (1− xi) + ei pcθ]− (1− β) eiν. (3.36)
Now, the worker is only partially compensated for the OTJ search costs and compensates for
the cost of vacancies if OTJ search takes place. Similarly, equations (3.32b) and (3.33b) can be
used to derive the same wage equations at the highest productivity as in the simple model:
w¯1 = (1− β) b + β (p + pcθ) (3.37)
Substituting it into the wage differential, yields the general wage equation:
w¯i = (1− β) (b + eiν) + β (pxi + (1− ei) pcθ) . (3.38)
Its interpretation is the same as in the simple model: the worker is compensated for potentially
incurred OTJ search costs and foregoing unemployment benefits and she gets her share of the
output and the cost of vacancies if she does not search.
Before I determine the thresholds for OTJ search and job destruction, I can calculate the
11The assumption of continuous time is not crucial for this result. In discrete time, if the worker can either hide
her OTJ search efforts from the firm, or take this decision after the wage is set, the same argument applies. Paying
a higher wage would not prevent her from performing OTJ search to find a better job for the next period. The firm
would have to be able to commit to the wage paid in the next period to prevent OTJ search. This is the case in Shimer
(2006), where the wage remains fixed for the duration of the match after it has been initially bargained.
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expressions for the surplus using equations (3.32a) and (3.35) as well as (3.31b) and (3.33b):
S1 − Si = p (1− xi) + ei (pcθ + ν)r + λ+ eia (θ) , (3.39)
S1 =
p− b + λ∑nj=1 g
(
xj
)
max
{
Sj, 0
}
+ pcθ
r + λ+ a (θ)
. (3.40)
I want to find an equilibrium, in which Si, and hence Wi and Ji, are monotonic in i. Mono-
tonicity of the surplus implies that there is a threshold R such that jobs are destroyed if xi ≤ R.
Monotonicity of the worker’s share implies that there is a threshold S¯ such that OTJ search is
performed if xi ≤ S¯.12
The worker will want to perform OTJ search if the expected gains from finding a better job
outweigh her OTJ search costs (a (θ) (W1 −Wi) ≥ ν). This yields the condition for OTJ search:
a (θ) β
p (1− xi) + ei (pcθ + ν)
r + λ+ eia (θ)
≥ ν. (3.41)
For the individual decision to be consistent with the equilibrium outcome ei, the condition
must hold when ei > 0 and the opposite must hold when ei < 1. For the corner solutions, this
yields the two conditions
a (θ) β
p (1− xi) + pcθ + ν
r + λ+ a (θ)
≥ ν, (3.42)
when there is OTJ search and
a (θ) β
p (1− xi)
r + λ
≤ ν, (3.43)
when there is no OTJ search. The first inequality defines a threshold such that OTJ search is an
equilibrium strategy when xi ≤ S¯1 (θ):
S¯1 (θ) = 1+ cθ − r + λ+ (1− β) a (θ)a (θ) βp ν. (3.44)
The second inequality defines a threshold such that no OTJ search is an equilibrium strategy
when xi ≥ S¯o (θ):
S¯0 (θ) = 1− r + λa (θ) βpν. (3.45)
If S¯0 (θ) = S¯1 (θ) held, there would be a unique OTJ search strategy. However, if S¯0 (θ) <
S¯1 (θ) holds, there are multiple equilibria for xi ∈ [S¯0 (θ) , S¯1 (θ)]: if nobody is searching in
equilibrium, this implies a higher wage, and it is optimal not to search. But if everyone is
searching, the wage is lower, and it is indeed optimal for each worker to search. This is the
case that will generally happen as S¯0 (θ) < S¯1 (θ) is equivalent to
βpcθ > (1− β) ν. (3.46)
This condition holds in equilibrium, because from the zero profit condition and the Nash shar-
ing rule it follows that the worker’s surplus at the best job is β1−β
pc
q(θ) . The worker’s gain from
finding a new job must be smaller than this: As her current job is not destroyed, there is a
12It could be that a non-monotonic surplus is reconcilable with a non-monotonic OTJ search decision because of the
existence of multiple equilibria, as shown below. This would create a further inefficiency of the market outcome. But
as such an equilibrium seems arbitrary, I exclude it in the further analysis.
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positive surplus, which reduces the gains from finding a new job. Therefore, the worker’s
gain from OTJ search is less than β1−β pcθ. In contrast, the worker’s gain must be larger than
her cost ν. Hence, condition (3.46) holds in any equilibrium, in which OTJ search takes place.
Then there are multiple equilibria if S¯0 (θ) < 1 holds, which is equivalent to positive OTJ
search costs (ν > 0). The threshold for OTJ search must thus be in the interval
S¯ ∈
[
1− r + λ
a (θ) βp
ν, 1+ cθ − r + λ+ (1− β) a (θ)
a (θ) βp
ν
]
. (3.47)
For now, I do not specify which equilibrium threshold shall be chosen. But the next subsection
shows that all possible thresholds are larger than the efficient one.
A job is destroyed if its surplus becomes negative. I restrict myself to the cases in which
there is at least some OTJ search as in the social planner’s discussion.13 Using equations (3.39)
when ei = 1 and (3.40), it follows that the surplus of a match becomes negative if
− pxi + ν ≥ −b + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Sj, 0
}
. (3.48)
Using equation (3.40) and the no profit condition, the expected surplus after a λ-shock can be
determined:
λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Sj, 0
}
= (r + λ+ a (θ))
1
1− β
pc
q (θ)
− p + b− pcθ. (3.49)
Combining the last two equations, gives the condition for job destruction:
p (1− xi) + ν ≥ (r + λ) 11− β
pc
q (θ)
+
β
1− β pcθ. (3.50)
It is monotonous in x and thus defines the job destruction threshold
R (θ) = 1− r + λ
1− β
c
q (θ)
−
(
β
1− β cθ −
ν
p
)
, (3.51)
and the respective dummy variable for job destruction
di =
{
1 if xi ≤ R (θ)
0 if xi > R (θ)
. (3.52)
To find the equilibrium level of market tightness, the analogous job creation condition to equa-
tion (3.18) has to be derived. Combining equations (3.33b) and (3.39), making use of the Nash
sharing rule, one obtains
(r + δ) J1 = p− w¯1 − λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (1− β) [p (1− xj)+ ej (pcθ + ν)]
r + λ+ eja (θ)
(
1− dj
)
, (3.53)
where δ ≡ λ∑nj=1 g
(
xj
)
I
(
Jj ≤ 0
)
is the probability of job destruction in equilibrium. Substi-
13This assumption is even less restrictive here because there will be more OTJ search than in the efficient case.
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tuting the zero profit condition and the wage equation (3.37), yields the condition
(r + δ)
pc
q (θ)
= (1− β) (p− b)− βpcθ
−λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (1− β) [p (1− xj)+ ej (pcθ + ν)]
r + λ+ eja (θ)
(
1− dj
)
. (3.54)
Using the thresholds for OTJ search and job destruction, this equation implicitly defines labour
market tightness in the decentralised equilibrium.
3.3.3 Comparison of the decentralised equilibrium with the efficient out-
come
In this subsection, I show that the market outcome is in general inefficient regardless of the
level of bargaining power. This stems from OTJ search taking place in excess, as the worker
does not fully incorporate the loss for a firm if she changes the job. Recall the OTJ search
thresholds derived in equations (3.26) and (3.47):
S¯SP (θ) = 1− (pcθ + ν) (r + λ)
a (θ) p
, (3.55a)
1− r + λ
a (θ) βp
ν ≤ S¯DEC (θ) ≤ 1+ cθ − r + λ+ (1− β) a (θ)
a (θ) βp
ν. (3.55b)
An efficient search threshold would only be possible if the lower bound for S¯DEC was lower
than S¯SP, which is equivalent to
βpcθ ≤ (1− β) ν (3.56)
But in (3.46), exactly the opposite inequality was shown to hold in equilibrium. As a result,
if market tightness in the decentralised economy was at the efficient level, the OTJ search
threshold would be higher in the decentralised economy and too much OTJ search would be
taking place. As this holds regardless of the worker’s bargaining power, one can conclude that
the outcome in this economy will generally differ from the efficient outcome.14
Proposition 2 The decentralised outcome is not efficient: conditional on the level of market tightness,
there is too much on-the-job search taking place.
The reason for this result is that without wage commitment, a worker will perform OTJ
search whenever the expected gain from finding a better job exceeds her search cost ν. In
particular, in the absence of OTJ search costs there will be OTJ search for all but the highest
level of productivity. From a social point of view, the gain of finding a better job is smaller as
the old job is destroyed and the firm loses its part of the rent. Even in the absence of OTJ search
costs, the social planner’s threshold (3.26) shows that not all workers should seek better jobs.
If the level of productivity is close to the optimal, it is not worth maintaining the additional
vacancies to potentially find a better job for the worker. This result differs from Pissarides
14As I assume discrete levels of productivity, the efficient outcome can be achieved if there is no possible level
of productivity between the two different thresholds. In general, the difference between the two outcomes will be
determined by the probability of a match having a productivity level between the efficient and the decentralised
threshold.
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(2000) and Stevens (2004) who both conclude that there is too little search taking place. First,
Pissarides (2000) assumes that the decision for OTJ search is taken jointly by the firm and the
worker such that their surplus is maximised. In this section however, there is no commitment
and the worker will base the OTJ search decision on her individual optimality conditions.
Second, they do not take into account or do not model the cost of maintaining vacancies for
OTJ search. In particular, in the absence of (direct) OTJ search costs, the efficient level of OTJ
search is that any worker with less than optimal productivity performs OTJ search. This does
not take into account that either more vacancies are needed to maintain the level of market
tightness or there is a congestion effect decreasing the chances of other job seekers who need
a (better) job more strongly.
The second decision of the agents in the economy that could potentially differ from the
efficient level, is job destruction. Nash sharing, however, ensures that this decision is jointly
optimal and there is no (direct) distortion. In other words, a match will be destroyed endoge-
nously whenever its surplus vanishes. This is the same action a social planner would take,
conditional on the OTJ search threshold and market tightness.
In the next section, I allow for (partial) commitment, which can lead to an efficient OTJ
search decision and the first best outcome.
3.4 Decentralised equilibrium with (partial) commitment
3.4.1 Setup
I extend the model from above to allow for partial commitment in terms of wages: I assume
that, unless productivity changes, the firm and the worker can only renegotiate the wage after
a shock with arrival rate ω has arrived. The parameter ω represents the level of commitment,
such that if it is 0, there is perfect commitment (until a productivity shock arrives). As ω be-
comes larger, the two parties are allowed to renegotiate after increasingly shorter intervals.
The intuitive consequence of wage commitment is that it becomes feasible for the firm to pre-
vent OTJ search by paying and committing to a higher wage. Without commitment, it was
shown that there is too much OTJ search taking place as the worker does not care about the
loss the firm incurs. Below, I show that for any finite level of ω, it is possible to achieve the
efficient OTJ search threshold in equilibrium. This result hinges on choosing an appropriate
subgame perfect equilibrium in the bargaining game over a non-convex bargaining set.
Denote by Wi (w¯i) and Ji (w¯i) the worker’s and the firm’s value of a match when the wage
is fixed at w¯i. The equilibrium values that are expected after renogatiation are denoted by Wi
and Ji, respectively. Adapting the stationary value equations then yields
rWi (w¯i) = w¯i + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (
max
{
Wj, U
}−Wi (w¯i))
+ei [a (θ) (W1 −Wi (w¯i))− ν] +ω (Wi −Wi (w¯i)) , (3.57)
rJi (w¯i) = pxi − w¯i + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) (
max
{
Jj, 0
}− Ji (w¯i))− eia (θ) Ji (w¯i) +ω (Ji − Ji (w¯i)) .
(3.58)
The worker’s optimal search decision is ei = 1 if a (θ) (W1 −Wi (w¯i)) > ν such that the ex-
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pected gain exceeds her search cost.
Before the outcome of the bargaining process is analysed in detail, note that in an equi-
librium, in which everyone sets the same wage, the level of commitment ω will not directly
influence the wage. It will rather influence the OTJ search decision. It was shown above that
there might be multiple equilibria without commitment: there can be an equilibrium featuring
a low wage and OTJ search that is Pareto-dominated by an equilibrium with a higher wage
and no OTJ search. Since the lack of commitment does not make it feasible for the firm to
increase the wage by as much as is needed to prevent the worker from performing OTJ search,
these bad equilibria could not be ruled out. With wage commitment, it becomes possible for
a match to set a higher wage and prevent the worker from performing OTJ search, even if
all other workers with the same level of productivity perform OTJ search. Furthermore, new
equilibria are feasible, when the bargaining game is adjusted to the non-convex bargaining set.
The bargaining set becomes potentially non-convex, because raising the wage can prevent
the worker from OTJ search and make both the firm and the worker better off. To see this
formally, the dependence of the worker’s and the firm’s surplus on the bargained wage can be
analysed. The worker’s value equation can be rewritten as
Wi (w¯i) =
w¯i + ei [a (θ)W1 − ν] + cWi
r + λ+ω+ eia (θ)
, (3.59)
where cWi ≡ λ∑nj=1 g
(
xj
)
max
{
Wj, U
}
+ ωWi does not depend on the outcome of the bar-
gaining. The worker’s surplus is strictly increasing in the bargained wage w¯i. The threshold
w¯NSi for OTJ search is given by the condition a (θ)
(
W1 −Wi
(
w¯NSi
))
= ν which yields:
w¯NSi = (r + λ+ω)
(
W1 − νa (θ)
)
− cWi . (3.60)
The worker’s optimal choice of this threshold ensures that her value function is continuous
at w¯NSi . But there is a kink as the slope for lower wages (i.e. when there is OTJ search)
is 1r+λ+ω+a(θ) which is less than the slope for higher wages (
1
r+λ+ω , when there is no OTJ
search). Hence, the worker’s surplus is continuous, piecewise linear, increasing, and convex
in her wage. Using the condition Wi
(
w¯Ri
)
= U, her reservation wage w¯Ri is given by:
w¯Ri = (r + λ+ω)U − ei [a (θ) (W1 −U)− ν]− cWi
= rU − ei [a (θ) (W1 −U)− ν]− λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Wj −U, 0
}−ω (Wi −U) .(3.61)
Likewise, the firm’s surplus is given by:
(r + λ+ω+ eia (θ)) Ji (w¯i) = pxi − w¯i + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Jj, 0
}
+ω Ji, (3.62a)
Ji (w¯i) =
−w¯i + cJi
r + λ+ω+ eia (θ)
, (3.62b)
where the maximum wage that the firm is willing to pay, cJi , does not depend on the outcome
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of the bargaining:
cJi = pxi + λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Jj, 0
}
+ω Ji. (3.63)
The employer’s surplus from bargaining is decreasing in the wage, piecewise linear, but not
continuous at w¯NSi : the limit from below (i.e. when there is OTJ search) is
−w¯NSi +cJ
r+λ+ω+a(θ) , whereas
the limit from above is higher (−w¯
NS
i +c
J
r+λ+ω ). This discontinuity reflects that at one side of the
threshold the employer risks to lose the worker due to OTJ search but marginally increas-
ing her wage prevents OTJ search and thus increases the expected job duration. Denote by
w¯Si < w¯
NS
i the maximum wage the firm is willing to pay when there is OTJ search without
being better off by raising the wage to w¯NSi . Using the firm’s surplus in equation (3.62b), this
condition
Ji
(
w¯Si |ei = 1
)
= Ji
(
w¯NSi |ei = 0
)
(3.64)
yields
w¯Si = (r + λ+ω+ a (θ))
(
W1 − νa (θ)
)
− cWi −
a (θ)
(
cWi + c
J
i
)
r + λ+ω
. (3.65)
Therefore no wage in the interval
(
w¯Si , w¯
NS
i
)
should be the outcome of the bargaining process
as both the firm and the worker could do better by raising the wage to w¯NSi .
Appendix 3.B shows that it is jointly optimal to perform OTJ search if the following condi-
tion holds:
a (θ) (W1 −Wi (w¯i)− Ji (w¯i)) ≥ ν. (3.66)
This is a stronger condition than the worker’s individual optimality condition:
a (θ) (W1 −Wi (w¯i)) ≥ ν. (3.67)
This is, because the worker does not take into account the firm’s loss, if she finds a new job.
Hence, if it is jointly optimal to perform OTJ search, it will also be individually rational to do
so for the worker at any wage that is feasible for the firm.15 The outcome of the bargaining
process will not influence the OTJ search decision and the firm and the worker bargain over
the surplus SSi . Nash bargaining can be applied to determine the wage in this case as in the
previous sections. If on the other hand it is not jointly optimal to perform OTJ search, it is still
individually rational for the worker to do so if the wage is below w¯NSi . Then, the bargaining
set becomes non-convex and standard Nash bargaining cannot be applied. Similar to Shimer
(2006), I use an alternating offer bargaining game to determine the wage in this case. It is
described and solved in the next subsection.
In contrast to the case of no wage commitment, the bargaining surplus depends on the
search decision implied by the bargained wage. In the previous section, it did not matter,
because the wage was renegotiated after search, making the search decision only dependent
on the equilibrium wage, which is taken as given. To see the dependence on ω, the difference
between the surplus with and without OTJ search can be calculated from equations (3.86) and
15Formally, this means that cJi ≤ w¯NSi holds. Then, the worker will search even if the firm offers the maximum wage
such that its rent becomes 0.
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Figure 3.1: Non-convex bargaining set when OTJ search does not maximise the joint surplus: When the worker’s
share is sufficiently high, she does not perform OTJ search, which maximises W −U + J. Below the cutoff, the worker
searches OTJ and the firm’s value drops discontinuously. The solidly drawn frontier of the bargaining set can be
obtained in an alternating bargaining game according to Lemma 3.
(3.87):
SNSi − SSi =
a (θ)
r + λ+ω+ a (θ)
[−p (1− xi) + (r + λ) S1 +ωSi
r + λ+ω
−
(
W1 −U − νa (θ)
)]
.
(3.68)
As ω → ∞, which corresponds to the case of no commitment, the term in brackets is bounded.
Therefore, the difference between SSi and S
NS
i vanishes in the limit. This proves that, as the
wage is renegotiated more frequently, the bargained wage becomes less important and the
wages in equilibrium dominate the worker’s OTJ search decision.
The next subsection describes the bargaining game used to deal with the potential non-
convexity.
3.4.2 Wage bargaining when the bargaining set is non-convex
An example for the non-convex bargaining set when OTJ search is not jointly optimal and thus
socially inefficient is depicted in figure 3.1. This set can in general be described as follows.
Denote by x ∈ [0, S] the worker’s surplus and by xNS the threshold at which the worker’s
search behaviour changes. Let T be the joint loss when there is OTJ search. Then the firm’s
surplus is given by
J (x) =
{
S− x if xNS ≤ x ≤ S
S− x− T if 0 ≤ x < xNS . (3.69)
Following Shimer (2006), I consider an alternating offer bargaining game extending the
Rubinstein (1982) model: in each stage of the bargaining process the worker is allowed to
make an offer with probability β ∈ [0, 1] and the firm makes an offer with probability 1− β.16
If the receiver of the offer accepts, bargaining ends with the respective payoffs. If the offer is
16β is again interpreted as the worker’s bargaining power.
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rejected, the bargaining process breaks down with probability 1− δ before the next stage.
Lemma 3 When δ is approaching 1, the following values for the worker’s surplus can be obtained in a
subgame perfect equilibrium:
• x = βS if β > xNSS
• x = xNS if β ≤ xNSS
• x = β (S− T) if β < xNS−TS−T
Proof. See appendix 3.C
Note that there are multiple equilibria if β < x
NS−T
S−T holds: both an equilibrium without
OTJ search (the surplus maximizing outcome) as well as one with OTJ search and Nash sharing
could be obtained. Even low β, this is a high bargaining power of the firm, cannot break the
surplus maximizing equilibrium, because potential marginal gains for the firm are offset by a
discrete loss for the worker. Therefore, as δ approaches 1, the worker would not accept such
an offer, even if she potentially had to wait a long time until making an offer again.
The selection of one of the multiple equilibria when β < x
NS−T
S−T determines the efficieny
of the decentralised solution. In the following section, I choose the equilibrium that leads to
an efficient OTJ search decision. This means that x = xNS is chosen for all β ≤ xNSS . The
worker’s surplus is large enough to prevent her from performing OTJ search. What makes
this equilibrium attractive is that it maximises the joint surplus and therefore yields an optimal
search decision given market tightness. At the same time, it also maximises the worker’s share
that does not fall below x
NS
S .
17
To conclude the discussion of a non-convex bargaining set, note that mixed lotteries could
potentially Pareto improve the outcome: by mixing over x = 0 and x = xNS, both agents can
be made better off compared to the equilibria in which OTJ search takes place, when β < x
NS
S .
In this case, the bargaining set becomes convex and Nash bargaining can be applied. Following
Shimer (2006), I rule out this possibility, as a wage lottery being the outcome of a bargaining
process might be difficult to interpret and implement.
3.4.3 Determining the equilibrium
In section 3.4 above, the reservation wage w¯Ri , the maximum wage c
J
i , the maximum wage with
OTJ search w¯Si , and the minimum wage without OTJ search w¯
NS
i were determined in equations
(3.61), (3.63), (3.65), and (3.60), respectively. These values only depend on the equilibrium
outcome but not on the individually bargained wage. It always holds that w¯Si is smaller than
w¯NSi but the relative ranking of reservation wage and maximum wage determine the outcome
of the bargaining process. I assume that w¯Ri ≤ w¯NSi holds such that OTJ search takes place at
some levels of productivity in equilibrium.18 Three cases have to be distinguished:
1. Job destruction zone (w¯Ri > c
J
i ): if the reservation wage is larger than the maximum wage
the firm is willing to pay, the result is immediate job destruction. When OTJ search takes
17Alternative selections of an equilibrium in the bargaining game could be the equilibrium that maximises the firm’s
share, i.e. x = β (S− T) if β < xNS−TS−T , or the one that maximises the weighted product of returns xβ J (x)1−β.
18The condition wRi ≤ wNSi is equivalent to a (θ) (W1 −U) ≥ ν as the reservation wage reduces the worker’s value
to U and she will only want to search if the option value of finding a job is larger than the cost. If it did not hold, the
OTJ search costs are prohibitively large and there could never be OTJ search as Wi ≥ U holds.
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place for low levels of productivity, jobs are destroyed if their output plus the option
value of getting hit by a λ-shock is less than unemployment benefit plus OTJ search
costs. This is the same condition as in the case without commitment.
2. On-the-job search zone (w¯Ri ≤ cJi < w¯NSi ): this is the case, in which it is jointly optimal
for the worker and the firm and also individually rational for the worker to perform
OTJ search. Therefore, the worker will perform OTJ search after any outcome of the
bargaining process and Nash bargaining can be used again. Using the above definitions,
the condition cJi < w¯
NS
i can be rearranged, yielding
a (θ) (W1 −Wi − Ji) > ν. (3.70)
This means exactly that the joint benefit from OTJ search is higher than the cost.
3. Non-convex bargaining set (w¯NSi ≤ cJi ): it would be jointly optimal not to perform OTJ
search (a (θ) (W1 −Wi − Ji) ≤ ν) but for low values of the wage it is individually rational
for the worker to do so (w¯Ri ≤ w¯NSi ). Therefore, the bargaining set becomes non-convex.
In this case, I apply the bargaining process from above to determine the wage. In the
notation of section 3.4.2, S ≡ SNSi , T ≡ SNSi − SSi , and xNS ≡Wi
(
w¯NSi
)−U = W1 −U −
ν
a(θ) . Applying Lemma 3 and choosing the equilibrium as discussed above, the worker’s
surplus is
Wi −U =
{
βSNSi if βS
NS
i ≥W1 −U − νa(θ)
W1 −U − νa(θ) else
= max
(
βSNSi , W1 −U −
ν
a (θ)
)
. (3.71)
Having determined the individual behaviour in the bargaining process, I can find the out-
come in equilibrium, where Wi (w¯i) = Wi and Ji (w¯i) = Ji hold. Then the value equations
for given w¯i and ei are the same as in section 3.3.2 regardless of the level of commitment. In
particular, also the surplus is given by equations (3.39) and (3.40).
Appendix 3.D shows that the same threshold for OTJ search as a function of market tight-
ness as in the social planner’s problem is obtained. The firing threshold is also efficient condi-
tional on market tightness. Depending on the level of productivity, the worker’s surplus and
optimal decision are summarised in the following table.
Decision Wi −U Range of productivity
No OTJ search βSNSi x∈
[
1− r+λa(θ)βp ν,1
]
No OTJ search βSNS1 − νa(θ) x∈
[
1− r+λa(θ)p (ν+pcθ),1− r+λa(θ)βp ν
)
OTJ search βSSi x∈
[
1− r+λ1−β cq(θ)−
(
β
1−β cθ− νp
)
,1− r+λa(θ)p (ν+pcθ)
)
Job destruction 0 x∈
[
0,1− r+λ1−β cq(θ)−
(
β
1−β cθ− νp
))
Table 3.1: Optimal decision and worker surplus with (partial) commitment
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Given the worker’s surplus at all levels of productivity, her wage can be calculated from
equation (3.57):
w¯1 = b + (r + λ+ a (θ))
β
1− β
pc
q (θ)
+ λ
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
)
max
{
Wj −U, 0
}
. (3.72)
As the surplus is not split in the same proportion at all levels any more, the expression for w¯1
becomes more complicated. The wage differential, however, can still be easily obtained:
w¯1 − w¯i = (r + λ) (W1 −U)− (r + λ+ eia (θ)) (Wi −U) + β1−β ei pcθ − eiν (3.73)
=

βp (1− xi) No OTJ search
(r + λ) νa(θ) Corner Solution
βp (1− xi) + βpcθ − (1− β) ν OTJ search
. (3.74)
The wage differential is the same as before in the first and the third case, as the surplus is still
shared according to the Nash rule. In the intermediate case, when the worker is just made
indifferent between searching and not, the differential reflects exactly this indifference: her
expected cost of finding a job that pays w¯1 is νa(θ) whereas the expected loss from the lower
wage is w¯1−w¯ir+λ .
The main result of this section is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The efficient threshold for on-the-job search conditional on market tightness can be ob-
tained at any positive level of wage commitment.
This result is a consequence of the non-convex bargaining set that is obtained whenever
OTJ search is not efficient. Of course, it crucially depends on the choice of the equilibrium
in the bargaining game: even if the worker’s bargaining power and the possible degree of
inefficiency is small, the equilibrium at the kink of the bargaining set was chosen. On the
one hand, this is a strong assumption when the worker and the firm enter such a bargaining
game after a shock. On the other hand, it maximises the expected surplus when the job is
created. The firm is thus compensated by having to pay a lower wage before such a shock,
in anticipation of possible future shocks. The chosen equilibrium implied that the worker’s
share is higher than β in some cases to prevent her from OTJ search. If this implicit non-
constant bargaining power was also used in the Nash bargaining in the no-commitment case,
the efficient OTJ search decision could also be obtained.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed two possible inefficiencies that are present in a search model
with OTJ search. First, opening vacancies imposes externalities on other firms and job seekers.
It was shown that the worker’s bargaining power as suggested by the Hosios rule is too low
in the presence of OTJ search. Second, a worker that quits her firm imposes an externality
on it. In general, this leads to too much job turnover. It was shown that allowing for wage
commitment can help to reduce this externality. Using a suitable subgame perfect equilibrium
the efficient OTJ search decision could be obtained.
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As pointed out above, the choice of the respective equilibrium is crucial for this result. In
future research, the consequences of different bargaining mechanisms may be analysed. A
second limitation of this chapter is that it focuses only on the outcome in a steady state. Com-
pared to Menzio and Shi (2011), it is more difficult to study aggregate shocks and transitional
dynamics; for example, the distribution of matches over productivity influences the efficient
level of labour market tightness. In the presence of aggregate shocks, this distribution will
depend on the past history of shocks, because the thresholds for destruction and OTJ search
become time-varying.
Appendices to Chapter 3
3.A Solution of social planner’s problem in the full model
The costates are denoted by U and Wi, respectively, which yields the Hamiltonian in the
current-value form:
H = ub + p
n
∑
i=1
xiwi − pcθ
(
u +
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
)
− ν
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
+U
[
λ
n
∑
i=1
dig (xi)
n
∑
j=1
wj − a (θ) u
]
+
+W1
[
λ
(
g (x1)
n
∑
j=1
wj − w1
)
+ a (θ)
(
u +
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
)]
+
+
n
∑
i=2
Wi
[
λ
(
(1− di) g (xi)
n
∑
j=1
wj − wi
)
− eia (θ)wi
]
. (3.75)
By differentiating with respect to θ, the analogous first-order condition to equation (3.3b)
is obtained:
a′ (θ)
[
u (W1 −U) +
n
∑
i=1
eiwi (W1 −Wi)
]
= pc (u + e) , (3.76a)
(1− η)
[
u
u + e
(W1 −U) +
n
∑
i=1
eiwi
u + e
(W1 −Wi)
]
=
pc
q (θ)
, (3.76b)
where e ≡ ∑ni=1 eiwi denotes the mass of OTJ seekers. Again, the marginal cost of increasing
θ must equal the marginal benefit from matching more unemployed and employed workers,
where the weighted average is now over all job seekers.
Maximisation with respect to ei gives the condition for OTJ search
a (θ) (W1 −Wi) ≥ pcθ + ν. (3.77)
OTJ search takes place at productivity xi, if the expected gain from improving the productivity
outweighs the cost of opening additional vacancies and of the OTJ search cost.
A match is destroyed, if the value of an unemployed agent becomes larger than the value
of keeping the job:
U ≥Wi. (3.78)
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The differential equations for the costates become:
U˙ = rU − [b− pcθ + a (θ) (W1 −U)] , (3.79a)
W˙1 = rW1 −
[
p + λ
(
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) [
djU +
(
1− dj
)
Wj
]−W1
)]
, (3.79b)
W˙i = rWi − [pxi + ei [a (θ) (W1 −Wi)− pcθ − ν]]
−λ
(
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) [
djU +
(
1− dj
)
Wj
]−Wi
)
, (3.79c)
and in a steady state the analogous equations to (3.5a), (3.5b), and (3.5c) are obtained:
rU = b− pcθ + a (θ) (W1 −U) , (3.80a)
rW1 = p + λ
(
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) [
djU +
(
1− dj
)
Wj
]−W1
)
, (3.80b)
rWi = pxi + ei [a (θ) (W1 −Wi)− pcθ − ν]
+λ
(
n
∑
j=1
g
(
xj
) [
djU +
(
1− dj
)
Wj
]−Wi
)
. (3.80c)
Subtracting the equations from each other, one can obtain an expression for the respective
surplus:
(r + eia (θ) + δ) (Wi −U) = pxi − eiν− b− (1− ei) (a (θ) (W1 −U)− pcθ)
+λ
n
∑
j=1
(
1− dj
)
g
(
xj
) (
Wj −Wi
)
, (3.81a)
(r + eia (θ) + λ) (W1 −Wi) = p (1− xi) + ei (pcθ + ν) , (3.81b)
(r + a (θ) + δ) (W1 −U) = p− b + pcθ + λ
n
∑
j=1
(
1− dj
)
g
(
xj
) (
Wj −W1
)
, (3.81c)
where δ ≡ λ∑ni=1 dig (xi) denotes the (endogenous) rate of job destruction. The second set of
equations could be substituted into the last to obtain W1 −U depending only on the control
variables.
Substituting equation (3.81b) into the OTJ search condition (3.77) yields
a (θ)
p (1− xi)
r + λ
≥ pcθ + ν, (3.82)
which is monotonous in xi. Hence, for each θ there exists a threshold S¯ (θ), such that there is
OTJ search if x ≤ S¯ (θ):
S¯ (θ) = 1− (pcθ + ν) (r + λ)
a (θ) p
. (3.83)
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3.B Derivation of jointly optimal OTJ search decison with (par-
tial) commitment
Under partial commitment, the joint value of a match is given by
(r + λ+ω) (Wi (w¯i) + Ji (w¯i)) = ei [a (θ) (W1 −Wi (w¯i)− Ji (w¯i))− ν] + cWi + cJi , (3.84)
where
cWi + c
J
i = −p (1− xi) + (r + λ) (W1 + J1) +ω (Wi + Ji) . (3.85)
It is piecewise constant and has a jump discontinuity at w¯NSi : when the worker does not want
to search, the joint surplus is
SNSi =
−p (1− xi) + (r + λ) S1 +ωSi
r + λ+ω
, (3.86)
and when the worker wants to search it is
SSi =
−p (1− xi) + (r + λ) S1 +ωSi + a (θ) (W1 −U)− ν
r + λ+ω+ a (θ)
. (3.87)
The ranking of the two determines whether it is jointly optimal for the firm and the worker to
perform OTJ search. They should jointly agree on OTJ search if
a (θ) (W1 −Wi (w¯i)− Ji (w¯i)) ≥ ν (3.88)
holds.
3.C Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Consider the following strategies: when they get the chance, the worker proposes xW
and the firm proposes xF. The worker accepts any proposal x ≥ xF and the firm accepts if
J (x) ≥ J (xW). I want to find xW and xF, such that these strategies constitute a subgame
perfect equilibrium. The firm must be indifferent between accepting or not. This condition
arises, because if the firm was strictly better off from accepting, the worker could marginally
raise her share. This would make the worker better off and the firm at most only marginally
worse off. In contrast, it can be the case that the worker is strictly better off from accepting
the firm’s offer. This difference is caused by the non-convexity: if xW is lager than xNS − T,
it is best for the firm to offer at least xNS and thereby prevent the worker from OTJ search.
Therefore, the firm will not propose xF ∈ (xNS − T, xNS). This yields the conditions
J
(
xW
)
= δ
[
βJ
(
xW
)
+ (1− β) J
(
xF
)]
, (3.89a)
xF ≥ δ
[
βxW + (1− β) xF
]
. (3.89b)
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being equivalent to
(1− δβ) J
(
xW
)
= δ (1− β) J
(
xF
)
, (3.90a)
xF ≥ δβx
W
1− δ (1− β) . (3.90b)
The inequality can only be strict if xF = xNS.
First, I discuss the case of equality; it immediately follows that xW > xF holds as there is an
advantage of being allowed to make an offer. Furthermore, both offers must lie on the same
side of the discontinuity at xNS, if δ is sufficiently large: if the worker’s offer involved no OTJ
search but the firm’s offer did, they cannot both be indifferent between accepting or not as the
(discounted) surplus is bigger when the worker makes the offer. Substituting xF into the firm’s
payoff function yields
(1− δ)
(
S− I
(
xW < xNS
)
T
)
− (1− δβ) xW = − δ (1− β) δβ
1− δ (1− β) x
W . (3.91)
Rearranging it, gives the worker’s surplus proposed by a worker and consequently by a firm:
xW = [1− δ (1− β)]
(
S− I
(
xW < xNS
)
T
)
, (3.92a)
xF = δβ
(
S− I
(
xW < xNS
)
T
)
. (3.92b)
As δ→ 1, the worker’s surplus converges to
x =
{
βS if β ≥ xNSS
β (S− T) if β < xNS−TS−T
.. (3.93)
The bargained share is such that xF indeed lies outside the interval
(
xNS − T, xNS) for δ suffi-
ciently large. This makes both strategies a best response and a subgame perfect equilibrium is
found.
Second, I discuss the alternative where xF = xNS holds, so that the firm just induces the
worker not to perform OTJ search. As the firm must be indifferent between accepting or not,
the worker’s offer cannot be smaller than xNS as well. Using condition (3.90a) for the firm’s
indifference, yields the worker’s offer
xW =
(1− δ) S + δ (1− β) xNS
1− δβ . (3.94)
As δ→ 1, the worker’s surplus converges to x = xNS, which is the claimed surplus in equilib-
rium for β ≤ xNSS . For it to be a best response by the worker xNS = xF ≥ δβx
W
1−δ(1−β) has to hold.
This gives the condition
xNS ≥ δβ
1− δ (1− β)
(1− δ) S + δ (1− β) xNS
1− δβ , (3.95)
which is equivalent to
β ≤ x
NS
δS
. (3.96)
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Therefore, x = xNS can indeed be obtained as δ approaches 1 for all β ≤ xNSS .
3.D Derivation of equilibrium with (partial) commitment
Workers in matches with high productivity do not perform OTJ search and the surplus is
divided by Nash bargaining. The range of such productivities can be determined using equa-
tions (3.86) and (3.39) when ei = 0 as well as that the Nash sharing rule holds for the maximum
productivity:
βSNSi ≥ W1 −U −
ν
a (θ)
, (3.97a)
β
p (1− xi)
r + λ
≤ ν
a (θ)
. (3.97b)
This is the same condition as condition (3.43) in the case of no commitment that defined the
lower bound S0 (θ) = 1− r+λa(θ)βpν for the range of productivities not featuring OTJ search in
equilibrium.
If productivity is below this threshold, there is still no OTJ search but the wage is not
determined by Nash bargaining but using the bargaining process for non-convex sets. The
worker’s value is then at the corner solution Wi = W1− νa(θ) as long as a (θ) (W1 −Wi − Ji) ≤ ν
holds, which yields the condition
a (θ) (S1 − Si − J1) ≤ ν, (3.98a)
a (θ)
p (1− xi)
r + λ
≤ ν+ pcθ. (3.98b)
This determines the OTJ search threshold S (θ) = 1 − r+λa(θ)p (ν+ pcθ), which is indeed the
threshold obtained in the case of a social planner in equation (3.26).
Below this threshold, OTJ search will take place until the productivity becomes too small
and the job is destroyed. The job is destroyed if w¯Ri > c
J
i , which using equations (3.85) and
(3.61) yields
(r + λ+ω)U − ei [a (θ) (W1 −U)− ν] > cWi + cJi , (3.99a)
−eia (θ)
[
S1 − pcθ + νa (θ)
]
> −p (1− xi) + (r + λ) S1 +ωSi. (3.99b)
In an equilibrium with at least some OTJ search, ei = 1 and SR = 0 hold, which yields the
condition
p (1− xi) + pcθ + ν > (r + λ+ a (θ)) pc(1− β) q (θ) , (3.100)
and hence the reservation productivity
R (θ) = 1− r + λ
1− β
c
q (θ)
−
(
β
1− β cθ −
ν
p
)
. (3.101)
It is exactly the threshold obtained in equation (3.51) in the case without commitment. It is not
surprising that it does not depend on the level of commitment in equilibrium as the firm and
the worker jointly decide to destroy the job, which only happens if the surplus is negative.
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Using equations (3.86) and (3.87) as well as the zero-profit condition one obtains the sur-
plus with and without OTJ search in equilibrium:
SSi =
pc
(1− β) q (θ) −
p (1− xi) + pcθ + ν
r + λ+ a (θ)
, (3.102)
SNSi =
pc
(1− β) q (θ) −
p (1− xi)
r + λ
. (3.103)
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